Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (135 page)

On the following day a break between the two countries was approved at the imperial council.
⁵⁵
On February 5 the Japanese imperial government, through its minister in St. Petersburg, informed the Russian foreign minister that the Japanese government had decided to terminate negotiations and take such action as it deemed necessary to preserve the freedom and territorial integrity of Korea. On the same day the emperor issued a rescript to the army and navy informing them that Japan’s relations with Russia had been broken, despite all the Japanese efforts to maintain peace.

A poem written by the emperor at this time seems to suggest (though very indirectly) his anxiety:

Chapter 54

The Russo-Japanese War opened without a prior declaration of war by either side. The Japanese navy, determined to wait until the cruisers
Kasuga
and
Nisshin
(recently purchased from Italy) were available for action against the Russian fleet,
¹
repeatedly vetoed plans to open hostilities, much to the army’s annoyance. Only when the cruisers had safely reached Singapore, the bastion of Japan’s ally, did the naval authorities agree to fire the first shots. They realized that it was essential to strike before a powerful Russian fleet, then on its way, arrived in Far Eastern waters.

Before making the decision to fight the Russians, the Japanese had waited in vain for a Russian reply to their proposals. Indeed, the immediate cause of the outbreak of war seems to have been the wounds to Japanese pride. During the past year, the Japanese had again and again been kept waiting by the Russians, who seemed indifferent to the effect that their dilatory behavior might have on Japan. This attitude was an intolerable affront to members of the Japanese government, even those well aware of Russia’s military strength. The Japanese might have acted even more quickly if they had known with what pejorative language they and their country were scorned by the czar and his cronies.

Regardless of what the two governments might do, people at the time seemed convinced that war between Japan and Russia was inevitable. The poet Ishikawa Takuboku wrote in his diary on January 13:

The storm winds of East Asia have grown tempestuous. Preparations are under way for the military to move out, and there is a report that a declaration of war is being drafted. Of late people have been in high spirits. There is no avoiding a war now. Since it can’t be avoided, I think it the sooner it starts the better, and I look forward to the valiant deeds of a great people.
²

At our distance from the events, this war may not seem quite so inevitable. It is hard to take seriously, in view of subsequent developments, the ostensible cause of the war: Japan’s determination to preserve Korean independence. The Japanese themselves destroyed Korean independence in the year the Russo-Japanese War ended, forcing the Korean emperor to sign a treaty that made Korea a protectorate of Japan. Five years later, Japan annexed Korea. Korean independence was clearly no more than a pretext. Ian Nish wrote,

In its origins the Russo-Japanese War stands in interesting contrast to other wars. It was not the result of economic pressures, for example the scarcity of resources for the number of people. Certainly Japan was the initiator: she also suffered from a shortage of raw materials and a rapidly growing population. But Korea was not sought for her raw materials or as a place to locate surplus population. Nor was Manchuria at this stage a place for great overseas settlement by Japanese or indeed of great commercial activity…. Nor can one say that Japan was in a state of social disintegration and was seeking war as a way of diverting attention from domestic problems. There was not in 1904 an appeal to xenophobia or nationalism or war-lust on the part of the Japanese people in order to deflect them from thoughts of poverty, revolution or political discontent. The decision for war in both countries was taken on a narrow basis and probably owed most to strategic considerations.
³

The chief strategic consideration was, of course, which country would dominate in Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese were determined not to yield; perhaps their victory in the Sino-Japanese War had given them confidence that they were a match for any country, no matter how big or militarily strong. They informed the Russians on February 6, 1904, that they were terminating negotiations and that they intended henceforth to take such independent action as they deemed appropriate. They may have supposed that this statement was tantamount to a declaration of war,
⁴
but the sudden commencement of hostilities against Russian ships at Port Arthur and Inch’on was denounced by the Russians as a shameful violation of international law.
⁵

The Japanese naturally defended their action, and they were not without support from other countries. Maurice Paléologue of the French Foreign Ministry wrote, “In thus commencing hostilities without a declaration of war, the Japanese are repeating against their enemy the mean tactics which the Russians themselves employed against the Turks on November 30th, 1853, when they surprised and destroyed the Ottoman Black Sea squadron, at anchor off Sinope.”
⁶

E. J. Dillon, known as “the greatest foreign authority on things Russian,”
⁷
wrote in 1918,

The Japanese were accused of hitting below the belt when they fell foul of the Russian squadron unexpectedly, and the charge is still believed by many. I feel bound to state that having followed the ups and downs of the crisis as closely as my sources of information would permit, I formed the conviction that from beginning to end in war, as in peace, the Mikado’s government displayed chivalrous loyalty and moderation. The notion that the Russians would have behaved differently from their enemies in dealing the first blow so unexpectedly is, I fear, erroneous. There is extant a telegram [dated February 8] from the Tsar to his viceroy containing this significant injunction: “If on the west of Korea the (Japanese) fleet should sail northward past the 38th parallel, it is open to you to attack them without waiting for the first shot from their side. I rely on you. May God aid you.”
⁸

The telegram indicated that the Russians would not have hesitated to attack, even without a declaration of war, but the Japanese beat them to the punch. On February 6 the Japanese cabled their minister to Russia to return to Japan, and on the same day the Russian minister to Japan, Baron Roman Rosen, was summoned to the residence of Foreign Minister Komura Jutar
ō
and informed that Japan was severing diplomatic relations with Russia. On returning to the Russian legation, Rosen learned from the Russian naval attaché

that at 6
A.M.
that morning the Japanese fleet had weighed anchor for an unknown destination, divided in two squadrons, one of which was convoying transports having on board two divisions of troops, evidently destined to be landed on the Korean coast, probably at some point on the west coast of the peninsula. The other squadron was no less evidently destined to attack our fleet, which was at anchor in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, a fact which was known to the Japanese.
⁹

Rosen’s information was correct, but he was powerless to warn the Russian government, as the Japanese government had suspended the sending of telegrams to foreign countries in order to preserve secrecy. While Rosen and his family were waiting for a ship to take them from Japan,

a touching incident took place. My wife was alone in her drawing-room when the arrival of the Grand Mistress of the Empress’s household was announced. She said that she had been commissioned by the Empress to express Her Majesty’s profound sorrow at seeing us depart under such painful circumstances, and that she begged my wife to accept from her a small souvenir in remembrance of our sojourn in Japan. This souvenir consisted of two small flower vases in silver, adorned with the Imperial Arms.

Baroness Rosen, though somewhat embarrassed to receive a gift from the empress now that their two countries were at war, accepted it in the spirit with which it was offered and asked to have her thanks conveyed.
¹⁰
Old-fashioned courtesy lingered on, in a manner hard to imagine today.

On February 8 an expeditionary force, escorted by ships under the command of Rear Admiral Ury
ū
Sotokichi, landed at Inch’on. With little opposition, the troops took Seoul and moved northward toward the Yalu River. At the time two Russian warships and a merchantman were in the harbor. Admiral Ury
ū
ordered the Russian ships to leave the harbor by noon on the following day. If they failed to comply, he would sink them inside the harbor. At ten minutes after twelve the next day, the two warships steamed out of the harbor. Baron Rosen heard that

the
Variag
, followed by the gunboat
Koreetz
, having accepted the Japanese admiral’s challenge, slowly steamed, colours flying, officers and men on parade, past the foreign men-of-war anchored in the roads, saluted by our national anthem, heroically going to meet certain destruction at the hands of an enemy who had spread the numerous and powerful vessels of his squadron in a wide semicircle, rendering escape a matter of utter impossibility.
¹¹

Japanese accounts relate more prosaically that when the
Variag
emerged from the harbor, the
Asama
opened fire. After about an hour of gunfire exchanges, a fire broke out on the
Variag
, which fled back into the harbor. The ship later blew up and sank. That night, the
Koreetz
, engulfed in flames, also sank, and the merchant ship was scuttled by the crew. The Japanese fleet suffered no damage in this first victory.
¹²

The main body of the Japanese Combined Fleet sailed from Sasebo on February 6. Two days later, destroyer units at Port Arthur staged night attacks against Russian ships, damaging two battleships and a cruiser. Admiral T
ō
g
ō
Heihachir
ō
, the commanding officer of the Combined Fleet, ordered the fifteen ships in his command to advance into the harbor at Port Arthur. At 11:30 the next morning, he raised signal flags with the famous message: “Victory or defeat will be determined by this battle. All hands, do your utmost.”

At the outbreak of war the naval strength of Russia in the Far East consisted of six first-class battleships and one second-class battleship, nine first-class and two second-class cruisers, as well as smaller craft. All the battleships and second-class cruisers and four of the first-class cruisers were at Port Arthur, while four of the latter were at Vladivostok and one at Inch’on.
¹³
During the next few weeks, most of this Russian fleet was severely damaged, and the Japanese gained control of the sea, enabling them to blockade Port Arthur and to land forces in Manchuria. The psychological importance to the Japanese of these early victories was, of course, enormous. On reading the somewhat exaggerated newspaper account of the success of the attack on Port Arthur and the battle off the Korean coast, Takuboku exclaimed, “Overcome by joy, I went about three to school, a newspaper under my arm, and discussed the war with the people there.”
¹⁴

The Russian declaration of war in the name of the czar was promulgated on February 9. The Japanese declaration was issued on the following day, in the names of the emperor and members of the cabinet.
¹⁵
By this time Japanese excitement over the forthcoming war had reached fever pitch, as we can gather from this entry for February 7 in Takuboku’s diary:

Today’s newspaper reports that the situation between Japan and Russia has suddenly become critical. I hear that reserves in the village are being called up. The gauntlet has been thrown. A Heaven-sent chance has come. A marvelous thing.
¹⁶

The ensuing Japanese victories at sea and on land are too well known to be recounted in detail again here. They attracted worldwide attention. Naturally, the Japanese were overjoyed, at least until reports came of the heavy casualties. The Koreans, whose land was once again the site of warfare, were less enthusiastic, but they had little choice but to acquiesce in the Japanese occupation. Japan proposed that China remain neutral, explaining that (however welcome China’s natural resources and limitless manpower would be) no additional strain should be placed on the exhausted Chinese finances. They also feared that Chinese involvement in the war might cause a recrudescence of the anti-foreign violence of the Boxer Rebellion. The Japanese promised to respect China’s neutrality, provided the Russians did the same.
¹⁷