Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (136 page)

England, as the ally of Japan, was bound by the treaty of alliance to fight by Japan’s side if a third country joined Russia. Because no other country joined Russia, England did not participate militarily in the war, but great enthusiasm was manifested for the Japanese cause. The most extreme example is found in
A Russo-Japanese War Poem
by Jane H. Oakley, a poem about 250 pages long in 84 cantos. This little-known example of doggerel is in rhymed iambic pentameter. Almost any section is equally ludicrous; the following, from an early canto, describes why the Japanese were successful and the Russians defeated at the naval engagement off Inch’on:

The Russian sailors were for prowess famed,

And hardihood, in sailing ships of yore;

Mechanic skill they seemed inapt to grasp;

The Japanese excel in science more.

Japan’s Mikado, “Mutsu Hito” named,

Belongs to oldest dynasty of Kings

Throughout the world; the Founder’s reign

To times of “Bel” the Babylonian, brings.
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The British not only were allies of Japan but from long before had been anti-Russian. The revelation of Russian indifference to the loss of human life during an incident that took place on the night of October 21, 1904, intensified this dislike into such hatred that many favored an immediate declaration of war against Russia. On that night the Second Squadron of the Russian Pacific Fleet, comprising thirty-five ships, was crossing the North Sea when it encountered a fleet of English trawlers on the Dogger Bank. They took these harmless vessels for Japanese destroyers, not considering how unlikely it was that Japanese ships would be operating in the North Sea, and opened fire. One trawler sank, and several others were damaged. Maurice Paléologue commented, “That a fleet of warships, traversing at night a fishing bank well known to all sailors, should mistake a fleet of trawlers for an ambush of enemy destroyers, particularly as these trawlers were carrying the regulation lights—has positively dumbfounded the British public.” The last straw was the decision of the Russian admiral, after realizing his mistake, to continue on his way without stopping to pick up the unfortunate fishermen.
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English public opinion was unanimous in demanding reparation from the Russian government. The French foreign minister told Paléologue, “It would not surprise me if war broke out at any moment.” But he thought that public opinion in Russia probably had been equally aroused because Russia regarded England as the traditional enemy, an enemy hated far more than the Japanese. The incident was finally settled with help from the French, and the Russian squadron continued on its way toward its fatal rendezvous with the Japanese fleet off Tsushima.

Baron Rosen was disappointed by public opinion in other countries. He said it “was everywhere arraigned against us, even in America, where we would least have expected it. To some extent this was probably due to the apparently glaring disproportion of the combatants, which naturally, as a purely sporting proposition, enlisted the sympathies of neutral onlookers on what had seemed to be the weaker side.”
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Rosen’s surprise that the United States favored Japan was probably based on his assumption that the problem of Japanese immigration to California would predispose the Americans in favor of Russia. But President Theodore Roosevelt detested the Russians, as he revealed in a letter of August 1905: “No human beings, black, yellow, or white could be quite as untruthful, as insincere, as arrogant—in short, as untrustworthy in every way—as the Russians under the present system.” Occasionally he also criticized Japan (in much milder terms), but on the whole he remained pro-Japanese both because he hated the Russian government and its “preposterous little Czar”
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and because, as an ardent advocate of physical fitness, he was impressed by the samurai tradition as described in
Bushid
ō
by Nitobe Inaz
ō
, one of his favorite books.
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Americans who wrote about the war were usually pro-Japanese. Dr. Sidney Gulick, a Christian minister, wrote
The White Peril in the Far East
in answer to Kaiser Wilhelm’s denunciation of the Yellow Peril. Gulick was able to justify all of Japan’s actions, even the prohibition on Christianity during the Tokugawa period and the xenophobia of the late Tokugawa era. He blamed
sakoku
(the closure of the country) on the Japanese discovery of the White Peril and concluded: “No nation has on the whole left a more honourable record in regard to its attitude toward foreigners than has Japan.”
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The generous treatment of Russian prisoners of war by the Japanese illustrated Gulick’s contention that the Japanese had fully absorbed the occidental code of behavior. Wounded Russian sailors from the
Variag
who were brought to Matsuyama were treated as “guests.” They were supplied with ample quarters, a special surgeon, an interpreter, a pharmacist, and eleven nurses. Beds of foreign style were supplied, as well as blankets, sheets, pillows, and pillowcases. Foreign foods were also prepared for them. Fresh-cut flowers were provided for their rooms every few days. As the “guests” recovered, they were given much freedom. Gulick speculated, “I doubt if these men had ever had such a delightful time in their lives before.”
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In contrast, he noted, “Profound resentment and anger have been roused in Japan by Russian treatment of her interests and rights in the Far East, by the methods of her diplomacy and by her cruelty to Japanese women, scouts and wounded soldiers.” After enumerating all the wrongs Japan had suffered on account of Russia, he added, “The white peril as embodied in Russia assumes its worst form for it adds hypocrisy to aggressive greed and cloaks its crimes with the very religion which condemns them.” His conclusion was: “The white race must abandon its cherished conviction of essential racial superiority and of its inherent right to dominate the earth, and to subordinate all coloured races to its own economic interests. So long as this conviction is held as an ideal, so long is the white race to continue a peril to the peace and welfare of the earth.”
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James Price, a former member of the British cabinet who met Kaneko Kentar
ō
in Washington in October 1904, told him, “Since coming to America I have traveled to every part of the country and met with people of every walk of life, and have been astonished by the great sympathy felt for your country. They support your country with an enthusiasm that one does not easily see even in my country, England, which is an ally of yours, and the antipathy they have for Russia was truly quite unexpected.” Among the reasons he cited for the pro-Japanese and anti-Russian sentiments were the warm relations created by Japanese who, ever since the Restoration, had studied in the United States.
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The Japanese government was eager to maintain goodwill abroad. It sent Suematsu Kench
ō
, a Cambridge graduate, to England and Kaneko Kentar
ō
, a Harvard graduate, to the United States.
²⁷
Kaneko not only was remarkably effective in his dealings with President Roosevelt but became his trusted friend. His first meeting with the president at the White House took place on March 26, 1904. Although thirty or more persons were waiting, as soon as the president saw Kaneko’s card, he came out and, after shaking his hand, ushered him into his office. He told Kaneko that he had been eagerly awaiting his visit and had wondered why Kaneko had not appeared earlier.
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On March 20, 1905, shortly after the Japanese army won a great victory at the battle for Mukden, Roosevelt sent Kaneko a telegram inviting him to have lunch at the White House. Kaneko was met by the president, whose face shone with joy over the unprecedented victory. Roosevelt was about to leave for Colorado to hunt bears and would be away for six weeks. Normally the president would not divulge where he planned to travel, but he told Kaneko that if for some reason he wished to discuss the war situation, he would return to Washington immediately.
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Recalling that the bear was a symbol for Russia, Kaneko said to the president, “The Russian fleet is about to enter the Pacific, and there is certain to be a great naval battle with our fleet in the near future. If you should kill a bear, this will be an augury of victory for the Japanese fleet. I pray that you will have great success.” To this Roosevelt said merely, “I fully intend to.” After the conclusion of the peace treaty, when Kaneko was about to return to Japan, the president gave him the skin of a bear he had shot, together with a note in his own hand, and asked him to present it personally to the emperor.

Although official relations between Japan and the United States were extremely friendly, the novelist Arishima Takeo detected anti-Japanese feelings in Europe. He wrote, “With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the fact that it was a conflict between a Christian and a non-Christian nation suddenly became a matter of importance. Granted that it was inevitable that Russia, having become the enemy of Japan, should have felt animosity toward Japan, it is obviously also true that the peoples of the countries of Europe as a whole felt jealous of Japanese successes because the Japanese belonged to a different race and religion.”
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The French, the allies of the Russians, were in the most difficult position. Few in the government wanted to get involved in the war. When French officials learned of the plan to send the Baltic Fleet to Japan, they urged the Russians to have the fleet make the voyage by way of Cape Horn, at the southern tip of South America. This route, though the longest, had the advantage of avoiding British possessions, whose inhabitants would no doubt inform the Japanese of Russian fleet movements they observed. An even more important consideration to the French was that this route also avoided French possessions, sparing the French the obligation to assist the Russian fleet.

The French believed that Russia was likely to be defeated in the war. A French general who had served as an observer with the Russian army in Manchuria, concluded that the Japanese would win and urged Russia to make peace as soon as possible, on any terms it could secure, because the Russian position could grow only worse. The French ambassador to Russia, who arrived in Paris from St. Petersburg at the beginning of November, reported, “The war in the Far East … is getting more and more unpopular with the masses in Russia; they regard it as an enterprise promoted by private interests, a vast filibustering expedition engineered by the Court. In many villages the departure of reservists has been accompanied by riots. One of the most common phrases to which public discontent has given currency is: Our masters have declared an unjust war. Is it surprising that God does not bless our arms?”
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In St. Petersburg and Moscow, students were reportedly organizing seditious meetings at which the “Marseillaise” was sung. High-ranking Russians in Paris assured Paléologue that “Russia must fight on, cost what it may, until dirty little Japan begs for mercy, even if the war lasts two more years.” But other Russians stated that not a week passed without a mutiny in the barracks or riots along the line when reservists leave for the front.
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The Russian admiral chose for his fleet a route along the west coast of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope, expecting to obtain help from the French whenever the fleet passed their colonies. The French, not wishing their cooperation to be known to the Japanese, urged the Russian admiral to put in at deserted places, but he insisted on anchoring at the chief ports. After rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the Russian fleet asked permission to remain for an extended period in Madagascar. Delcassé refused for fear of Japanese retaliation, but this did not prevent the Russians from sojourning there.

On January 2, 1905, Port Arthur, the “Gibraltar of the Far East, the great fortress which, symbolizing Russian determination in the China Seas, crowns the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula” surrendered to the Japanese. A Russian destroyer that had succeeded in escaping from Port Arthur brought the following telegram from General Anatolii Mikhailovich Stoessel to Czar Nicholas:

The Japanese are in possession of all our lines. We cannot hold out much longer; we shall have to surrender. Great Sovereign, forgive us; we have done everything possible. Be merciful in your judgment upon us. The constant struggle for eleven months has worn down our strength. Three-quarters of the garrison are in the hospitals or the cemeteries. The last quarter is holding no less than 27 versts and cannot take turns even to snatch a short rest. The men are shadows.

Although he was harshly criticized by many Russians for surrendering while the fortress still had ample supplies, General Stoessel received a most courteous message from General Yamagata Aritomo: “His Majesty the Mikado is graciously pleased to advise me that, in view of your gallant conduct, He desires that you shall be granted military honours. His Majesty has therefore commanded that your officers should retain their swords.”
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The fall of Port Arthur had immediate repercussions in Russia. On January 19 an attempt was made on the life of the czar, and on January 21 no fewer than 140,000 workers paraded the streets of St. Petersburg in a general strike. Discontent with the war rose as each Japanese military success in Manchuria was reported. Paléologue heard that “the government and people of Russia are still pinning their last hopes to the
Invincible Armada
, which is still at Madagascar.” However, for all the fleet’s repute, the French naval attaché in St. Petersburg declared, “The naval and military value of the 2nd Squadron is less than mediocre. It is not a homogeneous, cohesive organism but a motley collection, a hodge-podge of ships of all ages and types…. The efficiency of the crews is no higher than that of the fleet. There are few experienced officers; the engineering staff is of poor quality; there are no petty officers and most of the sailors have had no military training nor ever been to sea.”
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