The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks (30 page)

At least some of the attackers wore Saudi Arabian National Guard uniforms and drove vehicles commonly used by residents and guards. When the sentries requested ID, the terrorists opened fire.

Ali al-Khudair and two other new-generation radicals called on Saudis not to cooperate in the investigation. They were rebuffed and forced to retract their statements.

President Bush vowed “American justice” would be given the terrorists.

The Saudis said the 50- to 60-member al Qaeda cell that attacked on May 6, 2003, was responsible. It was led by Khaled Jehani, 29, who had left the country at age 18, and fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. He served in Afghan camps.

The bombings came hours before U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell was due to arrive in Riyadh.

Only three dead terrorists were positively identified via DNA. Possibly among the dead was Abdul Kareem Yazijy, 35, who was suspected of membership in the terrorist cell. His younger brother, Abdullah, called on him to turn himself in and noted that he had disappeared 18 months earlier. He had a long history of “emotional instability,” according to Abdullah. His brother went to Afghanistan for a few months in 1990 and later worked for two years in Sarajevo for the Saudi charity Supreme Committee for the Collection of Donations for Bosnia–Herzegovnia, which was raided in 2002 for al Qaeda ties.

Saudi officials said three al Qaeda cells with 50 active members were operating in the country before the bombings. The cells were set up by Abd-al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the former head of operations for al Qaeda in the Persian Gulf. He was captured in November 2002 and is in U.S. custody. He was involved in the USS
Cole
attack in October 2000 and planned other attacks on U.S. and Western ships. He was succeeded by Khaled Jehani, 29, a Saudi Afghan war veteran, who was in charge of planning the attack. The bombing team leader was Turki Mishal Dandani, another Saudi Afghan veteran who remained at large.

Saudi officials suggested that all of the dead terrorists came from the list of 19 who were sought in the May 6, 2003 case.

On May 14, 2003, the Saudis said they were holding a suspect who turned himself in to authorities the day of the bombings.

On May 18, 2003, Saudi interior minister Prince Nayef said that four al Qaeda suspects detained in the last three days knew in advance of the attacks.

On May 24, 2003, the Bush administration suspended contacts with Iran over reports that an al Qaeda cell in Iran was involved in the bombings. Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian serving as the group's military commander, was believed to have given the order to attack. He was believed hiding in Iran along with Abu Mohammed Masri, the group's training chief; Saad bin Laden, Osama's son; and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had been in Baghdad. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told
IRNA
that Tehran had arrested several al Qaeda members, “but we don't know who these people are to be able to say whether they are senior or not. They need to be identified and interrogated.” Iran claimed it had deported 500 al Qaeda members in the past year. Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud said the kingdom will seek to extradite anyone who had a role in the bombings.

A second command group was believed to be on the Pakistan–Afghan border.

Saudi oil and security analyst Nawaf Obaid wrote in the May 18, 2003,
Washington Post
that a captured senior member of the cell said they rushed the attack because the May 6, 2003, group feared it was about to be picked up by the authorities. He noted that two leaders of the cell and most of the explosives had come through Yemen.

On May 20, 2003, Saudi officials said that some al Qaeda members fled the country to the United States before the attacks.

Saudi officials arrested Ali Abdulrahman Gamdi, 29, a key figure in the bombings in Riyadh, on May 27, 2003. The Saudi had attended al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and was in contact with bin Laden at Tora Bora. He was picked up with two other Saudis after they left an Internet cafe; authorities said the trio were planning an attack on a major hotel and commercial center in Riyadh. Authorities confiscated the computers they were using. Ali Aburahman Gamdi was the first of the 19 people Saudi officials said were involved in the bombing. As of that date, Saudi officials had arrested 44 people, including 4 women picked up in Mecca.

Saudi authorities announced on May 28, 2003, that they had captured nine al Qaeda suspects in Medina during the previous 24 hours, along with Ali Khudair and Ahmed Khalidi, two clerics who had called on their followers not to cooperate with the investigation. The London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia said that the two clerics were shot dead in Medina. A third cleric, Nasser Fahd, remained at large. Those detained
included two Moroccans and a Moroccan woman stopped at a checkpoint. Saudi Special Forces also surrounded two groups of seven extremists in Medina. Police found explosives and bomb-making equipment at one of the Medina buildings.

In a gun battle on May 31, 2003, Saudi authorities killed Youssef Saleh Eiery, a Saudi national who belonged to the 19-member gang and arrested another after the duo threw hand grenades at a police patrol, killing two policemen.

The United States asked the Saudis to arrest Ahmed Abu-Ali in the case. His family's residence in Falls Church, Virginia, was searched by the FBI. He was represented by attorney Ashraf Nubani, who also represented some of the defendants in the June 25, 2003, arrests in northern Virginia against Lashkar-e-Taiba.

On July 3, 2003, following a five-hour standoff, Saudi police killed Turki Mishal Dandani and three associates when the terrorists ran out of ammunition in a shootout in a house in Suweir in the north.

On September 23, 2003, Saudi forces killed three terrorists, including Zubayr Rimi, a suspected al Qaeda militant believed involved in the attack, who was named in an FBI terror alert on September 5, 2003. The gun battle occurred at a housing complex in Jizan, near the Yemen border. One security officer died. Two suspects were arrested.

On January 8, 2004, 100 Swiss police officers raided homes throughout the country and arrested eight foreigners suspected of being al Qaeda supporters who aided the attacks. They questioned 20 other people in five states. The detainees were held on suspicion of providing logistical support to a criminal organization, but were not formally charged.

By April 2004, Saudi security forces had arrested more than 600 individuals on counterterrorism charges.

As of late 2013, the case remained open, with Abd-al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Guantanamo Bay military prison awaiting trial.

Overview:
The Philippines was the scene of various terrorist insurgencies for decades. The Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf, the Sparrow assassination teams of Communist Party of the Philippines radicals, and numerous other groups have operated, often with impunity, on the islands. Ramzi Yusuf's hopes to attack the Pope, fly planes into buildings, and other plots took shape in Manila. Bombings, targeted assassinations, kidnappings, and murders— including beheadings—became common in the 2000s. The Abu Sayyaf group's al Qaeda ties led to stepped-up bilateral efforts by the United States to improve Filipino security response capabilities. Abu Sayyaf's
bloodiest incident to date was its bombing of the Superferry, putting the death toll in the triple digits.

Incident:
On February 27, 2004, an explosion sank the Superferry 14, killing 118 people an hour after it left Manila, Philippines. In March 2004, Abu Sayyaf member Redendo Cain Dellosa confessed to hiding TNT in a TV set he carried onto the ferry before escaping. He later claimed he was tortured into signing the confession.

On October 11, 2004, authorities charged six men, two of whom were arrested shortly after the explosion, with setting off the bomb. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo said the six were also responsible for the 2001 kidnappings of 17 Filipinos and 3 Americans in Dos Palmas; one of the Americans was beheaded and another killed during a rescue attempt. Arroyo said the government was hunting for the attack organizers— Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sulaiman—and two accomplices. Police said Janjalani had demanded $1 million from the ferry company as protection money, which it said was “unhampered use” of the waters in the southern Philippines. Janjalani died in a September 2006 gun battle with Philippine security forces.

Overview:
Although Spain had a long history of attacks by Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Nation and Liberty separatists, terrorists from the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO)—the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain—and various right-wing groups, its most wrenching attack came at the hands of al Qaeda–inspired Islamic radicals who killed more than 200 and injured another 2,000 in a morning attack on commuter trains in Madrid. Ten million people marched in Madrid, Zaragoza, Valencia, Bilbao, and elsewhere in protest of the terrorist attacks. Public reaction to the attacks led to the March 14, 2003, electoral victory of the opposition Socialist Workers Party. Many voters said they had voted for the opposition because of the discovery that al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings and that most of the electorate was against Spanish involvement in Iraq. This appears to have been the first time a terrorist group had directly influenced the outcome of an election. Prime Minister–elect Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero promised to withdraw Spain's 1,300 troops from Iraq but make terrorism the government's chief priority.

Incidents:
On March 11, 2004, between 7:35 and 7:55 a.m., 10 bombs hidden in backpacks exploded on four packed commuter trains in three Madrid train stations during rush hour, killing over 200 people and injuring
another 2,000. Victims included at least 47 people from 10 other countries, including Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines, and Romania.

Three bombs went off at 7:39
A.M
. on a train entering Atocha station. Another four blasts hit a train arriving from Alcala de Henares at Atocha at 7:44
A.M
. A bomb went off on a train entering Santa Eugenia station at 7:49
A.M
. Two bombs went off on the platform of the El Pozo station at 7:54
A.M
., killing 70 people on a double-decked train. Police detonated several unexploded devices. Police said there were 13 bombs, all containing 28–33 pounds of explosives. Police also destroyed a suspicious car near one of the stations.

The government initially blamed the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), but later changed its focus to al Qaeda affiliates.

A van discovered outside Madrid in Alcala de Henares later in the day contained seven detonator caps and a cassette with Koran verses.

A sports bag found in one of the trains at El Pozo station contained a timed detonator, a mobile phone, wires, and explosives that were commonly available. The explosives had not gone off because the terrorists had mistakenly set the timer to 7:40
P.M.
, instead of 7:40
A.M.

The al Qaeda–affiliated Abu Hafs al-Masri group claimed credit in an e-mail to the
al-Quds al-Arabi
newspaper, saying that Spain was a U.S. ally. Spain had been part of the coalition in Iraq. The group said, “Operation Death Trains . . . a way to settle old accounts with Spain, crusader and ally of America in its war against Islam.” The group warned that “the expected ‘Winds of Black Death' strike against America is now in its final stage.” However, the group had also claimed credit for the East Coast blackout of 2003. Osama bin Laden had warned in an October 2003 tape that al Qaeda would attack Spain. The group later sent a videotape, which some officials suggested was filmed in Brussels or Amsterdam. Police were also investigating the movement of a large amount of money to Morocco to finance Islamic extremist operations. In a message following the election, the group said it would suspend operations to permit Spain time to fulfill the new government's promise to pull troops out of Iraq.

In a video found in a trash can in a parking lot on March 13, 2004, Abu Dujan al-Afgani, who claimed to be head of al Qaeda's European military wing, said the bombings were to protest Spanish “collaboration with the criminal Bush and his allies. . . . If you do not stop your collaboration, more and more blood will flow.” Police later believed him to be Rachid Oulad Akcha, a Moroccan immigrant.

On March 13, 2004, the government announced the arrest of three Moroccans and two Indians, possibly with links to Muslim extremists. Two Spaniards of Indian descent were also being questioned. Several buildings and houses were searched. The group had been linked to the cell phone and cell phone card found in the gym bag. The Moroccans were identified as Jamal Zougam, who had been listed as an al Qaeda operative in a 9/11 indictment; Mohamed Bekkali; and Mohamed Chaoui.
They had criminal records in Spain. Zougam apparently had been under surveillance since the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca, Morocco. The investigating judge also questioned Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (alias Abu Dahdah), who had been in prison since November 2001 on suspicion of leading the al Qaeda cell in Spain. Zougam was an associate of Yarkas. The suspects purchased 100 prepaid calling cards for mobile phones 15 days before the attack. Zougam owned a cell phone shop in Madrid.

The government also announced that it had received a videotape from the self-described al Qaeda military spokesman in Europe, who said “We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks on New York and Washington.”

On March 31, 2004, the investigating judge issued international arrest warrants for five Moroccans and a Tunisian. A wealthy Moroccan, Abdelkarim Mejjati, was thought to be the organizer of the attacks. He was also wanted for the bombings in 2003 in Casablanca and Riyadh. Police were now investigating the involvement of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group in the attacks. The Tunisian was identified as Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader and coordinator of the plot. All were wanted for murder and belonging to a terrorist group. The warrant said Fahket had rented a house 25 miles southeast of Madrid, where the explosives were prepared.