Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
7. Bureau of Prisons “WOW’ed” by Level of Deprivation at CIA’s COBALT Detention Site
In December 2002, the CIA’s Renditions Group sent a team of recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in interrogations. The interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the plans also called for detainees’ clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45 degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the CIA described as “Medium Value.”
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Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT. Following the November ██, 2002, through November
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, 2002, visit,
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CIA officers in Country
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remarked that the Federal Bureau of Prisons assessments, along with recommendations and training, had “made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility are performed,” and made the detention site a “more secure and safer working environment for
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officers.”
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On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of
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security staff.
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During that meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and stated that there was “absolutely no talking inside the facility,” that the guards do not interact with the prisoners, and that “[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark.”
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According to a CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that “they were ‘WOW’ed’” at first by the facility, because:
“They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [
sic
]. They explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s].”
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By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility’s initial “baseline conditions” involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact on the interrogations. The team thus recommended that “experts and authorities other than the individuals who crafted the process” review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a legal review be conducted.
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CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these recommendations.
8. The Places CIA Detainees in Country ██ Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard for Detention
In the spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at facilities in Country ██ who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA officer
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[CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country
██
officers in an email, writing:
“
█████████████████████████████████████████████
. They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people discretely [
sic
]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is very useful for housing guys that shouldn’t be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention.”
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CIA cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four detainees to these Country ██ facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention under the MON.
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In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country ██. CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during the period of its operation between September 2002 and ████ 2004, while DETENTION SITE GRAY held eight detainees between ███████ 2003 and █████████ 2003. The CIA later established two other CIA facilities in Country ██: DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held 34 detainees between ████ 2004 and ██████ 2006; and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which held 12 detainees between ████ 2006 and 2008.
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9. DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel
In late January 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and confinement guidelines for the program.
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In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees were kept shackled in complete darkness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.
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The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country, Country ██.
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At that time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE BLUE—including the three purpose-built “holding units”—met “the minimum standards set by the CIA” in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee’s degree of cooperation with interrogators.
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The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing “significant improvements” such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a new facility was under construction in Country ██ to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, “will be a quantum leap forward” because “[it] will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilities.”
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DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened in
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2004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing, detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than toilet facilities.
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The DCI’s January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12 “enhanced techniques” that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including two—use of diapers for “prolonged periods” and the abdominal slap—that had not been evaluated by the OLC. The “enhanced techniques” were only to be employed by “approved interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee.” The guidelines also identified “standard techniques”—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud music, isolation, and the use of diapers “generally not to exceed 72 hours”—that required advance approval “whenever feasible,” and directed that their use be documented. The “standard techniques” were described as “techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure.” The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use of either the enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.
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Although the DCI interrogation guidelines were prepared as a reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether interrogation techniques such as the “rough take down,”
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the use of cold water showers,
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and prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of “standard techniques” “whenever feasible,” the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA’s “standard” interrogation techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not “feasible” to request advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water
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—without approval from CIA Headquarters if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not “feasible.” In practice, CIA personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior approval.
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The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first requirements related to recordkeeping, instructing that, for “each interrogation session in which an enhanced technique is employed,” the field prepare a “substantially contemporaneous record . . . setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable.”
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In practice, these guidelines were not followed.
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There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted, on December 3, 2002, CTC’s Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.
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Prior to that time, the interrogation program was “joined at the hip” with CTC’s ALEC Station, according to ████████ CTC Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the program informed the CIA OIG that she “was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for interrogation activities.”
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Even after the formal designation of the CIA’s Renditions Group,
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tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and DUNBAR’s continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated ███████ as the CIA’s chief interrogator.
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As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.
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The dispute extended to interrogation practices. The Renditions Group’s leadership considered the waterboard, which Chief of Interrogations
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was not certified to use, as “life threatening,” and complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a result, the Renditions Group was “running a ‘sissified’ interrogation program.”
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At the same time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group and
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for their use of painful stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
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There were also concerns about possible conflicts of interest related to the contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that “the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record,” and that “only a staff psychologist, not a contractor, could issue an assessment of record.”
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In June 2003, however, SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as well as to assess KSM’s “psychological stability” and “resistance posture.”
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As described later in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that “[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect.”
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OMS then informed the management of the Renditions Group that “no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR’s] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures.”
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At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by “an experienced interrogator known to him” who would assess how forthcoming he is and “remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating.”
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In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, ████████ OMS noted that “OMS concerns about conflict of interest . . . were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique—at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique.”
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