Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
The discovery, identification, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat, “the shoe bomber,” is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the discovery, identification, capture, and/or arrest of Sajid Badat as an example of how “[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations
after
applying interrogation techniques” had “enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots” and “capture additional terrorists.”
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In at least one CIA document prepared for the president, the CIA specifically highlighted the waterboard interrogation technique in enabling the CIA to learn “that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in 2001.”
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The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “otherwise unavailable” and “saved lives.”
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As an example, on October 26, 2007, the CIA faxed a document to the Senate Appropriations Committee appealing a proposed elimination of funding for the CIA’s Rendition and Detention Program. The CIA appeal states that “[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way.” Representing the success of the CIA interrogation program, the document states:
“Detainees have . . . permitted discovery of terrorist cells, key individuals and the interdiction of numerous plots, including . . . the
discovery
of an operative who was preparing another attack
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like that attempted by ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid.”
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Similarly, in early March 2005, the CIA compiled talking points on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques for use in a meeting with the National Security Council. The document states, “[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence.” The document states that
‘‘after
applying interrogation techniques,” the CIA “learned from KSM and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001.”
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A month later, on April 15, 2005, the CIA faxed an eight-page document to the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel entitled, “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” which contained similar information.
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The Office of Legal Counsel used the information to support its May 30, 2005, legal opinion on whether certain “enhanced interrogation techniques” were consistent with United States obligations under Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
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The CIA-provided document states:
“Identifying the ‘other’ shoe bomber.
Leads provided by KSM in November 2003 led directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid’s one-time partner Sajid Badat in the UK. KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat—whom he knew as ‘Issa al-Pakistani’
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—as the operative who was slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001.”
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The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the purported role of KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi
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in the discovery, identification, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat in 16 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.
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However, in an additional case, a March 4, 2005, CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, the CIA credited Abu Zubaydah with identifying Sajid Badat,
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despite a lack of any reporting on Sajid Badat from Abu Zubaydah.
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Contrary to CIA representations, a review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in otherwise unavailable intelligence leading to the discovery, identification, capture, or arrest of Sajid Badat. According to CIA records and the U.K.’s own investigative summary,
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the investigation of Sajid Badat was a United Kingdom-led operation, and the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) a U.K.-based “Issa” (aka, Sajid Badat); (2) a potential second “shoe bomber” related to Richard Reid;
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(3) a suspected U.K. terrorist named “Sajid Badat”;
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(4) Sajid Badat’s connection to Richard Reid; (5) Sajid Badat’s physical description; (6) Sajid Badat’s location; and (7) the initial identification of a U.K. surveillance photo of Sajid Badat, the “shoe bomber,”
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was unrelated to information acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA records indicate that the information that led to Sajid Badat’s arrest and U.K. criminal prosecution was also not derived from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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Prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, and as early as January 14, 2002, the FBI informed the CIA that Richard Reid “had an unidentified partner who allegedly backed out of the operation at the last minute.”
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This information was later corroborated by a credible CIA source prior to any reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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In July 2002, a foreign government reported that pre-paid phone cards recovered by the FBI from Richard Reid upon his arrest were used by an individual named Sajid Badat to call a known terrorist, Nizar Trabelsi.
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FBI interviews of Trabelsi—officially relayed to the CIA in July 2002—reported that “L. Badad Sajid” was “involved in operations targeting American interests.”
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The CIA highlighted in a July 2002 cable that this information matched previous reporting from a European government that identified a “Saajid Badat,” of Gloucester, United Kingdom, with a date of birth of March 28, 1979, as a person suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.
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Additional analysis of the phone card connecting Badat and Reid—as well as other intelligence—placed Sajid Badat and Richard Reid together in Belgium in September 2001.
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According to
██████████
, Sajid Badat was linked to other well-known extremists in the United Kingdom who were already under investigation. Specifically, Badat was known to
██████████████
as “a member of Babar Ahmad’s group,” and was a “particularly close associate of Mirza Beg.”
███
reporting also determined that Badat had attended a jihad training camp in Afghanistan.
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Concurrent with the emergence of information linking Sajid Badat to Richard Reid, there was an ongoing international effort to identify one or more U.K.-based al-Qa’ida operatives known as “Issa.”
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As early as June 2002, CIA records indicate that an individual in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili, repeatedly referenced an “Abu Issa al-Pakistani” as a British-born Pakistani associated with Richard Reid and engaged in plotting in the United Kingdom at the behest of KSM.
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This information was corroborative of other intelligence reporting.
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In May 2003, this detainee met with CIA officers to produce several sketches that were described as having “achieved a 95% likeness” of this individual.
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On August 17, 2003, CIA officers noted that a photograph of Sajid Badat provided by ██████████ [foreign partner] looked “an awful lot like the sketches” of the Richard Reid associate made with the assistance of the detainee in foreign government custody.
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CIA Headquarters requested that the photograph be shown to CIA detainees. According to CIA records, on August 18, 2003, “KSM viewed the picture for a while, but said he did not recognize the person in the photo.” When KSM was asked if Issa’s name could be Sajid Badat, “KSM shrugged and said that the Badat name was not the name he recalled.” Pressed further, KSM stated, “he was confident that the name Sajid Badat was not Issa’s name.
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On August 22, 2003, emails among CIA officers stated that “CTC believes that Abu Issa’s true name is Sajid Badat . . . KSM says that Badat is not Abu Issa—but he might be lying.”
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On August 23, 2003, the detailed sketches derived from interviews of the detainee in foreign custody, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili—the sketches CIA officers stated so closely resembled the ████ [foreign partner]-provided photos of Sajid Badat—were shown to KSM. KSM stated he did not recognize the individual in the sketches.
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Meanwhile, on August 21, 2003, a CIA cable noted that the ████ [foreign partner] had informed the CIA that joint interviews by the FBI and ████ [foreign partner] authorities of an individual in FBI custody, James Ujaama, led investigators in the U.K. to a home “formerly occupied by both Mirza [Beg] and Sajid [Badat].”
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The ████ [foreign partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that “at least one of these men was known by the alias Issa,” and that the subjects were related to a separate ongoing terrorism investigation.
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On September 2, 2003,
████
[foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that “secret and reliable” reporting indicated that Sajid Badat is the Richard Reid associate and shoe bomber. According to the ███ [foreign partner] report, ███████ [foreign partner information] linked Badat to a larger
██████████
network in the United Kingdom, which was part of the
███
[foreign partner] investigation.
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On September 9, 2003, a detainee in U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, identified a photograph of Sajid Badat to a visiting U.K. official as Abu Issa the “shoe bomber.”
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The next day, KSM identified a photograph of Sajid Badat as “Issa al-Britani, aka Issa Richard”—the associate of Richard Reid. Other detainees in U.S. military custody subsequently identified the same photograph of Sajid Badat as “Abu Issa” the “shoebomber.”
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After conducting extensive surveillance of Sajid Badat, U.K. authorities arrested Badat on November 27, 2003.
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Badat immediately cooperated with U.K. investigators and confirmed he withdrew from a shoe bomb operation with Richard Reid in December 2001.
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On November 28, 2003, the United Kingdom provided a detailed account to the CIA on how investigative efforts in the United Kingdom led to the identification of Sajid Badat, noting that “key aspects” of reporting acquired from CIA, U.S. military, and foreign government detainees matched those of a “███████████” [specific U.K. intelligence collection on Sajid Badat]. The “
███████████
” [specific U.K. intelligence collection on Sajid Badat] was not previously referenced in U.K. investigative updates to the CIA.
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After pleading guilty in a U.K. court on February 28, 2005, to terrorism-related charges, Sajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years in prison.
███████████
Sajid “Badat was voluntarily cooperative throughout much of his pre-sentencing incarceration.”
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On November 13, 2009, Sajid Badat’s 13-year prison sentence was reduced to 11 years. In March 2010, approximately five years after his sentencing, Sajid Badat was released under an agreement whereby Badat became a cooperating witness for U.S. and U.K. authorities.
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The legal agreement came to light when Sajid Badat testified against Adis Medunjanin, a U.S. terrorism suspect on trial in New York, via a video-link from the United Kingdom in April 2012.
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7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting
summary
: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification and thwarting of the Heathrow Airport Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ammar-al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash. None of these individuals were captured as a result of reporting obtained during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees.
further details
: After the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States, KSM sought to target the United Kingdom using hijacked aircraft and surmised that Heathrow Airport and a building in Canary Wharf, a major business district in London, were powerful economic symbols.
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The initial plan was for al-Qa’ida operatives to hijack multiple airplanes departing Heathrow Airport, turn them around, and crash them into the airport itself. Security was assessed to be too tight at Heathrow Airport and the plan was altered to focus on aircrafts departing from mainly Eastern European airports to conduct attacks against Heathrow Airport. Al-Qa’ida was unable to locate pilots to conduct these attacks.
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Once KSM was detained in Pakistan on March 1, 2003, responsibility for the planning was passed to Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, who were at the time focused on carrying out attacks against Western interests in Karachi, Pakistan.
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The thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting as an example of how “[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques” had “enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots” and “capture additional terrorists.”
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The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “otherwise unavailable” and “saved lives.”
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For example, on December 23, 2005, CIA Director Porter Goss explained in a letter to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, that he was suspending the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques because of the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act (the “McCain amendment”). The letter stated:
“. . . only 29 [CIA detainees] have undergone an interrogation that used one or more of the 13 [CIA enhanced interrogation] techniques.
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These interrogations produced intelligence that allowed the U.S., and its partners, to disrupt attacks such as 911-style attacks planned for the U.S. West Coast and
for Heathrow airport
. I can inform you with confidence that this program has allowed the U.S. to
save hundreds, if not thousands, of lives
.”
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Similarly, the CIA informed the CIA inspector general on February 27, 2004, that:
“As a result of the lawful use of EITs,
KSM also provided information on an al-Qa’ida plot for suicide airplane attacks outside of the United States that would have killed thousands of people in the United Kingdom
. . . Of note, even after KSM reported that al-Qa’ida was planning to target Heathrow, he at first repeatedly denied there was any other target than the airport.
Only after the repeated lawful use of EITs did he stop lying and admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf
—like those in the World Trade Center would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside . . . We are still debriefing detainees and following up on leads to destroy this cell, but
at a minimum the lawful use of EIT’s on KSM provided us with critical information that alerted us to these threats
. . .”
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The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plotting in 20 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.
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A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that contrary to CIA representations, information acquired during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in “alert[ing]” the CIA to the threat to—or “disrupt[ing]” the plotting against—Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf.
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Prior to the detention and interrogation of the CIA detainees credited by the CIA with providing information on the plot, the CIA and other intelligence agencies were already “alerted” to al-Qa’ida’s efforts to target Heathrow Airport. Specifically, the CIA knew that: (1) KSM and al-Qa’ida were targeting “a national symbol in the United Kingdom” and that this symbol was the “Heathrow airport”;
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(2) the attack plan called for hijacking commercial aircraft and crashing them directly into Heathrow airport;
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(3) no pilots had been identified by al-Qa’ida and the planned attack was not imminent;
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(4) KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were involved in or knowledgeable about the plotting;
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(5) al-Qa’ida was seeking to recruit numerous operatives, but potentially already had two operatives in place in the United Kingdom named “Abu Yusif” and “Abu Adel,” although the two operatives were unwitting of the plot;
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and (6) KSM was seeking Saudi and British passport holders over the age of 30 for the attack.
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A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airport plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002),
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KSM (detained on March 1, 2003),
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Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on April 29, 2003,).
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There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the individuals were captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting. A draft National Terrorism Bulletin from March 2006 states: “the [Heathrow Airport] operation was disrupted mid-cycle, around the spring of 2003, when several of the key plotters, including KSM, were detained.”
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Foreign government intelligence analysis came to the same conclusion.
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While each of these four detainees provided information on the plotting during their detentions, none of this information played any role in the disruption of the plot. A wide body of intelligence reporting indicated that no operatives were informed of the plot, no pilots were ever identified by al-Qa’ida for the attacks, and only schedules of potential flights were collected for review.
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CIA detainee records indicate that reporting from CIA detainees on aspects of the Heathrow plotting was often unreliable and not believed by CIA officers. For example, KSM retracted information he provided while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including information linking Jaffar al-Tayyar to the Heathrow Plot.
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On May 20, 2003, nearly two months after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, a CIA analyst wrote that KSM had provided three different stories related to the Heathrow plotting, writing to CIA colleagues: “Bottom Line: KSM knows more about this plot than he’s letting on.”
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By late June 2004, KSM had retracted much of the varied reporting he had provided on the Heathrow plotting, most importantly the information KSM provided on tasking potential operatives to obtain flight training.
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KSM stated that during March 2003—when he was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—“he may have given false information,” and that, in many cases, the information he provided was “just speculation.”
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The value of other CIA detainee reporting was also questioned by CIA officers.
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In July 2003, a cable from the CIA’s ALEC Station stated that “HQS/ALEC remains concerned with what we believe to be paltry information coming from detainees about operations in the U.K.”
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In addition, KSM withheld information linking Abu Talha al-Pakistani to the Heathrow plotting. According to CIA interrogation records, KSM discussed Canary Wharf the first time he was shown his notebook, in which the words “Canary Wharf’ were written.
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KSM stated, however, that he had drawn the sketch for Ammar al-Baluchi. In June 2003, after being confronted with contradictory reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, KSM admitted that he had actually shown the sketch to “Talha,” whom KSM had not previously mentioned.
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8. The Capture of Hambali
summary
: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the capture of Hambali as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, the CIA consistently represented that, as a result of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided the “
first
” information on a money transfer by Majid Khan that eventually led to Hambali’s capture. These CIA representations were inaccurate. Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided this information prior to any reporting from KSM. CIA records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali’s capture in Thailand was based on signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities.
further details
: Riduan bin Isomuddin, aka Hambali, was a senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group, and served as an interface between the JI and al-Qa’ida. Hambali was linked to terrorist activity prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Shortly after those attacks, Hambali was described as the CIA’s “number one target” in Southeast Asia.
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When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the “mastermind” of the attacks and was further described as “one of the world’s most wanted terrorists.”
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The capture of Hambali is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policy makers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the capture of Hambali as an example of how “[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques” had “enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots” and “capture additional terrorists.”
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The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “otherwise unavailable” and “saved lives.”
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As an example, in a briefing prepared for the president’s chief of staff, Josh Bolten, on May 2, 2006, the CIA represented that the “[u]se of the DOJ-authorized
enhanced interrogation techniques
, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida.”
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The briefing document represents that “[a]ssessing the effectiveness of individual interrogation techniques is difficult,” but provides 11 specific examples of “Key Intelligence Collected from HVD Interrogations,” including:
“Hambali’s Capture: During KSM’s interrogation we acquired information that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia.
KSM first told us
about Majid Khan’s role in delivering $50,000 to Hambali operatives for an attack KSM believed was imminent.
We then confronted Khan with KSM’s admission
and [signals intelligence] confirming the money transfer and Khan’s travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative named ‘Zubair,’ whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair’s capture led to the identification and subsequent capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding.”
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