Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
545.
██████ 11319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as ████████████.
546.
ALEC █████ (222153Z APR 03).
547.
Email from: ████████████; to: ██████████; cc: ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, ████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM; ALEC ████ (302258Z JUN 03).
548.
ALEC █████ (302258Z JUN 03).
549.
Email from: ████████; to: ████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM’s passive restraint – please let me know if you have comments for a memo to the DCI; date: June 24, 2003, at 1:27:06 PM.
550.
Email from: ████████; to: ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████, [REDACTED]; CC: ██████; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
551.
ALEC █████ (111932Z NOV 03).
552.
████████ 10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawahiri the day before March 1, 2003, capture, first informed the CIA of this fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See ██████ 11139 (051956Z APR 03).
553.
██████████████ 7847 ████████; ██████ 2218 █████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ████████.
554.
█████ 2441 ██████████.
555.
████ 1079 ████████; █████ 2214 (050539Z SEP 06).
556.
See KSM detainee review in Volume III.
557.
For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara’iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali.
558.
For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. [
See
email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date: March 15, 2004.) The incident was reported to the CIA inspector general. See email from: ████████████; to: ██████████; cc: [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████, ██████████; subject: our telcon; at: March 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM.
See also
claims related to the treatment of Majid Khan.
See
████████████, Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, March 14, 2008.
559.
DIRECTOR █████ (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ██████ (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR █████ (252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR █████ (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS ████ (102352Z SEP 03).
560.
DIRECTOR █████ (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR █████ (040049Z MAR 03).
561.
[REDACTED] 60040 ██████████.
562.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ██████████.
563.
[REDACTED] 5759 ████████ 03).
564.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ██████████.
565.
According to a cable from CIA Headquarters, ███ detainees arrived in Country ██████████████, 2003. HEADQUARTERS █████ ██████████.
566.
[REDACTED] ███ ████████.
567.
[REDACTED] ███ ████████.
568.
Email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; subject: Re: DDCI-Armitage call on [Country ██] Detention Facility; date: August ██, 2003.
569.
[REDACTED] 6762 (█████ MAY 04).
570.
Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station ██████████ to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], ████████, ████████, ██████; subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage; date: █████████████████ at 7:40:43 PM. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “with regard to the Study’s claims that the State Department was ‘cut out’ of information relating to the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State . . . were aware of the sites at the time they were operational.” As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA records indicate the secretary of state was not informed of the CIA detention site locations. During meetings with the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentary evidence to support the assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response.
571.
See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details.
572.
HEADQUARTERS ███████ [REDACTED].
573.
[REDACTED] 64105 ██████████.
574.
[REDACTED] 30296 ████████.
575.
See Volume I for additional details.
576.
[REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED]
577.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ████████.
578.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ████████.
579.
[REDACTED] 4088 ████████.
580.
See Volume I for additional details.
581.
[REDACTED] 5293 ██████████.
See also
[REDACTED] 5327 █████████.
582.
[REDACTED] 5417 ███████████████████████████████. See Volume III for additional details on detainees in Country █.
583.
█████████████████ 39042 (██████ MAY 03); ████████████████ 38696 (201220Z MAY 03); █████████████████ 39582 (041743Z JUN 03); ████████████████ 38597 (201225Z MAY 03); ████████████████ 39101 ██████ MAY 03). Water dousing was categorized as a “standard” interrogation technique in June 2003.
584.
See ██████████████████ 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 2003; █████████████████ 34575 █████ ██████; email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████████████; subiect; Re: Update; date: ███████, at 4:51:32PM; ██████ 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); ██████ 10415 ███████████. In addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Klian, described elsewhere, there is at least one record of Abu Zubaydah receiving “rectal fluid resuscitation” for “partially refusing liquids.” (See ██████████ 10070 ███████████.) Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to what was originally referred to in a cable as an “enema,” but was later acknowledged to be rectal rehydration. (See ███████████████ 2563 █████████; email from: █████████████; to: ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING – Fw: ████████ date: March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.) Ramzi bin al-Sliibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. (See ███████ 10415 █████████████; ██████ 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); email from: ███████████; to: ███████████; subject: Medical Evaluation/Update ████ (047); date: March ██, 2004.) CIA medical officers discussed rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, “[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective, we were impressed with the ancillary effectiveness of rectal infusion on ending the water refusal in a similar case.” (See email from: █████████████; to: ████████████; subject: Re: ██████████████ (048); date: February ██ 2004.) The same officer provided a description of the procedure, writing that “[r]egarding the rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshing up the large intestines.” Referencing the experience of the medical officer who subjected KSM to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that, “[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag – let gravity do the work.” (See email from █████████████ to █████████, ███████, ███████, █████████, and [REDACTED], February 27, 2004, Subject: Re: ████ (048).) The same email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which “we used the largest Ewal [sic] tube we had.” (See email from: [REDACTED]; to ████████████; cc: [REDACTED], ████████████,[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: ███████████████ (048); date: February ██, 2004, at 11:42:16 PM.) As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-Nashiri “in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso.” (See █████████ 1203 (231709Z MAY 04).) Majid Khan’s “lunch tray,” consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was “pureed” and rectally infused. (See ███████████████ 3240 (231839Z SEP 04).) The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a “well acknowledged medical technique.” CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with “excessive force” on two detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA attorney █████████ was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: ████████, ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this morning, date: █████████, at 12:15 PM; email from: ███████████ to: [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Mornjng, date: ██████████, at 1:23:31 PM; email from: ██████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: █████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December, █ 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; ████ 3223 ██████████; HEADQUARTERS █████ ███████████.
585.
See, for example, ███████████ 38130 (121722Z MAY 03); ███████████ 38584 (201133Z MAY 03); ██████████ 38127 (121714Z MAY 03); ███████████ 38161 (131326Z MAY 03); ██████████ 38595 (201216Z MAY 03); ███████████ 38126 (121709Z MAY 03).
586.
See, for example, ███████████ 35341 █████████; ████████████ 39098 ███████████: █████████████ 39042 (███████ MAY 03); email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date: ████████; 2005-8085-IG; ██████████████ 39101 ███████ MAY 03); █████████ 37708 (051225Z MAY 03); ███████████ 39077 (271719Z MAY 03); █████████ 39099 (281101Z MAY 03).
587.
For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi; Al-Shara’iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash.
588.
The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara’iya aka Abd al-Karim.
589.
This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques may have also been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would bring the number of CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to 44. Those additional detainees were ██████████████████ [DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use of the techniques (ALEC ████ (██████████)); Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha’il Aziz Ahmad Al-Maythali whose records refer to a lack of sleep, but not the application of sleep deprivation (███████████ 28132 (101143Z OCT 02); ████████████ 27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first captured, he “had to stand up for five days straight and answer questions” and “was also forced to strip naked and stand in front of a female interrogator” (██████████ 14353 (231521Z APR 03)); and Sa’id Salili Sa’id, who later told debriefers that he was “mistreated and beaten by Americans while blind-folded and stripped down to his underwear in ████”
See
███████████ 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)).
See also
detainee reviews in Volume III for more information.
590.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response objects to the Committee’s count, arguing that “[n]o more than seven detainees received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response then asserts that “the
Study
miscounts because it confuses the use of standard techniques that did not require prior approval at the time they were administered with enhanced techniques that did.” This statement in the CIA’s June 2013 Response is inaccurate. First, prior to January 2003, the CIA had not yet designated any technique as a “standard” technique. Because sleep deprivation was included in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January 2003, sleep deprivation under a specific time limit was categorized as a “standard” CIA interrogation technique. Second, the January 2003 guidelines state that advance CIA Headquarters approval was required for “standard” techniques “whenever feasible.” For this reason, the Committee did not include cases where CIA interrogators failed to obtain authorization in advance, but did acquire approval within several days of initiating the use of the “standard” techniques. Finally water dousing was not characterized as a “standard” technique until June 2003. (See DIRECTOR ███ (211518Z JUN 03); DIRECTOR ████ (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR ████ (311702Z JAN 03); ███████████████ 39582 (041743Z JUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water dousing was explicitly described in CIA cables as an “enhanced” interrogation technique. (See, for example, DIRECTOR ████ (101700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See Volume I and Volume III for additional details.