Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
740.
See Volume I for additional information.
741.
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, ██████████; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005.
742.
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, ██████████; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; January 28, 2005.
743.
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, ██████████; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. The CIA’s June 2013 Response maintains that “[a] systematic study over time of the effectiveness of the techniques would have been encumbered by a number of factors,” including “Federal policy on the protection of human subjects and the impracticability of establishing an effective control group.”
744.
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to “National Security Advisor,” from “Director of Central Intelligence,” Subject: “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”
745.
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to “National Security Advisor,” from “Director of Central Intelligence,” Subject: “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.” Italics in original.
746.
March 5, 2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor re CIA Proposal for Independent Study of the Effectiveness of CTC Interrogation Program’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.
747.
March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Counterterrorism Center, re: Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs.
748.
September 2, 2005 Memorandum from ██████████ to Director Porter Goss, CIA re: Assessment of EITs Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
749.
September 23, 2005 Memorandum from ██████████ to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re: Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
750.
For additional information, see Volume III.
751.
███████████████ 1658 ██████████ JAN 04); ALEC ██████████ ████████████ JAN 04).
752.
███████████████ 54305 █████████.
753.
███████████████ 54301 █████████.
754.
██████████ █████ 1871 █████████; HEADQUARTERS ██████ (0223412 APR 04).
755.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
756.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
757.
███████████████ 2507 █████████.
758.
██████ 42655 ██████████.
759.
Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000.
760.
██████ 42655 ██████████.
761.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
762.
Referring to ███████████ and a second CTC officer named in the OIG’s Report of Investigation, the notification to Congress stated that the director “does not believe that . . . the performance of the two named CTC officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence as defined in CIA’s Standard for Employee Accountability.” The notification also stated that there was a “high threat environment” at the time of the rendition, which “was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here, previously had been sharply criticized for not connecting the dots prior to 9/11.” The notification acknowledged “an insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet the standard prescribed in the [MON],” and referred to the acting general counsel the task of assessing legal advice and personal accountability. Based on recommendations from the inspector general, the CIA “developed a template for rendition proposals that makes clear what information is required, including the intelligence basis for that information.” (See Congressional notification, with the subject, “CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri,” dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already been rendered to CIA custody by the time of this notification. The CIA’s June 2013 Response points to a review of analytical training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, “[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom received only an oral admonition.”
763.
█████████ 21753 ███████████; HEADQUARTERS █████ ██████ JAN 04).
764.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04). The CIA confirmed that the individual detained matched the biographical data on Hassan Ghul. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Khallad bin Attash confirmed that a photo provided was of Ghul. See ███████ 1260 █████ JAN 04).
765.
███████████ 1642 █████ JAN 04); DIRECTOR ████ ██████ JAN 04).
766.
███████████ 54194 ██████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1644 ███████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1645 █████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS █████ ██████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1646 █████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████ JAN 04); ██████████████ 1647 █████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████ JAN 04); ███████████ CIA ████ ███ FEB 04); ███████████ 1650 ████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1651 █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1652 █████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ DIRECTOR ████ █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1654 █████ JAN 04); ██████ 1655 █████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ CIA ████ █████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1657 █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1677 █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1679 █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1680 █████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1681 ████ JAN04), later released as ███████████ CIA ████ ██████ FEB04); ███████████ 1685 █████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ CIA ████ ██████; ███████████ 1687 ████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ CIA ████ ██████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1688 █████ JAN 04), later released as ███ █████ CIA ████ ██████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1690 █████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1656 █████ JAN04); ██████████████ 1678 █████ JAN 04).
767.
As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul’s initial interrogations stated, “He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.” (See December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ████████████.) CIA records reveal that Ghul’s information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was disseminated while Ghul was at DETENTION SITE COBALT, prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, “Manhunt.” The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: “. . . honestly, Hassan Ghul . . . when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn’t locked up in a cell. He wasn’t handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there’s—you know, there’s articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was.” (See www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee requested additional information from the CIA on Ghul’s interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA wrote on October 25, 2013: “We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody.” No information was provided on Hassan Ghul’s intelligence reporting while in U.S. military detention. See DTS #2013-3152.
768.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████ JAN 04).
769.
██████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04).
770.
██████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04).
771.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████ JAN 04).
772.
██████████ 1647 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1654 █████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1677 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1685 ████ JAN 04).
773.
████████████ 54194 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1644 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1646 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1647 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1654 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1655 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1677 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1685 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1656 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1678 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1650 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1651 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1657 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1687 ████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1690 ████ JAN 04).
774.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.
775.
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ███████, ███ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Italics in original. For additional representations, see Volume II.
776.
██████ 1283 ████ JAN 04).
777.
██████ 1285 ████ JAN 04).
778.
██████ 1285 ████ JAN 04).
779.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ████ JAN 04).
780.
██████ 1299 ████ JAN 04).
781.
██████ 1299 ████ JAN 04).
782.
██████ 1308 ████ JAN 04).
783.
██████ 1308 ████ JAN 04); ██████ 1312 ████ JAN 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that when hallucinations occurred during sleep deprivation, “medical personnel intervened to ensure a detainee would be allowed a period of sleep.” As described in this summary, and more extensively in Volume III, CIA records indicate that medical personnel did not always intervene and allow detainees to sleep after experiencing hallucinations.
784.
██████ 1299 ████ JAN 04).
785.
██████ 1299 ████ JAN 04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees.
786.
██████ 1308 ████ JAN 04).
787.
See Volume II for additional information.
788.
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004).
789.
█████ 2441 ████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ████████; █████ 1635 ███████; ███████ 1712 ███████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████; ██████ 1775 ███████; ████████; 173426 ██████.
790.
See ███████████████████████.
791.
The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul Rahman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
792.
█████████████ 2035 ███████.
793.
█████████████ 2186 ([REDACTED]).
794.
ALEC ████ ([REDACTED]).
795.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ([REDACTED]). For more information on AL-TURKI and Al-MAGREBI, see Volume III.
796.
See
Volume I and II, including HEADQUARTERS ███ ███████. In November 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to ███████ suggesting “changing the sleep deprivation line as [sic] between enhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours.” (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to ████████, cc: John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters informed CIA detention sites of the change, stating that sleep deprivation over 48 hours would now be considered an “enhanced” interrogation technique. See HEADQUARTERS ████ (101713Z JAN 04).
797.
████████ 1888 (091823Z MAR 04); █████████ 1889 (091836Z MAR 04). There is no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquarters addressed the repeated use of “standard” sleep deprivation against Adnan al-Libi. For more information, see Volume III detainee report for Adnan al-Libi.
798.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332).
799.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332).
800.
May 25, 2004, Talking Points for DCI Telephone Conversation with Attorney General: DOJ’s Legal Opinion re CIA’s Counterterrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III to Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).