Authors: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1318.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See also
U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, “Use of Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings,” dated August 4, 2008.
1319.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA “concluded early on” that the “dirty bomb” plot was “never operationally viable.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “it took [the CIA] until 2007” to stop citing the “dirty bomb” plot in its representations about the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. This is incorrect. The CIA referred to the disruption of this plotting in a representation to the Department of Justice in July 2007, in representations to Congress in late October 2007, and confirmed this information to the press in April 2009. See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, “Talking points,” sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, “Talking Points Appeal of the $██ Million reduction in CIA/CTC’s Rendition and Detention Program.”
See also
the July 20, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states that “interrogations of Zubaydah—
again, once enhanced techniques were employed
—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in Washington, D.C.” (italics added). As described elsewhere in this summary and in the full Committee Study, on April 21, 2009, in response to the partial declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the CIA stood by the “factual assertions” in the OLC memoranda. See “Waterboarding Saved L.A.,” Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA’s June 2013 Response further states “[d]espite the imprecision of our language, we continue to assess it was a good example of the importance of intelligence derived from the detainee program.” As described in this summary and throughout the full Committee Study, in its efforts to obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented that the intelligence referenced was obtained “as a result” of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques (not the “detainee program”), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable.
1320.
The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and border inspection agencies to perform name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify individuals who are ineligible for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov.
1321.
A February 16, 2001, email entitled, “Lost passport case- Jose Padilla,” states that a “Jose Padilla,” with a date of birth of October 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. The email notes that “his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and is allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt.” A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, “The continuing Jose Padilla saga!” states that there are “multiple CLASS hits” (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose Padilla. The author writes “[REDACTED] and I both agree there is something sketchy about the guy.” On March 21, 2001, State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla was provided with a replacement passport. See documents included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: “Lost passport case- Jose Padilla”; date: February 16, 2001, at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; second email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: “The continuing Jose Padilla saga!”; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09AM; U.S. State Department travel records identified by the Department of Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Department of Defense, to James Comey, U.S. Department of Justice, dated May 28, 2004.
1322.
Italics added. Jose Padilla’s fingerprints would later be found on the forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form.
See also
FBI Washington 101514Z (10 APR 07), “Summary Chronology of Intelligence on Jose Padilla,” and email from: [REDACTED]; to: ███████████████; subject: “Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the time”; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of “Padilla’s Muj pledge form.”
See also
numerous open source articles, to include, “CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda ‘Pledge Form’ Said to be Padilla’s,”
New York Times
, dated May 16, 2007; “Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup,”
Associated Press
, March 28, 2007; and “Terror Suspect’s Path from Streets to Brig,”
New York Times
, dated April 24, 2004. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this form in CIA databases. According to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla’s federal trial, the binder and other material were provided by a CIA source to CIA officers in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at Jose Padilla’s trial that, after he sorted through the material, the blue binder was placed in a sealed box and provided to the FBI in Islamabad, Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting.
1323.
ALEC ███ (102327Z APR 02).
1324.
████ 10972 (12031Z APR 02). As noted, the State Department already possessed information of concern related to Jose Padilla.
1325.
See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form.
See also
FBI Washington 101514Z (10APR 07), “Summary Chronology of Intelligence on Jose Padilla,” and email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████████████; subject: “Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the time”; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of “Padilla’s Muj pledge form”; and numerous open source articles, to include, “CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda ‘Pledge Form’ Said to be Padilla’s,”
New York Times
, dated May 16, 2007.
1326.
████ 10976 (120948Z APR 02). The official cable states that the Pakistani official and his office has “not received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] ██ due to concerns about possible terrorist activity.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the reporting from the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S. citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possible terrorist activity was “unremarkable at the time,” and that the CIA viewed the report as a “routine ‘illegal traveler’” report.
1327.
████ 10972 (12031Z APR 02); ████ 10976 (120948Z APR 02).
1328.
See DIRECTOR ███ (162003Z FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between █████ personnel and Pakistani officials.
1329.
████ 10972 (12031Z APR 02); ████ 10976 (120948Z APR 02).
1330.
There were no records identified to indicate that the CIA informed the FBI at this time that U.S. citizen “Jose Padilla” was engaged in “possible terrorist activity.” As described in Volume 11, once alerted, the FBI identified links between Jose Padilla and FBI counterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose Padilla’s travel to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp.
1331.
████ 10972 (12031Z APR 02); ████ 10976 (120948Z APR 02).
1332.
████ 10976 (120948Z APR 02). See additional reporting in the Volume II intelligence chronology.
1333.
Abu Zubaydah provided the names of the individuals as Talha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (█████ 10090 (210703Z APR 02)).
1334.
██████████████; ████ 10063 (180515Z APR 02); █████ 10096 (221545Z APR 02).
1335.
See FBI communications to FBI Headquarters in April 2002, as well as May 13, 2009, Senate Judiciary Committee testimony of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA’s June 2013 Response, the CIA states the CIA’s representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the “use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques” was accurate because, “Abu Zubaydah revealed this information after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be categorized as an enhanced interrogation technique once the program was officially underway.” As described in detail in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country █, the CIA sought to deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep and to cease Abu Zubaydah’s interaction with the FBI special agents who had been interviewing Abu Zubaydah and acquiring information from him at the hospital. Days later, after this new CIA approach was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the FBI was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah again. Further, the use of sleep deprivation during this period differed from future uses of sleep deprivation and had ceased by the time of the referenced FBI interview, as the CIA had determined that Abu Zubaydah’s ability to focus on questions and provide coherent answers appeared compromised. (See ████ 10071 (190827Z APR 02) and ████ 10116 (250731Z APR02).) Ali Soufan testified that Abu Zubaydah provided information about the “Dirty Bomb” plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditional interrogation approach with Abu Zubaydah, stating, “We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence. This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called ‘dirty bomber.’” (See Senate Judiciary Testimony, transcript at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=38428wit_id=7906.) The assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response is incongruent with additional CIA records. See senior CIA analyst comments on the draft CIA Inspector General Special Review from February 10, 2004, stating: “Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really gave us actionable intel to get them”; CIA draft response to Committee Questions for the Record concerning an OLC memorandum suggesting that information on Jose Padilla was acquired from Abu Zubaydah after enhanced interrogation techniques, with the CIA response stating that the CIA’s ██CTC Legal “[██████] simply inadvertently reported this wrong. Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI (████ 10091)”; CIA testimony from CIA Director Hayden on April 12, 2007, stating, “In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah”; and the CIA-vetted speech by President Bush on September 6, 2006.
See also
SSCI Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (Ali Soufan: “So we went back. And we start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different things. We flipped him about different things, ██ and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back to his senses and he started cooperating again. And this is when he gave us Padilla.”) (DTS #2008-2411).
1336.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III that details how, after Department of Justice approval in August 2002, the CIA began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, including the waterboard.
See also
████ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████ and [REDACTED]; subject: “Re: So begins”; date; August 4, 2002, at 09:45 AM.
1337.
████ 11036 (220348Z APR 02).
See also
ALEC ███ (220238Z APR 02); ████ 11041 (220802Z APR 02); and ████ 11042 (220921Z APR 02).
1338.
Among other documents, see letter from the CIA addressed to SSCI Staff Director Al Cumming, dated June 24, 2002, and entitled, “Arrest of Jose Padilla.” After being detained in Pakistan, Binyam Mohammad was rendered by the CIA ████████ July █, 2002, where he was held █████ government. On January █, 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to CIA custody █████ 30586 ███████; █████████ 1630 ███████.
1339.
Fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007 with subject line; “Jose Padilla,” includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based primarily on 29 IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003, a FBI document “Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003,” the FBI’s 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 [‘CIA Summary’]; a DIA Info Memo from ████ (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM “Jose Padilla Debrief Status” (11/11/03).
See also
SSCI Transcript “Detention of Jose Padilla,” dated June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603).
1340.
CIA Notification, “Arrest of Jose Padilla,” dated June 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-2866); WHDC ███ (242226Z MAR 03). Discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003, and SSCI Transcript “Staff Briefing by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Detention of Jose Padilla,” dated June 11, 2002 (DTS #2002-2598).
1341.
Pocket litter refers to material acquired on a person upon a search and may include notes, identification cards, tickets, phone numbers, computer files, photographs, or any other material in the person’s possession.
1342.
See CIA Document, Subject “CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02),” email from [REDACTED] to ███████ on August 2, 2002, at 3:54:17 PM, with the subject line: “Re: Padilla’s travel history,” and fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division to [REDACTED], at CIA CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: “Jose Padilla.” The fax includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based primarily on 29 IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003, a FBI document “Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003,” the FBI’s 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 [‘CIA Summary’]; a DIA Info Memo from █████ (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM “Jose Padilla Debrief Status” (11/11/03).
See also
SSCI transcript “Detention of Jose Padilla,” dated June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which the CIA informs the SSCI that, based on his address book confiscated in █████, Padilla “did have connections to Islamic extremists, both within the United States and outside the U.S.”
1343.
See Department of Justice memorandum referenced in chronology in Volume II that is based primarily on 29 IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003; a FBI document “Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003,” the FBI’s 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 [‘CIA Summary’]; a DIA Info Memo from ████ (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM “Jose Padilla Debrief Status” (11/11/03).
1344.
See CIA memorandum from: ██████; to: ██████; subject: “AZ information”; date: July 10, 2002, at 01:18:50 PM.
See also
February 10, 2004, email from: ███████; to: ███████; cc: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], ██████, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████; subject: Please Read -- Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004. In a SSCI transcript dated June 12, 2002, entitled, “Detention of Jose Padilla” (DTS #2002-2603), the CIA acknowledged it had information on Jose Padilla prior to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. A CIA officer stated: “the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids . . . there was enough information indicating that his travel was suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which occurred on 21 April.” This is the only known CIA representation that did not fully attribute information on Jose Padilla to CIA interrogations.
1345.
Email from: ███████; to: ██████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████; subject: Please Read -- Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004.
1346.
See email from: [REDACTED] C/CTC/OTA/CBRNG/RNTB; to: multiple recipients; subject: “Re: Urgent: Unclassified Fact Sheet for David Shedd”; date: October 6, 2005, at 04:35 PM.
1347.
See additional details in Volume II.
1348.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs.
1349.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See also
U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, “Use of Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings,” dated August 4, 2008. The latter document states that: “If the idea of the plot is to cause death and destruction on the same scale as had occurred in Russia, then Padilla’s methodology comes into question. The probability of causing this magnitude of death and destruction using natural gas [versus conventional explosives] would be considerably lower.”
1350.
ALEC ████ (May 17, 2002), with references to FBI WASH 150315Z, ███████, and CIA reporting from 2001, ███████. Upon Jose Padilla’s arrest, Padilla was found to be in possession of the phone number of Adham Hassoun, ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████; and providing material support to terrorists. U.S. prosecutors focused on more than 70 intercepted phone calls between the defendants during the 1990s, but provided no information at the trial related to plotting in the United States. See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants, including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including “Without a plot, is Padilla guilty?,”
Christian Science Monitor
, dated July 19, 2007; and “The others on trial in Padilla case,”
Christian Science Monitor
, dated May 29, 2007.
1351.
An Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution stated, “The narrative is fairly clear that Padilla was recruited to go overseas to participate in jihad.” See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants, including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including “Without a plot, is Padilla guilty?,”
Christian Science Monitor
, dated July 19, 2007; and “The others on trial in Padilla case,”
Christian Science Monitor
, dated May 29, 2007.
1352.
See open sources, to include press articles such as, “Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient,”
Reuters
, dated September 19, 2011.
1353.
█████ 30586 ███████; ███████████ 1630 █████████.
1354.
███████████ 2335 ████████.
1355.
██████████ 12520 (281655Z SEP 04).
1356.
Terrorism Watch, March 10, 2009,
Guantanamo Detainee’s Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship with UK
.
1357.
[REDACTED] 3174 (311725Z JUL 08).
1358.
Among other open sources, see “Compensation to Guantanamo detainees ‘was necessary,’”
BBC News UK
, November 16, 2010.
1359.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II and ████ 11454 (3017102Z APR 03).
1360.
█████ 33804 (190956Z SEP 02); [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR 03); █████ 45028 █████; DIRECTOR ██ ██████.
1361.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR ██ ████ MAY 03) and DIRECTOR ███ ████ MAY 03).
1362.
The Karachi terrorist plots encompassed a variety of potential targets in the Karachi area associated with U.S. and Western interests. Although the plotting involved multiple targets, the plotting is most often referred to as the “Karachi Plot.”
1363.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” from March 2, 2005.
See also
CIA talking points for National Security Council entitled, “Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques,” dated March 4, 2005.
1364.
From 2003 through 2009, the CIA’s representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots “disrupted” and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in “saved lives.” Among other CIA representations, see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was “necessary” to obtain “critical,” “vital,” and “otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence” that was “essential” for the U.S. government to “detect and disrupt” terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that “[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President’s September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA’s interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: “The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence . . . As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], ‘by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.’” (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that “the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives,” and warned policymakers that “[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA’s response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: “Information [the CIA] received . . . as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques (‘EITs’) has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties.” (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the “CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence,” and that “[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means.” (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009” and graphic attachment, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM),” including “DCIA Briefing on RDI Program” agenda, CIA document “EITs and Effectiveness,” with associated documents, “Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),” “Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment,” and “supporting references,” to include “Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.”) (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, “[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR],” located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of “some of the key captures and disrupted plots” that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: “CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means.” See Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that “saved lives.”