A Guide for the Aspiring Spy (The Anonymous Spy Series) (7 page)

On another occasion, a CIA “inside” case officer who worked at the US mission in the host country and I, a NOC officer not associated with the US government, double-teamed a target we both had met separately at the same symposium. We both developed a decent rapport with the target that resulted in several follow-up “social” meetings. Comparing our “take” from the elicitations, it was clear that the target was holding back information from the inside officer, known as a US government official, while he was more forthcoming with me. A decision was made at the Station for me to take the lead in the development of the target while allowing the inside officer to maintain the contact on a less frequent basis as a back-up to possibly make a recruitment pitch if our development of the case warranted recruitment.

I could go on with hundreds of such elicitation cases and find something new and unique to each case. But you are probably interested in commonalities that are transferable to your unique situation. First, keep the target in the dark on your real intentions. Be careful your questioning does not raise suspicion. Find a basis for rapport based on your knowledge of the target, or if lacking such knowledge, based on assumptions you can safely make about him or her. If possible, watch the target in a group setting first, then isolate in one-on-one contact. Establish the basis for a follow-up meeting based on shared objectives and interests.

Going back to cold contacts, there can be risks to making them, especially for a NOC officer; such contacts are usually made in alias with a throw-away cover though there are exceptions. The nature of the cold contact will drive the extension and degree of cover. If the reason for the cold contact is to make a “cold recruitment pitch,” then, of course, more layers of security are provided. If the reason for cold contact is to elicit information, either intelligence, biographical, or operational information, then there is less reason for concern. Case officers, both inside officers and NOCs, make cold contacts frequently. Such contacts at diplomatic functions are done by official cover officers in true name virtually all the time. NOCs may also make cold contacts in true name and true cover at social, commercial, and scientific forums all the time.

After the initial cold contact, the case officer usually prepares an operational cable on the person if he believes there may be further interest in the contact as a “target.” The cable will usually request name traces from headquarters to see if the target has been previously contacted or has otherwise previously come to the attention to the agency.

There are times when the Company may determine that the contact should be further assessed by a second officer but does not want any association to be given to the initial contacting officer, who may have made the initial contact in true name. Thus an unattributable spin-off or turnover is made to a second Case Officer perhaps in alias. This then becomes a Cold Contact for the second case officer who has an agenda in contacting the “target.”

There are a wide range of options available to making cold contacts and sustaining the contact as a development contact with a view toward future recruitment. Contact with the target could be continuous or intermittent, over a period of months or years. On each occasion of contact, the case officer should prepare operational cables that will go into the target’s 201 file, which maintains a historical record on the target.

During my career, I made about a dozen cold-pitch recruitment attempts in alias, but unfortunately only one of these turned into a bona fide agent. The recruitment attempt was made in commercial alias to “hire” the target as a “confidential commercial consultant” for my devised facility cover. After some time, another case officer turned the asset into a witting asset, meaning he then knew he was reporting to the CIA. Another cold-pitch target that turned down commercial recruitment later was contacted by an official cover officer and recruited as a witting agent. I guess as cold pitches go, two out of about twelve isn’t bad. Several other cold-pitch commercial recruitments were accepted by the target but since they later did not provide information of intelligence interest, they were amicably terminated without ever knowing they had been reporting to the CIA.

Of course, the more you know about the target the more likely will be the success of a cold contact. You may be so fortunate to have information about the target from public sources or from other agents or friendly contacts. If, however, you have zero information on the target, you may have to make social and professional assumptions about the target and make your initial approach somewhat generic as you elicit information about him or her to able to develop a tailored approach.

Role-playing is an important tool for the CIA case officer. Operating under cover and in alias, the CIA officer is given the freedom to completely change his persona, to alter his personality to fit the situation at hand. This is an arena where acting skills are so important. The case officer in alias can break away from the confines of his true character to become someone completely different. Operating in alias and perhaps light disguise, the case officer might find himself doing things that he would never do ordinarily. I am a fairly traditional person with fairly high moral standards, a sense of fair play, and I like to think I am fairly intelligent with a quick grasp of any subject matter that comes up in discussion. I found role-playing to be fun.

On one occasion, however, while developing a contact in alias and a light disguise, I found myself compelled to play the role of an idiot to feed the ego of a contact who felt that all Americans were dumb and that it was his job to educate us. In fact, he felt that everyone, even his own countrymen, were well beneath his intellectual level, and he was probably right.

The agent was an expert in the field of sub-micron lithography, one of only a few such experts in his country at the time. It seemed the dumber I acted the more he would divulge information about his research. I managed to use this dumber than dumb technique over a period of almost a year to elicit information about his research in this high-technology field. Clearly, his vulnerability was his superiority complex and vast ego, which were easily manipulated to obtain not only his verbal elicitation but also numerous documents on his research. Through this mechanism, we were able to assess the level of this technology without recruiting the contact and at very little expense to the US taxpayers. All that was required was a bit of acting and a shift in personality on my part and a few meals a month with the contact.

Of course each situation varies, but there are key ingredients common to all relationships where you are trying to elicit information on value. True rapport is necessary to place both parties at ease. Rapport implies a level of trust between the two parties. This rapport also implies some give and take by each party where both parties feel they are getting something from the relationship. What each party may be getting from the relationship does not have to be stated, implied, or even understood by the other parties. The CIA case officer in the relationship must develop over a period of time an understanding of the motivations and vulnerabilities of the contact and use these to encourage the contact to talk about the information that is desired. Of course, the contact knows that he is divulging information, but he has no idea, if the CIA officer’s cover is good, that he is divulging information to US intelligence. This is what makes it elicitation information and thus why the contact is called an elicitation contact.

Debriefings

Debriefings are used to obtain information from a cooperative agent, either witting or unwitting of any CIA affiliation. Debriefings may be defined as a structured, planned meeting between two parties to talk about certain specific requirements. Debriefings usually take place in an environment under control of the case officer that provides an atmosphere of security and confidentiality. Agent debriefings are pre-organized by the case officer to respond to specific collection requirements from CIA headquarters. From these debriefings the case officer then prepares intelligence reports and operational cables. Normally, an agent debriefing will last from two to six hours. The longer the meeting the less productive it becomes as both agent and case officer become exhausted. Debriefings are the bread and butter of agent operations to collect information of intelligence and operational value. During their basic operations training, case officers practice the technique of ascertaining the who, what, when, where, why, and how of an issue that are so necessary for the art of debriefing. However, it is in the field actually handling an agent that the case officer really hones the proper skills.

Interrogations

The last and most extreme communication tool is interrogation. Case officers seldom use direct interrogation unless the agent is under a tightly controlled environment. In interrogations the agent may be suspected of being a double agent or perhaps of fabricating information. Surreptitious interrogations, where the target is unaware that he is under suspicion, may take place in a normal debriefing setting but that is rare. Surreptitious interrogations may be initially employed to avoid the agent becoming aware that he is under investigation. If such interrogation techniques fail to resolve the issues under investigation, then hostile interrogation may be employed.

Interrogations by the CIA of agents suspected of wrongdoing, fabrication, or worse or interrogations of captives such as possible terrorists suspects are not at all like interrogations by law enforcement of suspects under criminal investigations. Unlike law enforcement, the CIA is not interested in developing information to document criminality. Also unlike law enforcement, the CIA does not have to be much concerned about a foreign agent’s or suspect’s legal rights.

Interrogations might have different objectives. Some interrogations have the objective to resolve unresolved issues. An agent suspected of fabricating information may, for example, be directly or surreptitiously interrogated to resolve details of his fabrication. Other interrogations are used to obtain actionable operational intelligence. Captured terrorists, for example, may be interrogated to obtain information upon which countermeasures may be developed. Also, terrorists may be interrogated to obtain operational details of their terrorist cell and its interconnections with other terrorist cells.

Developing Your Skills

During your training at the Farm, you will receive only cursory training in the communication tools of elicitation, debriefing, and interrogation that are so valuable to your CIA career. Once in the field, you will be expected to develop these skills through trial and error. Elicitation is the first skill you should take pains to develop. As an OC case officer, you will be given many opportunities to develop these skills at official receptions and functions where Foreign Service officers from other countries congregate. As a NOC officer, you will have to improvise by joining fraternal and social clubs or work-related professional organizations to develop these skills.

As you develop your pool of recruited agents, you will naturally and gradually develop your debriefing skills. It is pretty much a trial and error process, but your training at the Farm will fortunately concentrate more on debriefing than on elicitation or interrogation. The collection requirements provided by CIA headquarters will provide basis guidance for the debriefing process and greatly enhance the ability of the case officer to rapidly develop debriefing skills.

Elicitation, debriefing, and interrogation all have some commonalities. Perhaps the most important from the point of view of an intelligence professional is rapport. Put simply, rapport is a basis of a relationship between the participants. While it is best that this relationship be one of trust, respect, admiration, and sympathy, it may be tempered by less positive attributes such as fear and anxiety. But the relationship, whatever the foundation, provides a channel to foster communications through which the case officer will be able to obtain information of intelligence or operational use.

Elicitation, debriefing, and interrogation also have a psychological function. The experienced case officer may use these tools to plant seeds for the future. Some psychological seeds may provide inducements for an elicitation target to become an agent for the CIA through manipulation of the target’s motivations and vulnerabilities. For a recruited agent, seeds planted during debriefings may enhance control or influence over the asset by tweaking aspects of the agent’s motivations or vulnerabilities. In the interrogation mode, psychological pressure may be applied to the subject through a host of methods to enhance cooperation—to break the subject, so to speak.

Despite press reports to the contrary, however, the CIA does not condone the use of torture in the interrogation of suspected double agents, agents suspected of lying or fabricating information. More flexibility in the use of physical inducement has been used in the case of terrorist interrogations. Water boarding, as far as I am concerned, is not torture. In fact, the CIA has established guidelines on the degree of physical inducements that may be used during interrogation. Historically, foreign security liaison services that cooperate with the CIA to interrogate prisoners of war or terrorists have been known to use physical torture. Such has never been condoned by the CIA though CIA personnel at the scene have been known to turn the other way when they suspect torture may be being used. As a matter of practice, the CIA, as well as other components of the US intelligence community, does not trust information obtained by foreign liaison services where it is believed torture may have been employed.