A Just Cause (11 page)

A second section of the audit concerned the I-SaveRx program, set up by the governor to provide prescriptions from pharmacies in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Holland testified that outreach activities for the I-SaveRx program were “primarily coordinated” by the governor's office (470). The program had not been approved—in fact, the FDA had informed the governor in writing that it violated the law. But the governor ignored the FDA's warning and expanded the program “to state employees and their dependents” (471).

Franks again asked clarifying questions. He drew the committee's attention to a visual timeline of the flu vaccine procurement and went over the events step by step. Franks asked for Holland's confirmation of doses ordered, dates, and agreement that the governor's office had signed the contract knowing the drugs would never be delivered. Holland concurred. Instead of seeking an avenue to be relieved of the contract, because it was illegal, the governor donated the $2 million worth of vaccines to the government of Pakistan, Franks claimed. Holland again agreed.

Lou Lang continued with questions for the committee record. Concerning the flu vaccine procurement, “Where was the money to come from?” Holland answered, “One of the trust funds within the Department of Public
Aid.” “Assuming all of the transactions were legal,” Lang asked, “would that have been appropriate?” Holland referred to a letter from Deputy Comptroller Keith Taylor to the governor's chief of staff, Lon Monk, dated January 31, 2005. The letter expressed that the comptroller's office did “not believe the Governor's office can obligate . . . another agency's appropriations to make payments for its own contract liabilities” (491–93).

Holland entertained a few random questions from the committee, but his testimony was finished and the clarifying questions exhausted. The most powerful evidence for administrative cause had been presented. David Ellis and the committee had what they wanted—tangible evidence of administrative incompetence and a pattern of suspicious behavior that more than hinted at wrongdoing.

The day was growing late, but one more set of witnesses was still to come before the committee. A growing concern throughout Blagojevich's terms in office was the disregard of requests submitted by various government watchdog groups under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Several witnesses—Jay Stewart, executive director of the Better Government Association; Don Craven, appearing as a private citizen; and Paul Orfanedes, director of litigation for the conservative organization Judicial Watch—were to testify regarding the many FOIA requests, denials, and resultant ongoing litigation. But the hour was late and the committee members had expended their enthusiasm. Currie asked the witnesses to be brief. The witnesses reinforced a negative attitude toward the Blagojevich administration but provided no solid evidence. Although the FOIA denials displayed a pattern of reticent behavior, the court cases were not yet settled.

It had been an exhausting day. After a few questions from committee members, Currie announced that the committee would meet again on December 22 and cautioned members to prepare for two days of hearings. To everyone's relief, the committee adjourned.

Administrative Charges, Part II

Three days before Christmas, when the committee reconvened, the trappings of the holidays were on full display in the state capitol. The outside dome was festooned with colored lights, and a large Christmas tree adorned the center of the first floor of the rotunda. But the holiday atmosphere did not pervade the building. Inside room 114, it was business as usual. House staff was busy preparing for the meeting, doing the things
that had been done hundreds of times for committee meetings. Documents were passed out and microphones checked as committee members began to drift in. It had been thirteen days since the self-assured governor was last seen shaking hands in the federal court, and despite the national media focus and widespread speculation that he would resign and reach a compromise plea with federal prosecutors, he had not. Instead, the governor had engaged in a national media campaign, attacking leaders of the house and senate and proclaiming his innocence.

Over the previous four days, through the weekend, the committee staff had worked nonstop. The cause for the impeachment resolution was beginning to take shape. The resolution would include the allegations contained in the criminal complaint, but impeachment based solely on the criminal complaint, without an indictment, no matter what degree of probable cause could be demonstrated; would be difficult. The impeachment resolution had to include incidences of misconduct or the unlawful execution of lawful acts that had occurred during the governor's administration. The previous hearing had provided what the committee needed—tangible evidence that there had been constitutional violations, the governor had usurped legislative prerogative, and he had possibly engaged in criminal activity. It was expected that the prosecution would continue to add to the growing administrative charges.

The governor's defense attorney had questioned the legality of using the federal wiretaps in the impeachment hearings, and the house counsel felt that it was important to reinforce the use of the tapes as evidence of probable cause. To justify the federal government's use of wiretaps, the committee invited retired assistant US attorney John Scully to testify. Scully was not involved with the Blagojevich case, but he was an ideal, credible witness for the prosecution. A US Naval Academy graduate, he had gone on to law school and served as a lawyer in the navy. After retiring from military service, he joined the Department of Justice. Scully was familiar with the procedures required to obtain court permission to install wiretaps, and his experience and integrity were beyond reproach.

The committee had chosen Republican Jim Durkin to be the lead interrogator to question Sully. Durkin was a seasoned trial prosecutor who was also familiar with the procedures necessary to install wiretaps.
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His purpose was to ask questions and elicit answers that would serve to validate the necessity of, and establish a justifiable cause for, installing wiretaps. Scully's testimony would walk the committee through the process of review
by the US Attorney's Office, court review, and authorization. To further legitimize Scully's testimony regarding wiretaps, Durkin started with basic questions: What were the types of intrusive devices, bugs, and wiretaps, and what did it mean to be a cooperating witness wearing a wire? Scully dutifully answered. Could he explain the process of obtaining permission to install a wiretap? Scully reviewed the steps necessary within the US Attorney's Office to prepare an affidavit and apply for court permission to install a wiretap (555–97).
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“What you are trying to do . . . is establish probable cause, that there is evidence that various federal felonies are being committed,” he said (565). Scully's testimony accomplished the committee's intent: to establish that the wiretaps had been installed only after thorough review and approval by a federal judge and that the recordings had been obtained based on probable cause.

There was little Genson could do to challenge the validity of Scully's remarks. Instead, he attempted to use the witness to his advantage. He lauded Scully's experience and cited the many awards that Scully had received during his career with the Department of Justice. He asked Scully a series of questions concerning wiretap procedures, not to probe but to solicit affirmation and show that he and the witness were in agreement. Then Genson turned the questioning to the Blagojevich case. Scully confirmed that he had played no part in the preparation of the documents necessary to install the wiretap, had not read the application, and therefore never made a judgment as to the existence of probable cause.

Genson then asked if Scully knew whether the governor's defense counsel had been given the affidavits used in the Blagojevich case, eliciting an immediate objection from Jim Durkin. Durkin did not know the objective of the lawyer's question, but he was not going to provide the shrewd Genson any latitude. He objected because the question was not relevant and the witness had already stated that he had no knowledge of the Blagojevich case. Genson disagreed and continued by reading a section of a federal statute regarding the restrictions on the use of wiretaps. The lawyer was challenging the use of the wiretaps by the investigative committee and perhaps looking toward the eventual trial. He was attempting to use Scully's reputation and prestige to support his claims, but Currie and the committee stopped him. Calling his questions and statements irrelevant, and saying they exceeded the limits of clarification, Currie informed Genson that the committee would be happy to accept the statute he cited or any statistics he may wish to present to the committee, but his line of questioning was inappropriate.

The committee next swore in Matt Brown, executive director of the Procurement Policy Board (PPB) from its creation in 1998, and Ed Bedore, a member of the PPB since its founding, as witnesses for the prosecution. As members of the PPB, which has oversight over the state's procurement process, Brown and Bedore could provide intimate details about highly suspicious activities of CMS in the award of contracts and leases since Blagojevich had taken office in 2003. The audit of CMS published in 2005 provided circumstantial evidence of administrative wrongdoing, but the committee needed solid evidence. The legislature was well aware of the problems the PPB and Brown were having dealing with CMS and the Blagojevich administration. Jack Franks had been investigating the procurement deficiencies since Blagojevich had taken office and on several occasions had engaged in verbal altercations with CMS personnel and had publicly criticized the governor. Lou Lang had kept in touch with Matt Brown concerning his ongoing problems with CMS.

The committee had informed Brown and Bedore beforehand what it wanted them to discuss in their testimony. Hoping for tangible evidence, the committee had asked the witnesses to elaborate on sole source contracts where CMS or departments determined that the vendor was the only qualified supplier, cases where state leases had expired but the state continued to occupy the property (holdover leases), standards for leasing and building improvements, and the state's conducting of business with offshore companies that paid no federal or state tax. The committee was focused; the areas selected had been the subject of investigations by Jack Franks and his State Government Administration Committee and had long been sources of controversy between the governor and the legislature.

Like Bill Holland and Vicki Thomas, Brown was a consummate bureaucrat. He studiously addressed the problems that the PPB had encountered with CMS and the discrepancies in procurement procedures. His testimony was short but specific. He discussed Executive Order No. 2003-10, which consolidated all decision-making and administration for real estate under CMS. While promoted by Blagojevich as a cost-cutting move, the executive order had resulted in all decisions on contracts being under one agency, where they could easily be directed by the governor's office. The PPB had repeatedly requested operating rules to accompany the administrative change but had been ignored.

Brown also told the committee of the lack of transparency and justification of sole source procurement awards. The PPB had requested justification
for “hundreds of [sole source] awards every year” (601). In many cases CMS simply canceled the awards rather than submit justification. The awarding of contracts was slipshod at best, but to many it reeked of corruption.
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Brown told the committee what most already knew. He reviewed the number of holdover leases, noting the increase since Blagojevich took office, and described the problems for the state. He said that the PPB had requested the adoption of rule revisions that would identify which improvements for leased facilities were permanent and which were temporary. The purpose of the rules would be to prevent lessors from making permanent improvements on their properties with state money. No rules were ever adopted. The PPB suspected that the refusal to negotiate new leases and to adopt rules, along with allowing wide latitude to lessors, was a conscious effort designed to reward lessors for campaign contributions. While Brown's testimony was intriguing, raised speculation, and highlighted areas for future investigations, it provided no specific evidence of wrongdoing.

Ed Bedore was called to add detail to Brown's remarks. A former aide to Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley, grandfatherly in appearance, and with a reputation for financial acumen, he had the respect and confidence of both Republican and Democratic members of the committee. Bedore proceeded to give facts and figures and pointed out specific instances related to millions of dollars' worth of potential waste that the PPB found at CMS because of incompetent or intentional mismanagement. Referring to past
Chicago Tribune
articles that mentioned the price of influence to the Blagojevich administration, Bedore told the committee that everyone had heard about the $25,000 club, but the owner of one of the properties he cited in his testimony was a member of the $50,000 club. Emphatically, he stated that the examples he presented to the committee “have cost or would have costs to the people of the State of Illinois approximately $6 million in additional costs,” and then cited Sam Adam Jr., one of the governor's attorneys, who said, “If the people of Illinois suffer, the governor will step aside.” Bedore started to elaborate on Adam's remark when Genson interrupted. “This is inappropriate. This whole topic is inappropriate and this gentleman's statements are inappropriate,” he said. Currie agreed that the remarks were “a bit over the top.” Trying to emphasize the connection between campaign contributions and CMS procurement, Bedore concluded that the PPB review had gone back just a few years and had saved $6 million by not approving leases because “the rates were too high or the space [rented] was too much” (612–13).