A Just Cause (21 page)

The following day Harris confirmed to the governor that he had talked with the financial advisor about the problem of going forward with the Cubs IFA assistance with the current
Tribune
editorial board in place. The financial advisor was aware of the delicacy of the issue and would discuss it with the Tribune owner, Harris reported. Blagojevich was concerned about whether the financial advisor had gotten the message that editorial board
members had to be fired. Harris responded, “Oh, yeah, he got it loud and clear” (212; para. 78). However, the Tribune Company failed to act on Blagojevich's recommendations. Blagojevich and Harris continued discussions about the company throughout November, and the governor repeatedly restated his desire to remove members of the editorial board in exchange for assistance from the IFA, but nothing changed at the
Chicago Tribune
.

The prosecutor had organized and presented his accusations for maximum effect. The first two charges, the trading of Obama's senate seat and attempted interference with the
Tribune
's editorial board, dealt with information that had been gleaned from the wiretaps in November and December. Using evidence that had been gathered through years of FBI investigations and surveillance, Ellis next turned to alleged criminal activity. The prosecutor started with a topic that continues to generate disagreement: the propriety and influence of campaign contributions. Again, for impact, Ellis read to the senate the title of a section contained in the affidavit: “Evidence Concerning the Solicitation and Receipt of Campaign Contributions in Return for Official Acts by Rod Blagojevich prior to October 2008.” Ellis began by relating the statements of Ali Ata. Ata was a Jordanian immigrant who came to the United States to study engineering. After graduation he held various jobs in the private sector before becoming involved in politics after meeting Alderman Dick Mell in the 1970s. He subsequently met Rod Blagojevich and had contributed to his campaign during his run for congress. Ata's foray into Illinois politics also introduced him to Tony Rezko. The two became friends and seemed to have much in common. Both were emigrants from the Middle East; Rezko was a Syrian. Ata had agreed to raise funds for Blagojevich during his race for governor, and he and Rezko had discussed a position within state government after the election. He also became acquainted with Chris Kelly and Lon Monk. Ata was duly rewarded for his fund-raising efforts and named president of the newly founded Illinois Finance Authority.
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There is an old refrain in Springfield: Be careful when you are swimming with sharks. Ata had jumped into the pool.

In connection with the ongoing Operation Board Games, the federal investigation of corruption in the Blagojevich administration, the government charged Ata with tax fraud on $1.2 million he had received from Rezko and for lying to FBI agents. Ata reached an agreement with the government, pleaded guilty, testified as a witness for the prosecution during Rezko's trial, and agreed to cooperate with the federal government in exchange for a lesser
sentence (218). Rezko was charged with and convicted of two separate fraud schemes. He was convicted of shaking down millions of dollars from firms doing business before Illinois regulatory boards and of defrauding General Electric Capital Corporation and investors in a pizza restaurant business owned by Rezko.
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Rezko was sentenced to ten and a half years in prison.

Portions of Ata's testimony during the Rezko trial were introduced as evidence in the criminal complaint against Blagojevich and were contained in the supporting affidavit. Attempting to link Blagojevich with the newly convicted Tony Rezko, Ellis read a portion of Ata's testimony. Ata claimed that as early as 2001 he was becoming aware of the close relationship between Rezko and Blagojevich, and he related a series of incidents when Rezko had asked Ata to raise money for Blagojevich. Ata always complied.

During the Rezko trial, Ata testified that he had discussed a high-level position within the Blagojevich administration “while a $25,000 donation check to Friends of Blagojevich from Ata was sitting on a table in front of Blagojevich.” Ata also testified that after another substantial contribution, Blagojevich told Ata that he was aware of the contributions, that Ata was a good supporter, and that he understood Ata would be joining the administration. He added that “it had better be a job where Ata could make some money” (221–22, 227–28; para. 16). Ata was apparently surprised at Blagojevich's response and told Rezko about it. Rezko said he was “not surprised and had heard Rod Blagojevich say things like that before” (228). Ata was eventually appointed director of the Illinois Finance Authority.

The Ata testimony linked Blagojevich with Rezko and served implicitly to revive the question of whether the governor was involved with Rezko's nefarious deeds. But the account of Ata giving contributions in return for a position also was problematic. The governor had expressed that Ata was a good supporter and that he was aware that Ata would be joining the administration. Ata supported Rod Blagojevich, and Blagojevich did what every successful politician does—he rewarded his supporter by bringing him into the administration. Politics is a process of reciprocal arrangements. Patronage, tempered by the evolving demands of government, has been and always will be a component of our particular form of democracy.
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The only direct link of a quid pro quo was the check for $25,000 that was supposedly on the table in front of Blagojevich, and as verification that the event took place, the senators had only Ata's word. But the senate was not a court of law, and to remove Blagojevich, the senators did not have to find the defendant guilty of unlawful actions beyond a reasonable doubt. The
prosecution instead sought to establish a pattern of abusive actions that made the governor unfit to hold public office. All the charges were presented to the senate in one impeachment article. The senate would decide on the totality of the article, and the Ata testimony served the purpose of linking Blagojevich and Rezko.

Ellis moved next to the Rezko trial testimony of Joseph Cari, portions of which were also included in the affidavit supporting the criminal complaint. Cari, an experienced fund-raiser on the national level, had served as the national finance chairman for Al Gore's 2000 presidential campaign. Cari had been cooperating with federal authorities since being confronted with the charge of extortion in early 2005. Initially, Cari lied to the federal agents about his relationship with Stuart Levine, but when pressed, he finally agreed to cooperate. He was the first person to provide any real evidence that Blagojevich and those around him were going above and beyond what was allowable in the fund-raising arena.
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Cari testified that on October 29, 2003, he flew to New York along with Blagojevich, Rezko, Chris Kelly, and Levine to attend a fund-raiser that he was hosting on behalf of Rod Blagojevich. The airplane was arranged and paid for by Levine, a member of the board of the Illinois Teachers Retirement System. The governor expressed that he was thinking of running for president of the United States and was interested in Cari's fund-raising experience on the national level. According to Cari, Blagojevich had remarked that it was easier for governors to solicit campaign contributions because they could “award contracts” to campaign contributors. He also informed Cari that Rezko and Kelly were his point people in raising money. Additionally, Blagojevich said that contracts and other Illinois work could be given to contributors who “helped Rod Blagojevich, Rezko and Kelly,” and that “Rezko and Kelly would follow up with Cari.” On the plane ride, Levine informed Cari that a plan was in place where Rezko and Kelly would choose what consultants would do business with state boards, and afterward the consultants would be solicited for campaign contributions. At a subsequent meeting among Rezko, Levine, and Cari, Rezko told Cari that Lon Monk, then the governor's chief of staff, “would help implement” Rezko's choices of consultants, and that “in exchange for” Cari's help in fund-raising, the Blagojevich administration would be “financially helpful to Cari's business interests” (231–33).

In March 2004 Kelly met with Cari and stated that he was following up on the conversation between the governor and Cari during the plane ride
to New York. Cari testified that he initially informed Kelly that he was “not inclined” to help Blagojevich on the national level. Kelly responded “that helping Rod Blagojevich would be good for Cari's business interests and that Cari . . . could have whatever Cari wanted” (233–34). The opportunity was too great for Cari to pass up, and he became involved in an attempt to extort $750,000 from JER Partners, a Virginia-based private equity firm seeking an $80 million investment from the Teachers Retirement System.

In connection with another attempted shakedown scheme, the federal authorities were also secretly recording conversations on the phone of Stuart Levine. In early 2004 Levine and a contractor named Jacob Kiferbaum attempted to extort the chief executive officer of Edward Hospital in Naperville, Illinois. The hospital was attempting to build a facility in nearby Plainfield. Instead of cooperating with the scheme, however, the Edward executive went to the FBI, and Levine's phone was subsequently tapped.
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Levine, one of the most disreputable characters associated with Blagojevich and Rezko, was a board member of both the Teachers Retirement System and the Health Facilities Planning Board. His criminal activities included abuse of power on both boards.
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Levine had served in board positions in preceding Republican administrations, but upon Blagojevich's election, he quickly associated himself with Rezko and Blagojevich. Unrelated to the Edward attempt, Cari had been recorded discussing JER with Levine. The Virginia firm was balking at paying a $750,000 kickback to an associate of Tony Rezko's as a “finder's fee.” Levine was upset that the firm was hesitating. Cari, who had connections with JER, intervened and urged the firm to cooperate. He sent several messages to JER “that they needed to hire a consultant and that in Illinois, the Governor and the people around the Governor pick the consultants to be used on particular deals.” If JER did not hire the consultant, Cari said, then it would not receive the money from the Teachers Retirement System (235; para. 30). JER dallied; no one at the firm had ever heard of the supposed consultant, Emerald Star International, and JER became suspicious when it discovered that the consultant's fax machine was located in the Turks and Caicos Islands.
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Ellis now moved on to an allegation contained in the affidavit concerning the Health Facilities Planning Board. Levine and fellow Health Facilities Planning Board members Imad Almanaseer, a Park Ridge pathologist, and Thomas Beck, a former Cook County comptroller, had testified at Rezko's trial for the prosecution. All the men had been placed on the board by Tony Rezko. It was the function of the Health Facilities Planning Board
to approve permits for the construction of hospitals, medical office buildings, or other medical facilities. Entities seeking to construct facilities were required to receive a certificate of need (CON) from the planning board prior to construction. The prosecutor described how Almanaseer and Beck would receive instructions on how to vote from Rezko. Beck had testified that at times he would provide note cards to Almanaseer conveying Rezko's instructions on how to vote (232; para. 35–37).

Mercy Hospital Systems, in Chicago, wished to build an expansion and was seeking a CON from the planning board. Initially, Rezko said that Mercy would not receive a CON, arguing that it had submitted a poor application. But Levine had planned well. He had persuaded Mercy to hire Steve Loren, an outside attorney for the Teachers Retirement System and a conspirator with Levine, as well as the contractor on the project, the same one who was involved in the Edward Hospital deal, Jacob Kiferbaum.
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Both Loren and Kiferbaum would advise Mercy to make a contribution. Levine asked Rezko if a contribution would make a difference, and Rezko responded that it might. Rezko gave the go-ahead and Mercy received a CON. Rezko later admitted that he manipulated the vote based on Mercy's agreement to contribute (238–40; para. 38n10. According to Almanaseer, Rezko stated that the governor wanted it to pass (244; para. 41).

Ellis had been before the senate for more than two hours, but his audience, the members of the senate and those observing from the galleries, remained keenly attentive. One by one the criminal allegations were paraded before the senate. Reports of Blagojevich's confederates and the federal investigation had been in the news for years. All were aware of the investigations, the parties involved, and the Rezko trial. Now the events of the past years were being synthesized before them, and the enormity of the ongoing saga challenged their moral sensibilities. Ellis's performance was arduous; the audience was exhausted. The room of seasoned politicians silently looked on, stunned by what they were hearing. Moral outrage permeated the staid senate chamber. Justice Fitzgerald suggested that the senate break for lunch. As the galleries emptied, each audience member seemed to be contemplating what he or she had just witnessed. Few looked at each other, few spoke.

When the trial reconvened, Ellis reminded the senate that the day before, Senators Rickey Hendon and William Haine had asked if any evidence favorable to the governor would be presented. Hendon wanted to defend the governor. Haine, a former county prosecutor, knew the trial would be the
subject of future analysis and scrutiny; he wanted the trial to be conducted in a fair manner. Ellis, referring to the affidavit, responded that “there are a few places in here that I think one could argue there is information favorable to the Governor” (246). In fact, there was little. The prosecutor noted only that in Rezko's discussions with the federal authorities, his recollection had differed from what Ali Ata had said about the quid pro quo for his job at the IFA. Rezko could only remember asking for one check, for $25,000 (247). The prosecutor also offered the obvious: Rod Blagojevich had denied involvement in illegal activities (250).