A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (98 page)

62. Michael Duffy and Na-icy Gibbs, "The Soul of Dole," Time, August 19, 1996, p. 30.

63. Nightline, ABC,July 24, 1995.

64. Inside Politics, CNN, July 28, 1995.

65. Elaine Sciolino, "Senate Vote to End Embargo May Prove a Pyrrhic Victory," New York Times, July 28, 1995, p. Al.

66. Ibid.

67. Charles Trueheart, "Journalists Take Aim at Policymakers; in Europe and U.S., Media Mirror Mood," Washington Post, July 21,1995, p. A27.

68. Ibid.

69. Leon Wieselter,"Accorlplices to Genocide," The New Republic, August 7, 1995, p. 7.

70. This Week with David Brinkley, ABC,July 17, 1995.

71. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, July 12, 14, and 17, 1995; White House briefing, Federal News Service,July 14 and 18, 1995.

72. Walter Goodman, "Critic's Notebook; Horror and Despair in the Balkans," New York Times, July 25, 1995, p. C 18.

73. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, July 12, 1995.

74. William Safire, "The Time Has Come," NewYork Times, July 12, 1995, p. A23.

75. Charles Gati, "Tell It to Srebrenica," Washington Post, July 13, 1995, p. A25. Gati, a senior vice president of a money management firm, served on the State Department's policy planning staff from 1993 to 1994.

76. R.W.Apple Jr.,"Clinton Is Scrambling to FindWays to Help UN in Bosnia," New York Times, July 14, 1995, p. Al.

77. George Soros, "This Is :he Moment of Truth," Washington Post, July 16, 1995, p. C7.

78. Anthony Lewis, "Lessons of Disaster;' New York Times, July 17, 1995, p. A13.

79. George F Will, "Worthy of Contempt," Washington Post, August 3, 1995, p. A31.

80. "A Candid Look at Foreign Policy and Opinion on Bosnia," Weekend Edition, NPR,July 15, 1995.

81. Holly Burkhalter,"Whst We Can Do to StopThis Genocide," Washington Post, July 20, 1995, p. A27.

82. Dana Priest, "Coalition Calls for Action in Bosnia; Groups Want More Allied Military Force Used 'to Stop Genocide," Washington Post, August 1, 1995, p.A14.

83. William Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod U.S. into Role in Bosnia," Washington Post, July 19, 1995, p. A 17.

84. Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1984), p. 88.

85. Stephen Engelberg, "How Events Drew U.S. into Balkans," New York Times, August 19, 1995, p. A1;Woodward, The Chore, pp. 260, 280-281;Thomas W. Lippman and Ann Devroy,"Clinton's Policy Evolution: June Decision Led to Diplomatic Gambles;' Washington Post, September 11, 1995, p. Al.

86. Woodward, The Choice, pp. 261-263.

87. Morris, Behind the Oval Office, pp. 252-254.

88. Engelberg, "How Events Drew U.S. into Balkans."

89. Woodward, The Choice, pp. 261-262.

90. Lippman and Devroy,"Clinton's Policy Evolution."

91. Woodward, The Choice, pp. 265-267.

92. Ibid., p. 270.

93. David Maraniss, "Exploring How Dole Thinks; Clues Lie in His Kansas Roots, War Wound and Senate Service," Washington Post, August 4, 1996, p. Al. Dole was never particularly expressive. He had worked with McCain for nearly a decade in the Senate before he told him that while McCain had been held prisoner in Vietnam, Dole had worn a remembrance bracelet, with McCain's name on it.

94. Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on US. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 218-219.

95. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Bob Dole, and Cyrus Vance, press conference at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., November 7, 1997, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State.

Chapter 12, Kosovo

1. Gary Bass, "A Look at ... War Crimes and Punishment; It's a Risky Business;' Washington Post, November 26, 2000, p. B3.

2. See Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1997) and Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). In fact, the Serbian kingdom had crumbled several decades before Prince Lazar Hrebel- janovic's demise in this fourteenth-century battle. Serbia did not finally fall to the Turks until 1459.

3. Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (NewYork: Penguin, 1997), pp. 29-35.

4. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 37.

5. Tim Judah, "A History of the Kosovo Liberation Army," in William Joseph Buckley, ed., Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 108-115.

6. "Hearing of the House International Relations Committee on Kosovo and Possible Deployment of U.S.Troops," Federal News Service, March 10, 1999.

7. Stephen Engelberg, "Weighing Strikes in Bosnia, U.S. Warns of Wider War;' New York Times, April 25, 1993, p. A20.

8. R. Jeffrey Smith, "This Time, Walker Wasn't Speechless; Memory of El Salvador Spurred Criticism of Serbs," Washington Post, January 23, 1999, p. A15.

9. Anticipating Russian and Chinese opposition to the NATO bombing operation, the United States and its European allies did not seek authorization from the UN Security Council. This elicited widespread criticism. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later acknowledged the undesirability of seeing the Security Council block action that may have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Unauthorized actions, he said, would lead the world on a "dangerous path to anarchy." But if the council failed to authorize a humanitarian intervention, it would "betray the very ideals that inspired the founding of the United Nations" "The choice," Annan said, "must not be between Council unity and inaction in the face of genocide-as in the case of Rwanda-on the one hand, or Council division and regional action, as in the case of Kosovo, on the other." Kofi Annan, "The Effectiveness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining International Peace and Security," speech given at The Hague, May 18, 1999, SG/SM/6997.

10. "President Clinton Address to the Nation Regarding NATO Air Strikes Against Serbia," Federal News Service, March 24, 1999.

11. In the 34,000 sorties conducted over seventy-eight days, the United States supplied between 65 and 80 percent of the aircraft and precision ordinance. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), pp. 92, 206. Anthony Cordesman conducted a study for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Lessons and NonLessons: Executive Summary," which found that the United States flew more than 60 percent of all sorties, 80 percent of strike sorties, 90 percent of the advanced intelligence and reconnaissance missions, and 9C percent of electronic warfare missions. The United States also fired more than 80 percent of the precision-guided weapons and more than 95 percent of the cruise missiles.

12. Congress later voted to check any decision to commit U.S. ground troops without its goahead. Alison Mitchell, "House Votes to Bar Clinton from Sending Ground Troops to Yugoslavia Without Congressional Approval," New York Tithes, April 29, 1999, p. Al.

13. Christiane Amanpour, "Strike on Yugoslavia," CNN, April 3, 1999.

14. Ignatieff, Virtual War, p 105.

15. No Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000), p. 140.

16. Samantha Power, "Misreading Milosevic," The New Republic, April 26 and May 3, 1999, p. 24.

17. Richard Holbrooke, Tip End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 231.

18. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "We Are Neither Angels Nor Devils: An Interview with Slobodan Milosevic," United Press International, April 30, 1999.

19. David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (NewYork: Scribner, 2001), p. 453.

20. "The Rationale for Air Strikes," New York ']'lines, March 24, 1999, p. A26.

21. Carol J. Williams, "Coriference Highlights Flaws of NATO's Kosovo Campaign," Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2000.

22. Confirmation hearing of former senator William Cohen to be secretary of defense, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 22, 1997.

23. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 313.

24. Holly Burkhalter, Statement on Genocide in Kosovo, All Things Considered, NPR, April 9, 1999.

25. Henry Kissinger, "Doing Injury to History," Newsweek, April 5, 1999, pp. 38-39.

26. Henry Kissinger, "New World Disorder," Newsweek, May 31, 1999, p. 41.

27. John McCain, "Now That We're in, We Have to Win," Tithe, April 12, 1999, p. 56.

28. Dana Priest, "Bombing by Committee: France Balked at NATO Targets," Washington Post, September 20,1999, p. Al.

29. Ibid.

30. General Clark feuded constantly with his top air force officer, Lieutenant General Michael C. Short. Clark lobbied for NATO planes to hunt down tanks and artillery terrorizing civilians in Kosovo, whereas Short thought such "tank plinking" would be ineffective. He insisted that the quickest route to bringing Milosevic to heel would be to destroy "strategic" targets, such as Yugoslav ministries and power plants. In one exchange, reported by Dana Priest in the Washington Post, Short expressed satisfaction that NATO was at last preparing to strike Serbian special police headquarters. "This is the jewel in the crown," Short said. "To me, the jewel in the crown is when those B-52s rumble across Kosovo," replied Clark. "You and I have known for weeks that we have different jewelers," said Short. "My jeweler outranks yours," said Clark. Dana Priest, "The Battle Inside Headquarters; Tension Grew with Divide over Strategy," Washington Post, September 21, 1999, p. Al. See also Clark, Waging Modern War.

31. Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle That Never Was," Washington Post, September 19,1999,p. Al.

32. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, p. 274. Russia's role in bringing about the settlement remains cloudy. Just prior to his diplomatic intervention, on May 26, 1999,Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin's special envoy to the Balkans, had published a bitter op-ed in the Washington Post charging that "the United States lost its moral right to be regarded as a leader of the free democratic world when its bombs shattered the ideals of liberty and democracy in Yugoslavia." He had de manded reparations be paid to Yugoslavia and had said he would urge President BorisYeltsin to freeze U.S.-Russian relations until NATO stopped bombing.

33. "Shiptar" is a derogatory term used by Serbs to describe Albanians.

34. "President Clinton's Remarks at Ferizaj (Urosevac) Area Sports Pavilion, Ferizaj (Urosevac), Kosovo," Federal News Service, November 23, 1999.

35. Michael Walzer,"Kosovo;' in William Joseph Buckley, ed., Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), p. 334.

36. The Guardian, June 7, 1999.

37. William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 11, 4.5.213.

38. "Human Rights Watch: NATO Killed Yugoslav Civilians," Associated Press, February 6, 2000. See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (NewYork: Human Rights Watch, 2000). See also Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage' or Unlawliil Killings? Violations of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force (London: Amnesty International, 2000).

39. NATO press release, "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, on the Human Rights Watch Report," February 7, 2000.

40. Michael Ignatieff, "The Reluctant Imperialist," New York Times Magazine, August 6, 2000, p. 46.

41. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (NewYork: Summit Books, 1986), pp. 48-49.

42. Melissa Eddy, "Head of KFOR Troops Blasts NATO Governments Over Lack Of Reconstruction In Kosovo," Associated Press, January 19, 2000.

43. "NATO's Crimes," Spectator, March 11, 2000.

44. U.S. credibility was also damaged by NATO's overestimation of the damage it inflicted upon Serb forces and hardware. On May 23, 1999, President Clinton claimed that NATO had destroyed between one-third and one-half of Serb heavy weapons in Kosovo. When the war ended two weeks later, however, the Pentagon and NATO admitted that the real damage was no more than 7-10 percent, which amounted to 800 Serb heavy weapons, including 120 tanks. William Jefferson Clinton, "A Just and Necessary War," New York Times, May 23, 1999, sec. 4, p. 17; Cohen, Defense Department news briefing, Federal News Service, June 10, 1999. Once inspectors gained access to the field and found no more than a few dozen charred skeletons of heavy weapons, the estimates sank further. Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 154-155. This drop-off is comparable to the discrepancy between original and final estimates of damage done to Iraqi weaponry during the Gulf War. See Thomas A. Keaney and Elliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993), pp. 126-128.

45. Foreign Press Center briefing with David Scheffer, Federal News Service, April 5, 1999; emphasis added.

46. White House briefing, "News Conference with President Bill Clinton," Federal News Service,June 25, 1999.

47. Special State Department briefing, Federal News Service, April 9, 1999.

48. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, April 19, 1999.

49. Defense Department briefing, Federal News Service, May 7, 1999.

50. State Department briefing, "Erasing History," Federal News Service, May 10, 1999.

51. Serge Halimi and DonriniqueVidal, "Lessons of War: Media and Disinformation," Le Monde diplomatique, March 2000, online.

52. John Bolton, The World Today with Wolf Blitzer, CNN, November 10, 1999.

53. UN press briefing by the prosecutor for the UN tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, November 21, 2000. See also Christopher Hitchens, "Body Count in Kosovo," Nation, June 11, 2001, and Michael Ignatieff, "Counting Bodies in Kosovo," Neu, York Times, November 21, 1999, sec. 1, p. 1.

54. Anthony Lloyd, "Corpses Testify to State-Run Cover-Up of Kosovo Slaughter," Times (London), August 20, 2001, p. 1.

55. Hitchens."Body Count in Kosovo," p. 9.

56. Dusan Stojanovic, "Officials Detail Milosevic Cover-Up Attempt;' Associated Press, July 28, 2001.

57. UN Mission in Kosovo press release, Noverniber, 10, 1999.