A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (91 page)

On 12 April General Faure brought to his fellow conspirators, gathered in a darkened room, the simple message: “
Challe marche!
”[
3
] The previous day Challe in disgust had heard de Gaulle deliver an “inhuman homily” to the Press, declaring, “Decolonisation is our interest and, therefore, our policy. Why should we remain caught up in colonisations that are costly, bloody and without end, when our own country needs to be renewed from top to bottom?” Algeria, he was now convinced, “will be sovereign, both within and without”, and France would place no obstacle in its way. That was it! Without even informing his wife, Challe decided to act. Planning for the putsch now moved into top gear with Challe at the helm. D-Day was to be the night of 20 April — only eight days away.

Over-hasty planning

As Clemenceau once remarked, for anyone about to revolt “the first day is the best day”. But, as unsuccessful putschists — such as Germany’s Stauffenberg — have also discovered through the ages, the twin necessities of secrecy and speed, hampered by the inevitability of faulty communication, make precipitate planning the greatest and least escapable enemy of conspiracy. The first move was for the four leaders — Challe, Jouhaud, Salan and Zeller — to reach Algeria by various means and set up the standard of revolt there. Key units, such as the 1st R.E.P., would act simultaneously to seize vital centres and officials in authority; then, by snowball effect, the rest of the army in Algeria would follow suit. But, says Challe sadly in his memoirs, though all but one sector commander had declared himself “for us…unhappily this was only true in theory, while nothing had been fixed in practice. We were going to have a sad experience here.” With typically careless improvidence, for instance, the plotters had neglected to consider that, in Oranie, where General Pouilly was hostile, his deputy, General Lhermitte, on whose support they vitally counted, would be away on leave.

There was also, as usual, inadequate thought (and considerable unresolved disagreement owing to the problem of communication) as to what to do next once the military act had been consummated in Algeria. Challe’s programme was to declare solemnly that the French army’s unshakable intention was to remain in Algeria, and then re-launch a new flat-out “Challe Offensive” against the A.L.N., mobilising eight classes of Algerians of both races for this purpose. In three months he would present France a pacified Algeria,
sur le plateau
. He hoped, in effect (comments Jacques Fauvet): “to finish what two regimes, four commanders-in-chief and seven governments were unable to finish in seven years”. During this period of three months, a breakaway Algeria could exist economically off the fat of its oil resources, an embargo being placed on their export to France. For the long-term political future of Algeria, Challe basically supported a return to the principles of Lacoste’s abandoned
loi-cadre
. As regards allies, though known to be more left-wing than either of the other two services, the air force was reckoned to be in the bag — largely on account of the presence in the putsch of both Challe and Jouhaud; as for the navy, Challe relied on an out-of-context remark made by Admiral Querville some months previously: “With the navy you have no problem. Whatever happens, it’s always one government behind!” On the eve of the putsch, Jouhaud seemed even to have half-deluded himself that Premier Debré might prove sympathetic.

The putsch and the C.I.A.?

In few ways did the generals’ self-deception, their interpretation of desires as realities, reach a higher peak than in their almost total lack of thought as to how the outside world might react. To this day Challe insists most emphatically that he “had no contact personally with any foreign countries”, and that in fact he had deliberately avoided all such contacts so as not to incur any possible charge of having been brought in on foreign bayonets. Nevertheless, some of his subordinates appear to have made informal, and highly tentative, soundings with representatives of various countries that might be considered sympathetic, among them Portugal, Spain, Israel and South Africa. But nothing more encouraging or positive had been received than offers of “hang on as long as you can, and then we’ll see” — beyond a commitment allegedly made by a South African contact promising material aid after eight days. The promise was never to be invoked.

One of the more curious illusions of the putschists (especially in the light of subsequent revelations of the far-ranging activities of the C.I.A.) concerns the possibility of an American role. At the time, rumours of clandestine United States involvement ran extremely strong in France. Undeniably, during his time at N.A.T.O. headquarters the popular Challe did make firm friends of a number of high-ranking United States generals, who made no secret of their aversion to what de Gaulle was doing to N.A.T.O., going so far — over a plethora of Scotch — as to express enthusiasm for anyone who might rid France of her turbulent president, or, at least, force him to change his tune. If Challe and his colleagues can be excused for taking these utterances at more than face value, one needs to recall the prevailing atmosphere at the time; just four days before the unleashing of the Algiers revolt, the untried and unproved new Kennedy regime had itself launched its own putsch — the “Bay of Pigs” adventure against Castro’s Cuba. Writing in 1967 and noting how “only belatedly did President Kennedy declare for de Gaulle and openly condemn the rebel generals”, Major Edgar O’Ballance claimed that it was then firmly believed,

that the American Central Intelligence was actually involved in, and had knowledge of some aspects of the planning and preparation, and perhaps also of the revolt itself, but nowadays this is firmly discounted. This is mentioned to show that there might have been sound reasons for Challe expecting American aid that was not forthcoming.

The Senate C.I.A. hearings of 1975, thorough as they were in every other respect, produced no evidence, however, of any collusion with the French putschists of 1961, and Challe too is categoric on the subject, stressing how strongly antipathetic to
Algérie française
United States foreign policy had always been, “right from the very earliest days”. Any contacts made with the C.I.A. were “not on my orders”, and it seems that, if an attempt at a
démarche
was made at all, Colonel Godard was the intermediary.

Nevertheless, once the putsch started, strong rumours that Challe was seen accompanied by senior United States officers in uniform were lent tendentious support by the fact that the United States Military Attaché in Paris happened, quite fortuitously, to be in Algiers on that critical day of 22 April. As far afield as Tunis there were also rumours that the C.I.A. had promised Challe United States recognition if they succeeded — in order to keep the Communists out of North Africa. Any hopes, however, that all this may have engendered in the bosom of the conspiracy were to be swiftly dashed when the United States Ambassador to Paris, General James M. Gavin (himself a former para of utmost distinction), firmly assured de Gaulle that if any rebels attempted to land on French bases where there were American troops, these would at once open fire. In retrospect, the notion of C.I.A. involvement in the putsch seems to have been largely a
canard
launched by the Communist Press in France and Italy.[
4
]

Disagreements and leaks

Challe continues to insist that it was
not
his design to bring down the de Gaulle government, but merely “to change its policy”. Under no circumstances would he, the good republican, back anything that smacked of a fascist regime. This moderation, however, was certainly not shared by his fellow plotters, for the majority of whom Captain Sergent probably speaks:

The absolute key to the whole business was de Gaulle — it was essential that de Gaulle should be removed….If I had known Challe’s thoughts, I would not have gone with him in April 1961…I fought to win the war — not like those generals who fought for the sake of their good consciences.

Challe was also at odds with his fellow conspirators as to whether the army should move simultaneously in France too; Challe argued for Algeria only, on the grounds (rightly) that there would be insufficient sympathy among the home-based forces, and secondly that any division of effort would interfere with his pet hobby-horse — continuation of war against the A.L.N.

There was no dearth of latent divisions within the ranks of the putschists. Despising and distrusting the
pied noir
“ultras”, Challe was adamant about having nothing to do with Susini; he was supported by para leaders like Masselot and Saint-Marc. In his whole-hearted zeal, Saint-Marc had but one reservation: “Don’t let the activists interfere in this affair!” There were also those who, given a free choice, would have kept the inscrutable “Mandarin” out of the action. But that was clearly impossible; nevertheless, it was not till late in the day that a fretting Salan, still isolated in Madrid, was brought fully into the picture. Meanwhile, he in his turn was doing everything he could to conceal the putsch from his
bête noire
, Lagaillarde; it was only on the 18th that Salan, persuaded by Susini of Lagaillarde’s mob-appeal, finally agreed to take him along.

With all these comings and goings it was inevitable that word of the pending putsch should reach the ears of the government in Paris. In army circles in Algeria, what was afoot had been discussed fairly widely; on the night of the putsch a notable conversation took place on the open telephone between Madame de Saint-Hillier, wife of the commander of Massu’s old 10th Division, and Madame de Saint-Marc:

“
Dîtes-moi, Madame
, is your husband up to some dirty trick tonight?”

“Yes, I fear so…!”

Early in March Louis Joxe had heard disquieting rumours in Paris and had passed these on to Jean Morin in Algiers. Snippets of information had flowed into French Intelligence from a variety of sources. These included François Coulet, Morin’s political adviser and de Gaulle’s private listening-post in Algiers; Herr Blankenhorn, the West German Ambassador in Paris; and Lucien Bitterlin, leader of the Mouvement pour la Communauté in Algeria (whose informant was found floating in a river a few days later). The G.P.R.A. itself allegedly filtered back to the French Ministry of the Interior the names of the four generals as well as the precise date of the expected putsch. But, as so often happens, virtually nothing seems to have been done to act on the information received.

The putsch begins

At 19.15 hours on Thursday, 20 April, Challe accompanied by his fellow five-star general, André Zeller, and Colonel Broizat, took off for Algiers in an air force plane. The aircraft had been “purloined” by General Bigot, a
pied noir
who had had a brilliant war career flying Marauder bombers with Challe, and who now commanded the Fifth Air Region in Algeria. His superior, General Nicot, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, turned a blind eye, but sent Challe off with the caution: “I am convinced that you are committing a stupidity….” Lying on their stomachs under packages marked
service cinématographique de l’armée
, and flying at 150 feet to evade the French radar screen, the former Commander-in-Chief was smuggled indecorously out of France. On landing at Algiers there was a first hitch; no reception committee. The plane had been expected at Blida, not Algiers. Once again it took off. This time all was well; the anxiously waiting para officers now had their leader. Salan was still in Madrid, but Jouhaud — free to move without let or hindrance as a resident — was already in Algiers, ostentatiously lunching at the Algiers Yacht Club with his wife so as to mislead the detectives constantly shadowing him. There were immediately other hitches; Challe found an order, bearing his own signature but apparently put out by the 1st R.E.P., postponing the operation twenty-four hours for no very good reason, while Godard, the master intelligence operator, in the excitement of arriving had mislaid in a public corridor his briefcase containing all details of the putsch.

Concealed “underground” at a para headquarters in the Villa des Tagarins, Challe spent the day of Friday the 21st setting up his command network, checking Godard’s tactical plan for the coup — which he apostrophised as “perfect” — drafting his first proclamation for the next day, and making numerous covert telephone calls to confirm the “loyalty” of unit leaders who had declared for the putsch. At Zéralda Captain Sergent, returned from his exile in Chartres to the 1st R.E.P., got his orders to “go” from Major de Saint-Marc. His company, the spearhead of the whole operation, was to head for Algiers, twenty miles distant, shortly after midnight. Inevitably more precise leaks now percolated through to those unsympathetic to the putschists. From Tizi-Ouzou General Simon, in command of Kabylia, one of the senior officers who was to remain rock-firm in support of de Gaulle, telephoned to warn Morin at the Palais d’Été that evening that “something was afoot”. Morin telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Gambiez, who rang back with some irritation, around midnight, assuring the Government-Delegate that all was well: “I’ve spoken to Saint-Marc at Zéralda. He’s just returned from dining with General Saint-Hillier. When I mentioned the movement of troops of the general reserve, why, that made him laugh. Everything at his end is perfectly quiet.” Next, a telephone call from the Ministry of the Interior in Paris gave Morin quite different intelligence. After Gambiez had had two more conversations, in increasing ill-humour, with the Government-Delegate, the deceived but courageous little general set off himself by staff-car towards Zéralda to find out what was happening.