An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (110 page)

Through the fall of 1963, Kennedy remained open to the possibility that Cuban aggression or developments on the island could compel U.S. military action. At a Palm Beach conference with defense and military chiefs in December 1962, he told them that despite the lull in Cuban difficulties, “we must assume that someday we may have to go into Cuba, and when it happens, we must be prepared to do it as quickly as possible.” He asked them to plan an invasion “one, two, three, or four years ahead.” On February 28, when the Chiefs advised him that it would take almost three weeks to launch an attack, he wanted suggestions on how to get “some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising.” At the end of April, he asked McNamara, “Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans up to date?” In October 1963, he told McNamara that “the situation could develop in the Caribbean which would require active United States military intervention.” He doubted that the United States was “prepared for this satisfactorily,” and he asked McNamara to give such plans “the highest priority.” The 150,000 Cuban exiles in Florida also pressed Kennedy to act against Castro or at least to allow them to act on their own. (Kennedy made futile efforts to persuade the exiles to settle in other states, which would blunt their political influence in a presidential contest for Florida’s votes.)

In a speech in Miami’s Orange Bowl to welcome members of the Cuban brigade, whom Castro had released after twenty months of imprisonment, Kennedy celebrated their courage and devotion to Cuba’s freedom. Few of the forty thousand Cuban exiles listening to the president’s speech could imagine that he had anything in mind for Cuba other than its eventual liberation from Castro’s rule. Presented with the brigade’s flag for safekeeping until it could be returned to Havana, Kennedy in emotional, unrehearsed remarks declared, “I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana.” The president’s speech triggered shouts from the crowd of
“Guerra! Guerra!”

The presence of thousands of Soviet troops in Cuba gave Castro’s elimination an enduring appeal, but subversion remained a greater concern. At a post-missile crisis meeting on November 3, when Rusk cited sabotage in Venezuela that was “instigated by a pro-Castro group of Cubans,” Kennedy responded, “We should be as tough as we can in dealing with such situations.” To reduce Cuban influence all over the hemisphere, Kennedy asked U.S. national security officials to pressure Latin governments into lessening, and possibly eliminating, “the flow of students, labor leaders, etc., who go to Cuba for training and indoctrination and then go back to their own country as possible communist organizers.”

In January 1963, an Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs had been set up to replace the failed Mongoose. The unauthorized decision of William Harvey, CIA Mongoose coordinator, to send reconnaissance teams into Cuba during the missile crisis had provoked a Harvey-Bobby shouting match, which, following a blowup between them in September over other Cuban missteps, spelled the end of Mongoose. The new ICC was “to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action,” including the creation of a subcommittee on Cuban subversion. It was to gather information on the dissemination of communist propaganda, arms shipments, and transfers of funds to other Latin American countries. In September 1963, Llewellyn Thompson, relying on the subcommittee’s findings, told Dobrynin that Cuban-trained guerrillas were engaged in “terroristic activities” all over the hemisphere; that Cuba was “furnishing funds to revolutionary groups”; and that Castro and other Cuban leaders were publicly exhorting revolutionaries “to resort to sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla action.”

Yet despite continuing interest in ousting Castro, renewed discussions yielded no better plans than in the previous two years. The ICC wished to encourage “developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes.” But how? The ICC could only suggest applying “increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures . . . until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.” It offered no explanation of just how this would be done or why it would work. And though the CIA had resumed covert activities, including new assassination plots against Castro, they were as ineffective as before. Indeed, their schemes were often ludicrous. In 1962, for example, McCone suggested they could acquire a Soviet fighter plane through defection, purchase, or U.S. manufacture. The plane could then be used “in a provocation operation in which Soviet aircraft would appear to attack U.S. or friendly installations in order to provide an excuse for U.S. intervention.” Although McCone made no mention of Cuba in his memo, the U.S. base at Guantanamo was a perfect fit for his idea. The White House ignored the proposal.

According to Lawrence Freedman, “Kennedy was maintaining his military options [against Cuba] for no better reason than his preference for never closing any options off, just in case circumstances changed.” JFK’s affinity for competing rapprochement proposals makes Freedman’s assertion convincing. In November, as the Cuban missile crisis ended, Castro’s anger at Khrushchev for giving in to U.S. pressure and agreeing to on-site inspections raised the possibility that Castro might actually welcome a rapprochement with the United States. In fact, Castro announced himself ready for an agreement with Washington, but his conditions for an accommodation—an end to Washington’s economic embargo, subversion, exile raids, U-2 overflights, and control of Guantanamo—were more than any American government could accept, especially if it hoped to avoid a firestorm of criticism from Cuban exiles and their American allies.

Castro’s demands did not kill Kennedy’s interest in reducing Cuban-American tensions. In February, after an NSC staffer urged him to talk publicly about isolating Cuba from the Soviet bloc and not other hemisphere countries, Kennedy told newsmen that the communist threat in the hemisphere did not emanate “primarily” from Cuba. Instead, it fed on economic “hardships” suffered by Latin American peoples. If Cuban subversion disappeared, a communist threat would still exist. A few days later, when a Cuban MIG fighter fired at an American shrimp boat in the Caribbean, the administration’s measured protest and a “soft” Cuban reply avoided an escalation in Cuban-American tensions, and, as the
New York Times
reported, became instead an opportunity for the two sides to discuss their overall differences.

Bobby remained the principal voice in the administration for anti-Castro action, and the failure of Mongoose and the CIA to propose practical means of ousting Castro moved him to look to Cuban exiles to rescue their country. In March 1963, when McCone told an NSC meeting that an internal military coup in Cuba was more likely than a civil uprising facilitated from the outside and predicted that congressional pressure over Cuba would ease, Bobby disputed his analysis. He also took exception to Rusk’s advice against giving the Cuban exiles false hopes. The next day, he sent his brother a memo urging “periodic meetings of half a dozen or so top officials of the Government to consider Cuba and Latin America.” He felt that the NSC meeting showed an insufficient commitment to new anti-Castro actions. They needed to “come up with a plan for a future Cuba.” “I would not like it said a year from now,” he explained, “that we could have had this internal breakup in Cuba but we just did not set the stage for it.”

When the President ignored Bobby’s recommendations, Bobby wrote his brother: “Do you think there was any merit to my last memo? . . . In any case, is there anything else on this matter?” Another Bobby suggestion in early April that the administration support a five-hundred-man raiding party also received no reply.

Kennedy was in no mood to exacerbate tensions with Cuba. In March, after Cuban exiles attacked Soviets ships and installations in Cuba, Kennedy expressed concern at the potential damage to Soviet-American relations and the need to prevent further assaults. He told an NSC meeting that “these in-and-out raids were probably exciting and rather pleasant for those who engage in them. They were in danger for less than an hour. This exciting activity was more fun than living in the hills of Escambray, pursued by Castro’s military forces.” McCone warned against openly cutting off the commandos; it would produce “intense public and press criticism” as well as congressional complaints. And while he acknowledged that the raids would probably increase difficulties with Castro and the Soviets, he also saw potential benefits, including a Soviet reappraisal of their Cuban commitment, which might cause them “to open a discussion of their presence [in Cuba] with the United States.” Kennedy was not convinced. Although he was willing to consider encouraging the raiders to strike only at Cuban targets, this was as much to give himself political cover as to promote Castro’s demise. Negotiations with Castro for the release of twenty-two American citizens held in Cuban prisons as CIA agents were one reason for discouraging exile attacks. James B. Donovan, a New York lawyer who had negotiated the release of the nearly twelve hundred exile Cubans captured at the Bay of Pigs in exchange for $53 million worth of medicines, had Kennedy’s approval for these additional talks. In April, Kennedy privately made clear to the exiles that for the time being he wanted no more attacks. By May, the CIA described the exile groups as “puzzled with regard to the American policy toward Cuba and the exile community.” Exile leaders, the CIA also reported, saw “[no] real reason for unity because obviously there is no moral or financial support forthcoming from the U.S. government and without this support there is no point to unity.”

Though Donovan was careful to emphasize his status as a private citizen during his April visit, Castro and Kennedy saw him as an intermediary who might help initiate better Cuban-American relations. During his five days in Cuba, Donovan spent more than twenty-four hours in conversations with Castro. A first meeting on Sunday, April 7, lasted from 1:00
A.M.
to 6:30
A.M.
Castro asked Donovan for suggestions on “how relationships could be established with the United States.” When Donovan replied that American public sentiment toward Castro might be changing, as White House limits on the exiles and majority opinion against a war with Cuba demonstrated, Castro declared that a future “ideal” Cuban government “was not to be Soviet oriented. . . . There was absolutely no chance that Cuba would become a Soviet satellite.” He also stated that “Cuba was not exporting subversion to other Latin American countries.” He pressed Donovan to say how Havana and Washington could achieve better political relations and raised the possibility that Donovan be given some official status that would allow him to continue these discussions in Havana. Castro saw official relations with the United States as a “necessity,” but explained that “certain Cuban Government officials, communists,” currently limited what he could do. A report from Donovan greatly interested Kennedy, especially the part about Castro’s eagerness for better relations and his description of communist constraints.

In May, when Castro visited Moscow for a month, the CIA, White House, and State Department tried to decipher the consequences for Cuban-American relations. Was Castro’s visit meant to remind the United States that no attack on Cuba would be tolerated? Was it an effort to reduce Soviet-Cuban tensions and head off a U.S.-Cuban accommodation? Or was it a demonstration of Khrushchev’s conviction that a Cuban “rapprochement with the U.S. [was] a necessity” and that Castro needed “indoctrination to this end”? Although the State Department acknowledged that the visit might signal the start of a campaign to improve Cuban-American relations, it argued against a rapprochement: An agreement with Castro would be destructive to the development of democracy in Latin America and would touch off a firestorm of domestic political opposition. Yet Kennedy did not want to close off the possibility of reaching an accommodation with Castro. As the NSC conceded at the end of May, all of the existing courses of action proposed for toppling Castro “were singularly unpromising.” Bundy was even more emphatic: The anti-Castro measures being considered “will not result in his overthrow.”

Pessimism about U.S. capacity to alter conditions in Cuba, however, did not deter the administration from agreeing to renewed raids and sabotage. The political consequences of open efforts at rapprochement were more than Kennedy felt he could risk a year before his reelection campaign. Though raids and sabotage would not unseat Castro, they would meet continuing domestic pressures for action and encourage the belief that he was vulnerable to defeat. In September and October, respectively, when Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko told Kennedy of Khrushchev’s unhappiness with these raids, Kennedy conceded that they were serving “no useful purpose.”

Consequently, albeit secretly, Kennedy agreed to further explore the possibility of improved relations. The principal advocate of change was William Attwood, a former
Look
magazine editor, who had interviewed Castro and had served from March 1961 to May 1963 as ambassador to Guinea, where he had helped bring a government friendly to Moscow into the Western camp. Appointed an adviser to the United States Mission to the U.N. in the summer of 1963, Attwood listened attentively to “neutral diplomats,” who suggested “a course of action which, if successful, could remove the Cuban issue from the 1964 campaign.” Stripping the Republicans of the Cuban matter by “neutralizing Cuba on our terms” had considerable appeal to Kennedy. It would also eliminate international embarrassment over the image of a superpower America bullying a weak island country. If rapprochement included the removal of all Soviet forces from Cuba, an end to Cuba’s hemisphere subversion, and Havana’s commitment to nonalignment in the Cold War, Kennedy believed he could sell it to the American public.