Ancient Chinese Warfare (39 page)

A frequently noted variant was the punitive campaign or
cheng
, a term that came to describe “campaigns of rectification” that were
mounted against the rebellious, especially external peoples who were viewed as “barbarians” in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. However, given that the oracular inscriptions sometimes employ the same term to record attacks by peripheral peoples on the Shang,
cheng
had not yet acquired a strongly punitive sense.

Terms that connote more destructive intent include
p’u
,
tsai
,
shun
, and
t’u
. The first of these can probably be translated as to “pound” or “pummel,” while
tsai
, to “damage” or “harm,” is normally understood as meaning to “hunt,” “damage,” or “wound with weapons.”
³²
Though sometimes synonymous with “attack,”
tsai
usually entailed an intent to inflict serious damage rather than just slay or capture and was even used when referring to the damage visited on two Shang cities by the T’u-fang.
³³
The term
t’u,
to “massacre” or “slaughter,” also means something like “punitively attack” but may have merely signified going out to resist the enemy or manifesting awesome power.
³⁴

Tun
, which came to mean “substantial” or “solid” and even “to break” in
Chuang-tzu
, is perhaps best understood as to “pound” or “pummel.”
Yü
would later mean “defend against,” but in the Shang it seems to have referred to highly aggressive actions mounted on the periphery to extirpate the enemy. Armies were frequently dispatched to
chui
or pursue enemy contingents, implying that the latter had already been either defeated or scared off, whereas c
h’ü
, which simply means “to take” or “to seize,” is occasionally used in a field context to indicate the taking of a town or prisoners. Other terms less frequently seen include characters that seem to mean “to ram,” “capture,” “search out and destroy,” and a couple of uncertain but clearly aggressive meanings.
³⁵

The idea of reconnaissance, fundamental to any intelligence reporting system but also a separate function on the battlefield, had already appeared. Surprisingly, whether or not small numbers of scouts were forward deployed, it is large contingents that were dispatched to “look at” the enemy, though the term
shih
almost certainly includes the concept of assessment rather than simple observation. Late in the dynasty the
shih
(army) occasionally seems to have acted as a reconnaissance in force, either to probe (as later articulated in the
Wu-tzu
) or to provoke a meeting engagement.
³⁶

Apart from defending towns subject to border incursions, the
shih
(army) and other contingents that primarily engaged in combat missions
could also be deployed to act as forward or defensive screens.
³⁷
However, as the dynasty progressed the concepts of segmentation and functionality evolved, and the various contingents were sometimes denominated as forward, center, and rear. For example, in one late case actions by an advance unit were immediately followed by an enveloping attack (
chou fa
) mounted by border defensive units (
shu
).
³⁸
However, even in Wu Ting’s era the dispatch of a single army or levying of a subject state’s forces was often a preliminary move, a strike that might achieve victory but would probably need reinforcement and therefore was only intended to open the way (
ch’i
).

Movements to surround enemies out in the field were also undertaken, sometimes by more than one army, and cases of enemy armies surrounding Shang units are similarly known, showing that steppe forces were not incapable of coordinated action.
³⁹
In addition to assaults on settlements, Shang attacks were attempted against fortified towns, but little is known about them and they are unlikely to have been frequent because the defenders would have enjoyed an overwhelming advantage as long as they remained ensconced behind the massive walls, siege equipment not yet having begun to evolve.

Evidence for their relative impregnability is clearly visible in Wu Ting preemptively attacking an enemy proto-state because it had commenced fortifying its town with walls. Even the
Art of War
subsequently compiled in the formative period of siege technology admonished commanders not to waste their resources in foolishly assaulting fortified enclaves because a third of the troops would perish.
⁴⁰
Fortunately for the Shang, pastoral practices predominating in the steppe precluded the seminomadic peoples from undertaking substantial, fixed defenses even though stone fortifications were employed for some villages in Inner Mongolia.

Based on documented practices of subsequent ages, it has often been asserted that weapons were a royal monopoly in antiquity, being furnished to the combatants only when under attack or being mobilized for an external expedition. Many later dynasties even prohibited weapons possession among the populace because they furnished the sole means
of challenging the ruling family. However, particularly with the shift to bronze, even though their fabrication was carried out under governmental auspices, there is no evidence that this sort of proscription was ever implemented in the Shang. Conversely, being a rather brutal era in which the king gradually evolved into an unchallenged despot and martial values had long been esteemed, it seems more likely that members of the regal clans at least possessed weapons, if they did not routinely carry them. Moreover, the enormous number of weapons interred with the deceased throughout the Shang implies sufficient availability for them to be wasted in this fashion. (The late Shang gradually shifted toward the use of replica weapons and bronze ritual items that employed a larger component of more easily formed lead and less copper, thereby conserving the latter while minimizing the labor involved in sharpening and finishing.)

The inscriptions provide vestigial glimpses of formalized training measures in these weapons that apparently carried over into the early Western Chou. Only by becoming familiar with the features of their weapons and practiced in their employment could combatants survive on the battlefield and be contributors rather than liabilities. In addition to acquiring experience in the coordinated employment of the shield and spear or shield and dagger-axe, every warrior had to develop the strength necessary to adroitly wield his piercing or crushing weapon and sustain the effort under combat conditions.
⁴¹
The Shang also had martial dances that were performed with weapons that no doubt contributed to the overall development of martial spirit, but whether they had any training function (such as practicing coordinated movement) is unknown.
⁴²

The degree to which the privileged warrior class may also have been educated in writing, the techniques of command and control, or the rudimentary administrative skills increasingly needed to direct Shang farms or other enterprises remains unknown. Some historians claim that chariot driving, which would become one of the “six arts” or essential accomplishments of every gentleman in the Chou, had already begun to be important. Formal training would also distinguish warriors who had acquired additional capabilities, making them more qualified in some general sense for broader responsibilities.
⁴³

Because archery was highly esteemed and extensive practice is required to develop the skills necessary for firing quickly and accurately in the heat of battle, sons of the nobility certainly underwent formal training. In the middle Warring States period Sun Pin would comment that “those who excel at archery act as the left (of the chariot), those who excel at driving act as drivers, and those who lack both skills act as the right.”
⁴⁴
A good archer could easily fire several arrows per minute from his reflex bow, quickly expending the quiver of ten normally carried. A few inscriptions refer to archery schools, officials being entrusted with training people in archery, archery officers who exercised command functions in combat, and new archers being deployed on the battlefield.
⁴⁵
Although there may have been archery contests under royal auspices such as convened in the early Chou or localized competitions that became the basis for the highly esteemed communal and ritual archery ceremonies that subsequently developed, evidence is lacking.

Nevertheless, oracular inscriptions fail to support claims which are based on late writings that Shang military training was already highly structured and carried out under government supervision. The use of common weapons such as the spear and dagger-axe was probably taught in the time-honored way, by older warriors and low-ranking officers skilled in their use, but again the inscriptions offer no further information. Conflict having been virtually a normal part of warrior life in the Shang, particularly under Wu Ting, a certain amount of “training” no doubt occurred in the family, from early age, to equip men with the necessary skills to fully participate in the society. On the battlefield itself, more skilled and experienced fighters invariably played the leading role, allowing novices to learn under life-threatening conditions and become effective warriors or soldiers, presuming they survived.

Furthermore, whether ensconced in a chariot or fighting on the ground, battlefield clashes required more than warriors simply wielding individual weapons. Early engagements may have rapidly disintegrated into hundreds or thousands of individual clashes and become nothing more than a chaotic melee, yet a tendency toward some sort of cohesive approach and the formulation of basic tactics that might be executed upon command is thus already visible in the Shang. But deploying and maneuvering to create tactical advantages required discipline and the
creation of fundamental organizational units. Whether the clan forces,
lü
, and contingents of 3,000 consisted of numerous squads, platoons, or companies as in later eras and the soldiers trained together in small units for greatest effectiveness remains unknown. The only group training visible in the inscriptions remains the hunt, though there are indications of night exercises as well.
⁴⁶
Claims that complex battle formations (which would have required far more extensive training) were employed in the Shang lack all substantiation, as does their projection back into the legendary era of the Shang’s supposed progenitor, Fu Hsi.
⁴⁷

14.

F
OR REASONS BOTH obvious and subtle, the discovery of metals has always been viewed as a turning point in the history of warfare. Whereas naturally occurring materials such as stone must be laboriously worked and impose numerous constraints because of their weight and inherent characteristics, the ductile properties of metallic alloys convey considerable freedom in designing and fabricating weapons.
¹
Hammering and forging, the first measures, increased productivity, but casting even in simple individual cavities immediately multiplied the quantity and ensured the uniformity critical to combat. (The slightest change in weight or balance can cause fatal awkwardness when a new weapon is first employed, and arrowheads can stray far off target.) Thereafter, multiple casting dramatically increased productive efficiency, particularly for small, expendable arrowheads.

Coincident with increased population, economic prosperity, and centralized administration, China witnessed a sudden surge in mining, smelting, refining, and casting after a lengthy period of incipient development that resulted in industrial-scale production both in dedicated urban workshops and at a few distant fabrication points. This newly organized, “mass scale manufacturing” did not simply augment older methods, but replaced them, enabling warfare to escape the limitations imposed by craft methods that had relied on laborious hammering, chipping, and shaving. Sustained and perhaps stimulated by the increased availability of effective weapons, the scope and intensity of warfare
had already begun to escalate in the Hsia, no doubt prompting increased demand for bronze weapons in a self-reinforcing loop.
²

Although the emergence of metal weapons constituted a monumental step in the evolution of warfare, the impact of copper-based versions in the Hsia and Shang should not be overestimated. Effectively sharp edges can be produced in stone, bone, and surprisingly even bamboo (which can easily be lethal), and deadly spears with stone tips continued to be employed for centuries even after adequate metallic resources had become available.
³
Arrowheads were still being fabricated primarily from bone in the early Chou, and bone and stone continued to predominate in economically impoverished cultures and peripheral areas bereft of metallic resources for centuries more, especially for agricultural implements.

The relatively late appearance of fabricated metal objects in China, in comparison with Russia and the West, has prompted irresolvable arguments about indigenous origination versus diffusion or the hybrid known as “stimulus diffusion.” Apart from issues of national pride, the idea that metallurgical insights are so complex as to be discoverable only once rather than being a common experience of mankind, one not just replicable but repeated in different environments and disparate times, has fanned the dispute. Nevertheless, many Chinese scholars believe that the unique, piece-mold bronze-casting techniques extensively employed to fabricate complex ritual cauldrons in the Shang must have evolved out of advanced ceramic methods and pyro-technology and therefore conclude that Chinese metallurgy is the result of independent discoveries.
⁴

Fortunately, in comparison with questions about technological and productive capabilities and within the greater context of Chinese warfare, this intriguing issue may be deemed somewhat irrelevant. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that Xinjiang in the northwest shows considerable external influence in both alloy composition and object style. Conversely, the metallurgical tradition discernible in more central areas seems to have a strongly indigenous character and may have evolved separately despite the inevitable, sometimes extensive cultural interaction known to have occurred. Furthermore, the advanced bronze technology found in the K’a-yao culture that developed in the Huang-shui river valley south of the Yellow River is itself marked by readily identifiable local
elements intermixed with many common to the central plains, north China, and even northern Eurasia.
⁵