Antiquity recognized that achieving the requisite competence required a long period of dedicated training, any lack of focus in the driver or horses easily resulting in disaster for both.
17
From the Spring and Autumn onward the image of Tsao Fu, the Western Chou charioteer whose superlative skill supposedly allowed King Mu to travel an impossible 1,000
li
a day and penetrate the distant regions, loomed large. More than a hero to be emulated, he continued to be employed in both common parlance and the military writings as an exemplar of measure and constraint. For example, the somewhat enigmatic statement that “Tsao Fu’s skill was not his driving” was explained by saying that “Tsao Fu excelled at ‘looking’ at his horses, constraining their liquids and food, measuring their strength, and examining their hooves. Therefore he was
able to take distant roads without the horses becoming exhausted.”
18
It was also said that because he was essentially in resonance with his horses, able to instinctively respond to them, Tsao Fu was able to hunt successfully and race far.
19
In marked contrast, Yen Hui predicted that the horses of a highly regarded charioteer, Tung Yeh-pi, would soon dissipate their strength. The ruler attributed his remark to mere jealousy, but Yen Hui proved correct when Tung, although capable of arranging a stirring display for the court, exhausted them in actual use. Yen then (perhaps too smugly) commented, “In traversing narrows and going far he exhausted their strength, yet ceaselessly sought more from the horses.”
20
A few well-known incidents in which drivers became disaffected and therefore subverted the mission by deliberately driving into enemy forces have been preserved in the
Tso Chuan
.
21
However, distraction was equally deleterious, as evidenced by a chariot driver at the Battle of Yen-ling (575 BCE), who kept fearfully looking about at his pursuers.
22
The horses could equally affect battlefield operations adversely if they were unfamiliar with the driver or the terrain, as reflected in the following famous incident that unfolded in 645 BCE when a highly motivated Ch’in force invaded Chin in reprisal for several perverse actions on the latter’s part:
23
After Chin suffered three defeats in succession, Ch’in’s army reached Han-yüan [the plains of Han]. The duke of Chin said to Ch’ing Cheng, “These brigands have penetrated deeply, what shall we do?”
He replied, “Since my lord has caused this deep penetration, what can we do!”
The duke retorted, “You are insubordinate!”
He then divined who should serve on his right [in the chariot] and found it would be auspicious to employ Ch’ing Cheng. However, he didn’t use him. Instead, P’u Yang drove the war chariot and a foot soldier from among his clan forces acted on the right. They were hitching a team presented by the state of Cheng to their war chariot where Ch’ing Cheng commented: “For great affairs the ancients invariably employed native horses. They are nurtured by its water and soil, know the hearts of men there, are settled in their instructions and training,
and are thoroughly familiar with the roads. Only when they are used will everything proceed in accord with intentions. But if you now yoke a foreign team to undertake martial affairs, they will prove inconstant when frightened and go against the driver’s intent. When their
ch’i
chaotically races and the
yin
components thoroughly arise in their blood,
24
their engorged veins will protrude prominently. They will look strong outside but be dry within. When they cannot advance or retreat, nor turn and wheel about, you will certainly regret it.”
Once the battle began, Ch’ing Cheng’s analysis proved highly prophetic, because the duke’s chariot turned into a muddy patch and was stopped, resulting in the duke being captured when Ch’ing ignored calls to aid him. Although he did dispatch others, who futilely mounted a rescue attempt, he was of course executed after the duke was released. Before citing a number of these passages, the
T’ai-pai Yin-ching
would assert that “martial horses must be accustomed to the water and grass of the places they dwell and their hunger and fullness should be constrained.”
25
The quality of the horses similarly had a significant battlefield impact. For example, one warrior gave his two best horses to his uncle and brother during a conflict, making it impossible for him to escape the enemy with a lesser team, resulting in his being slain after he abandoned his chariot and fled into nearby trees.
26
Although no equine manual comparable to Kikkuli’s famous short tract on conditioning or Xenophon’s two focal discussions,
The Cavalry Commander
and
The Art of Horsemanship
, ever appeared in China, rules for nurturing horses and employing them for the chariots and eventually the cavalry evolved over the centuries.
Whatever their date of composition, the earliest Chinese passages on the chariot’s employment are now preserved in two Warring States compilations, the
Ssu-ma Fa
and the
Wu-tzu
, the latter attributed to the great commander Wu Ch’i. Though they postdate the Shang by nearly a thousand years and thus represent fully articulated views probably not held a millennium earlier, they identify essential operational issues worth contemplating. In view of the need for even well-conditioned horses to have intervals of both brief and extended rest, the
Ssu-ma Fa
emphasized measured control.
27
In addition, in order to prevent chaos on the battlefield the individual chariots had to be synchronized with each other, as well as be coordinated with the infantry forces:
Campaign armies take measure as their prime concern so that the people’s strength will be adequate. Then, even when the blades clash, the infantry will not run and the chariots will not gallop.
28
When pursuing a fleeing enemy the troops will not break formation, thereby avoiding chaos. Campaign armies derive their solidarity from military discipline that maintains order in the formations; not exhausting the strength of the men or horses; and not exceeding the measure of the commands, whether moving slowly or rapidly.
29
When asked what would ensure victory, Wu Ch’i stressed measure and control:
30
Control is foremost. In general, the Tao for commanding an army on the march is to not contravene the proper measures for advancing and stopping; not miss the appropriate time for eating and drinking; and not completely exhaust the strength of the men and horses. These three are the means by which the troops can undertake the orders of their superiors. When the orders of superiors are followed, control is produced.
If advancing and resting are not measured; if drinking and eating are not timely and appropriate; and if, when the horses are tired and the men weary, they are not allowed to relax in the encampment, then they will be unable to put the commander’s orders into effect. When the commander’s orders are disobeyed, they will be in turmoil when encamped and defeated in battle.
Thorough knowledge of the terrain was vital for avoiding impediments and effectively exploiting the topography so as to reduce the burden on the animals:
[The commander] should arrange the employment of terrain so that it will be easy for the horses; the horses so that they will easily pull the
chariots; the chariots so that they will easily convey the men; and the men so that they will easily engage in battle. If he is clear about treacherous and easy ground, the terrain will be light for the horses. If they have hay and grain at the proper time, the horses will easily pull the chariots. If the axles are well greased, the chariots will easily convey the men. If the weapons are sharp and armor sturdy the men will easily engage in battle.
Although probably compiled in the middle Warring States period prior to the inception of cavalry,
31
the
Wu-tzu
also preserves insights on equine training and care that would subsequently be incorporated intact by the T’ang dynasty
T’ai-pai Yin-ching
and Sung dynasty
Wu-ching Tsung-yao
:
The horses must be properly settled with appropriate grass and water and correct feeding so as to be neither hungry nor full. In the winter they should have warm stables, in the summer cool sheds. Their manes and hair should be kept trimmed and their hooves properly cared for. Blinders and ear protectors should be used to keep them from being startled and frightened. Practice galloping and pursuit, constrain their advancing and halting. Only after the men and horses become attached to each other can they be employed.
All the equipment for the chariots and cavalry such as saddles, bridles, bits, and reins must be complete and durable. Normally the horses do not receive their injuries near the end of the battle but are invariably injured at the start. Similarly, they are not injured so much by hunger as by being overfed. When the sun is setting and the road long the riders should frequently dismount, for it is better to tire the men than overlabor the horses. You should always direct movements so as to keep some strength in reserve against the enemy suddenly turning upon us. Anyone who is clear about this can traverse the realm without hindrance.
32
Horses dramatically affected early civilization and became inextricably entangled in a reciprocal relationship with man. By providing tractive
power for vehicles and mounts for riding they immediately expanded the political, economic, and military horizons of ancient settlements. Although their capabilities were not unique, other animals were either too small (donkeys) or large (elephants), with only the ox being comparable. An ancient Chinese saying summarized their respective strengths: “Horses are the means to go far, oxen the means to bear weight.”
33
Observations recorded over the centuries attest to the horse’s superiority not just in speed but also in ability to deliver a significantly greater percentage of its load to a designated location within a given time frame. However, far more important for the chariot’s utilization in warfare is the horse’s ability to trot at seven to nine miles per hour and to race briefly at fourteen to twenty miles per hour depending on the chariot’s drag.
Even though horses are said to be shy and shun conflict, troops confronting them are normally disconcerted by their size, irrespective of whether they are being employed as cavalry or are yoked to the front of a chariot. Being highly visible embodiments of temporarily constrained “wild power,” their psychological impact, whether in peaceful conditions or the chaos of the battlefield, is great.
34
In measured parades their constrained cadence lends an aura of majesty, and the sound of their pounding hooves as they charge forward augments their impact. Because image can be as important as capability, they were frequently selected for contingents and matched for chariot employment by color, size, and spirit.
Although not as freewheeling and maneuverable as cavalry, chariot forces could still produce immense terror. Particularly when massed in a battlefield charge, their terrifying bulk often shattered formations and scared defenders into breaking and running even after it was historically attested that solid formations that maintained their integrity could withstand such onslaughts. Segmenting and individually racing about, they could cause the chaos and consternation described in Caesar’s observations on the British use of chariots.
35
An incident from the Spring and Autumn period suggests the psychological importance of prestige to the chariot’s riders and undermines claims that chariots merely served as transport for dismounted fighters. By then China’s sedentary core had already been battling the peripheral
peoples for nearly a millennium, dating back to Hsia conflicts with the Tung Yi and others, and some steppe peoples had long fielded forces with chariot components, though others continued to rely solely on infantry. In 541 BCE, when a Chin chariot contingent found itself confronted by a Ti infantry force, the commander ordered his men to dismount and re-form as infantry units. Unwilling to suffer this loss of dignity, one man resisted and was promptly executed, after which Chin scored an unexpected victory.
36
In some civilizations the horse became the focus of culture and center of existence, even being accorded the status of a spirit or god. In China, apart from being sacrificed to honor (or appease) the ancestors, it early on acquired a number of symbolic and mystic roles. Horses were associated with fire and thought to be most active (or rambunctious) in the summer; therefore, the annual sacrifice to the horse was conducted at this time according to the idealized compilation of Chou rites known as the
Chou Li
.
37
Ritual practices eventually came to integrate a wide range of magical and mystical aspects, including specifying the color of the king’s horses so that they would be in accord (or resonate) with the season.
As the horse’s prestige and importance increased, methods for discriminating between sturdy and sickly animals evolved and eventually became codified. Incidental aspects also came to be integrated into the vibrant prognosticatory tradition that would characterize China through the ages. Unfortunately, even though the horse is still a prominent member of the twelve animals found in the popular zodiac, little more than remnants of horse prognostication have been preserved, scattered about a few Sung dynasty compilations. Apart from horses reportedly having given birth to humans, three of the more interesting are:
38
“When horses eat pebbles and stones, the general is courageous, and the warriors strong, their attack will certainly result in victory.”
“When horses sprout horns the ruler will be defeated.”
“If a colt is born without eyes the ruler will suffer long illness; without a mouth or nose, the ruler will not have any sons; without ears, deaf, or without feet, the ruler will lose his
position; without a tail, troops will arise, the state will be weak, and the ruler will lack posterity.”