Around the World Submerged (4 page)

There was a scattering of applause from below, then silence again. The drone of the loudspeakers went on and off several times. Some people near the invisible launching platform bowed their heads. Still not an intelligible word came through the loudspeakers, and I could only assume that the launching was drawing closer. Instinctively, I took a firmer grip on the handrail.

There is always a little apprehension when a ship is launched. Will she start when the trigger is released? Will the motion be accompanied by a jolt which might knock personnel off their feet or over the side? Poised only on two slender slides for her entry into water, our ship was in its most vulnerable condition. Any miscalculation, any error in fixing the location of the stresses, could easily result in damage. Unthinkable, but conceivable—she might even topple over. Surface ships, usually broader than they are tall and essentially flat-bottomed, are not prone to such mishaps, but submarines
are taller than they are wide and their bottoms are round. The catastrophe of rolling over on the crowds below would be appalling. A fine time for me to come up with this, I thought; surely the Electric Boat people ought to know how to launch a submarine, even one as big as
Triton.

Being idle, I also had time to concern myself over how the new ship would behave when she entered the water. Were the many hull openings all closed? Submarines are designed to lie low in the water. Might
Triton
not partially submerge as she entered her element? It had happened before.

The speakers went off again. There was a moment’s interruption, then the blare of a steam whistle and a siren, joined immediately by several others. I felt nothing: no tremor, no shift of weight, no indication of motion—nothing. And then the steel General Dynamics sign on the structure of one of the crane tracks began to glide away. For a long moment I watched it, wondering whether it was really moving or whether it was simply that I wanted it to move. But the sign was actually receding, and within seconds, the vertical stanchions that lined the building ways were flying by.

I turned around just in time to see our stern enter the water with a great froth of white spray, as the propellers dug in. An insignificant amount of water came up over the turtle back and part of the main deck aft—not far. On either side of us, long streamers of white wake marked our dash. And now we were in the river; small boats and pleasure craft of all sorts, heretofore maintaining a cautious distance, raced toward us for a closer look. Up ahead was water, and the naked ways.
Triton
was fully waterborne.

In reporting the ceremony and the launching, the New London
Day
commented that as she slid down the ways,
Triton
attained a speed higher than she would ever see again. Having spent the past seven months studying the power-packed ship, I had some reservations about the accuracy of that statement.

After launching, there is a long period of further construction,
called “fitting out”—a holdover from traditions of the days of sail when “fitting out” amounted to installing masts and guns in a completed hull. It is not the launching, but the commissioning of a ship which signifies her acceptance for service. And, although launched on the nineteenth of August, 1958,
Triton
did not go to sea on trials until September, 1959. She was commissioned into the Naval Service on the tenth of November, 1959.

This period between launching and commissioning is critically important, for this is when the bulk of the crew is assembled and organized into a cohesive ship’s company. In forming a crew, nuclear ships have a special advantage, thanks to Admiral Rickover’s foresight. All our engineering personnel came directly from the
Triton
’s prototype at West Milton, New York, where they had been put through a rigorous training schedule on the dry-land reactor and engine room the Atomic Energy Commission had built there at the Admiral’s behest. These men were already thoroughly trained and qualified in their primary functions. Nuclear ships are unique—and among the special aspects was that our engineering department, in effect, was handed to us ready-made. Its personnel could not have been better prepared for their duties. Proper preparation to take the ship to sea would have been impossible otherwise.

Some of the men came from other submarines, but most of them were in no way connected with the propulsion plant. One, Chester Raymond Fitzjarrald, a Chief Torpedoman’s Mate with some eighteen years service, had last been in my old ship,
Trigger
II, where he had held the position of Chief of the Boat. (In submarines, the “Chief of the Boat” is the key enlisted man, direct assistant to the Executive Officer.) Fitzjarrald was a natural for this post, and was so assigned in
Triton.
In deference to her size, we promoted him a notch and made him “Chief of the Ship.”

Another old shipmate who had been Chief Fire Controlman
in
Trigger
II, Loyd L. Garlock, was given a similar job in
Triton.
A third, William E. Constantine, had been in the
Amberjack
in 1948 and ’49.

It was heartening to have these old friends serving with me, but it was not any of my doing; the Navy cannot operate with favoritism and personal interest. The submarine force is so small (it represents only three percent of the entire US Navy—approximately the same size as the WAVES) that after a few years, one may have served with almost everyone in the force at one time or another.

I did assert myself in one case, however: Lawrence W. Beckhaus, the Gunner’s Mate who had dived from
Salamonie’
s deck into fifty-foot waves to rescue a man swept overboard from another ship, had since become a submariner. He also reported aboard.

Triton
’s crew had begun standing watches on our ship before she was launched; and as our personnel increased, we set up additional watches, not to make more work for ourselves, but because they were necessary. There were two officers on duty at all times, one for engineering and one for the rest of the ship. There was a “below-decks” watch whose job was to patrol the interior of the unfinished ship to guard against unexpected hazards, such as flooding, fire, gas, or failing ventilation; and we set up a crew with regular watches, under the Engineering Officer, to carry out those parts of the nuclear test program which were our immediate concern. The watches went on twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. They are going on still—and will—until
Triton
is decommissioned.

At 4:22
A.M
. on the morning of October 1, 1958, we faced our first trial. The nuclear fuel had not been loaded in the ship, but many of the steam-generating components were installed and were being tested. Steam from an Electric Boat boiler was being led into number two reactor compartment to test a stand-by condenser. Lieutenant Commander Leslie B. Kelly, prospective Engineer Officer, was on board and supervising. Engineman First Class John R. Thomas was in immediate operational control, assisted by Engineman First Class James T. Lightner. As is common with ships under construction, the compartment was haphazardly strewn with heavy timbers and other working gear.

In the corner of the compartment, Ralph Harris, Engineman Second Class, Kelly’s telephone talker, wore a telephone headset
with earphones. In the center of the compartment stood one or two civilian employees of the Electric Boat testing gang. At this juncture, Thomas instructed Lightner to open one of the valves to the stand-by condenser. After he had done so, Lightner bent over to inspect the indicator at the side of the valve to see whether it was fully open, thus, by great good fortune, removing himself from the direct line of die valve stem. The very moment he did so, without any warning, stem and valve wheel shot out of the valve body and hit the steel overhead of the compartment with such force that the steel valve wheel was bent. Great vapor clouds whistled from what was now a direct opening into the steam line, and within seconds the compartment was full of scalding steam; visibility was zero.

Les Kelly immediately assumed charge of the situation. “Secure the steam!” he bellowed, his voice rising above the noise. The main valve was promptly shut, but high-pressure steam continued to spew from the hole in the line until the trapped vapor had been reduced to atmospheric pressure. Kelly quickly ordered that necessary action be taken to safeguard the plant and machinery. Then he directed the compartment to be evacuated and the watertight doors shut. The two Electric Boat workers dived out the forward hatch. Thomas, half-supporting Lightner, who had been scalded about the face and hands, came out aft. Kelly, quickly checking the compartment to see that it was clear, also proceeded aft, and was the last man out—or so he thought.

Calling a muster of all hands, checking by telephone with the forward compartment to see who had left by that exit, Kelly was dismayed to find one man not accounted for. Harris was evidently still inside the steam-filled compartment. Without hesitation, Les dived back through the watertight doorway, calling and groping for Harris in the blinding vapor. Feeling his way back to the spot where he had last seen him, Kelly discovered Harris crawling on the floor, scalded and temporarily
blind, groping his way toward the exit. In a moment, the two men were back outside.

Both Harris and Lightner were hospitalized. Neither was seriously injured, fortunately, and both returned to duty within a few days. Les Kelly’s dive into the steam-filled compartment was the act of a brave man. A few more minutes of steam inhalation would have seriously injured or killed Harris, and of course Les ran the same risk. It was a pleasure to recommend him for a life-saving medal.

As a result of an investigation to discover why the valve stem blew out under pressure, a new valve was designed to make this mishap impossible in the future; all submarines with similar installations made similar changes.

In April, we experienced an accident which might have had even more serious consequences. A fire broke out in the ship’s galley from an improperly installed deep-fat fryer, and within minutes flames, sucked by fans, broke out in the ship’s ventilation lines in the immediate vicinity. Most of the Electric Boat civilian personnel rushed out immediately to notify the fire department, but one man, A. B. Evans, remained behind, aiming smothering streams of carbon-dioxide from a fire extinguisher at the base of the flame. The men from
Triton
’s below-deck watch, George W. McDaniel, Sonarman First Class, and D. R. Quick, Engineman Second, swung rapidly into action. The ship’s Duty Officer, Lieutenant George A. Sawyer, Jr., had just completed his midnight inspection of the ship and had returned to our temporary headquarters on a barge moored nearby. Aroused by telephone, he mobilized all the temporarily off-watch people in the duty section and had them aboard
Triton
within a few minutes.

Lieutenant Tom Thamm, Engineering Duty Officer aft, ran forward to see what help he could give, calling up all the men he could spare from his test program. (It was impossible to leave this entirely untended.) Seizing fire axes, the
Triton
crew chopped away at the ventilation line, where the fire now was
blazing furiously. Quick had stopped the ventilation fans, thus reducing the oxygen supply to the flames, and duty-section electricians cut off all electricity in the area, thus removing the basic source of the fire. Others set up temporary ventilation ducts to remove the acrid fumes and smoke from the space.

Firemen arrived within minutes, but the fire was already out. Estimated cost of the repair to the ruined galley was fifty thousand dollars. Had the fire been allowed to rage unchecked even five minutes longer, the loss might have been nearer a million dollars.

These two incidents, the faulty steam valve and the galley fire, illustrated the kind of thing that can happen to a ship going into commission. In each case, had our ship’s company not been present, the damage would have been much more severe; serious injury or even loss of life could have resulted.

But naval ships, building or already built, are not supposed to have fires. Proper checking of the deep fat fryer before the test should have turned up the faulty wiring. For two days I worried over the barbs I could expect from the “Kindly Old Gentleman,” Admiral Rickover. But when he finally telephoned, he was friendly and understanding, asking whether there would be any delay in our testing program or in meeting our date for sea trials. When I assured him there would be no delay, he enjoined me only to investigate the causes of the accident and be sure they were eliminated. I told him this was already being done, and he hung up the phone.

Some time in February our first reactor received its load of precious nuclear fuel. As “Officer-in-Charge,” I signed the inspection report and somewhat nervously acknowledged responsibility for a reactor core worth several million dollars. As soon as it was received, the uranium fuel was stored beneath a headplate weighing twenty tons, and, though it has been partially used up, I am very sure it is still there.