Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (5 page)

Read Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe Online

Authors: Ian Castle

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Military, #World, #Reference, #Atlases & Maps, #Historical, #Travel, #Czech Republic, #General, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #19th Century, #Atlases, #HISTORY / Modern / 19th Century

While these searches were bringing results, Bonaparte ordered Général de division Savary, a trusted aide with a great aptitude for intelligence work and who commanded the Gendarmerie d’Élite, to intercept the landing of the French prince, presumed to be the comte d’Artois. From a cliff top at Biville, Savary employed lantern signals in an attempt to lure the British vessel to discharge her cargo, but despite his best efforts, the captain grew suspicious and returned to England.

During his communications with the British envoy in Munich, Méhée de la Touche learnt of the plans of the duc d’Enghien, who, it was suggested, planned to lead an
émigré
force into France when war returned to Europe. At the time, the duke had settled just beyond the borders of eastern France, at Ettenheim in Baden, roughly 35 miles south of Strasbourg and close to the Rhine. This news reached the first consul on 1 March, prompting an investigation. The subsequent intelligence revealed that the duke was in league with another French general, Charles Dumouriez, considered a traitor since his desertion from the army, following his defeat at Neerwinden in 1793, and subsequent sojourn in England. Bonaparte’s fury knew no bounds when he suddenly discovered enemies on his very borders and determined to end these constant intrigues against him once and for all.

But the first consul’s spy network had let him down. Dumouriez was still in London and had never returned to France. The duc d’Enghien’s companion was an innocent
émigré
, the Marquis de Thuméry, whose name – unfortunately for him – when spoken with a German accent was mistaken for ‘Dumouriez’. The interrogation of one of Cadoudal’s servants had provided the flimsiest scraps of intelligence: but they were enough to lead Bonaparte to the erroneous conclusion that the duc d’Enghien and Dumouriez were masterminding the plot against him, while Cadoudal was merely their weapon of execution. Ignoring the fact that these two men resided in neutral Baden, the first consul demanded their arrest and trial. What was more, he wanted to set an example to all would-be plotters. He would strike a blow, both swift and deadly, to instil fear into all who opposed him. He discussed the situation with his supporting consuls and ministers – some of whom raised doubts about the implications – but Bonaparte was determined to have his way, and ordered the seizure of d’Enghien and ‘Dumouriez’.

On the evening of 14 March, under cover of darkness, a detachment of French cavalry crossed the border between France and Baden. At dawn they surrounded the house where the duke was living. There is a suggestion he received a warning of the danger and resolved to leave Ettenheim and join his grandfather. This journey required him to travel through Austrian territory, and it was while he awaited the appropriate travel documents he that was
seized.
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The duke, Thuméry, and a secretary – along with a batch of papers – were bundled out of the house and escorted speedily back to France, where they were held outside Paris at the Château de Vincennes.

The first consul authorised a trial by court martial, which would allow for a swift judgement and sentence. The recently appointed governor of Paris, the dashing cavalryman Joachim Murat, received instructions from Bonaparte to select the officers to form the court martial, a task he found repugnant. One of those selected, Général Hulin, claimed that the seven officers had not, ‘the least idea about trials; and, worst of all, the reporter and clerk had scarcely more experience’.
4
GD Savary, back in Paris after his failed mission to Biville, received orders to proceed immediately to Vincennes to carry out the sentence of the court martial. Two days after the seizure, Bonaparte learnt of the error concerning Thuméry: he brushed the matter aside and concentrated on the duke. The papers taken with the duke confirmed his communications with the British government and of his hope to lead a force in a future European war, but in no way did they suggest his involvement with Cadoudal: the reason for his arrest.

The court martial went ahead on 20 March. The direction of the trial now changed, following the intelligence gleaned from the duke’s papers, his complicity in the Cadoudal plot reduced to a minor charge in the prosecution. When questioned, he admitted bearing arms against France, accepting payments from Britain, and his desire to fight against the current French government. He requested an interview with the first consul, which the court was prepared to assent to, but Savary, observing proceedings and well aware of his master’s wishes for a swift resolution, advised Général Hulin against it. Although showing reluctance to pass sentence immediately, the court eventually proceeded, finding the duc d’Enghien guilty of conspiracy against the State and sentencing him to death. The whole process had taken but a few hours and was completed early the following morning. With sentencing concluded, Savary lead the prisoner directly out into the dry moat of Vincennes. Denied a priest, the duke bowed his head in prayer as Savary’s gendarmes formed a firing squad, the poignancy of the moment and the enormity of the deed framed in the light of a few flickering lanterns. Standing with his back to the chateau wall just a few feet from his grave, the duc d’Enghein faced the firing squad. On Savary’s order, the guns fired and the duke collapsed to the ground, shot through the heart.

When the news emerged there was widespread shock in France. Many awakened for the first time to the ruthless side of the first consul’s nature. Even Bonaparte’s mother criticised him for what he had done: but there were no more Bourbon plots against his life.

For the main conspirators in the Cadoudal plot there was to be no reprise. On 6 April, just over two weeks later, Pichegru was discovered dead in his prison cell. Initially rumours circulated that he had been murdered, but later
these were discredited and it appears more likely that he took his own life. Moreau, Cadoudal, and the other Royalist conspirators taken in February and March were put on trial. Despite a determined cross-examination of a number of witnesses, the prosecution was not able to indict Moreau directly in the plot, other than ascertain that he had met with Pichegru and was aware of the plot but did not report it to the authorities. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, which, with a pretence of clemency, Bonaparte commuted to banishment to America. Of the others, twenty were sentenced to death, although eight of noble birth later had their sentences commuted to imprisonment. For Cadoudal and the remaining eleven there was no reprieve: they were executed on 10 June 1804.

The enormity of his decision regarding the duc d’Enghien stayed with Bonaparte all his life. Even in his Last Will and Testament he remembered it and continued to defend his actions:

‘I caused the duc d’Enghien to be arrested and tried, because that step was essential to the safety, interest, and honour of the French people, when the comte d’Artois was maintaining, by his own confession, sixty assassins at Paris. Under similar circumstances, I should act in the same way.’
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To Fouché, recently removed from the post of minister of police, and now a senator, the decision was a bad one. To him is attributed the condemnation: ‘It is more than a crime; it is a mistake’.

To the crowned heads of Europe, Bonaparte simply became an unrestrained monster and murderer. Their fury knew no bounds. It was the spark that ignited the flames of war.

_________

*
Napoleon Bonaparte to Lord Whitworth, British Ambassador in Paris, 13 March 1803.

Chapter 3

The Eagles of Europe

‘Eagles don’t breed doves.’
*

The shock waves created by the arrest and execution of the duc d’Enghien reverberated around Europe. The dynastic heads, as one, condemned what they considered an act of murder and territorial violation. Nowhere was this response more pronounced and more damning than in Russia: when the news reached Alexander his sense of outrage was unbounded. To the tsar, not only was Bonaparte guilty of murder, but he also directly insulted Russia: for when French troops seized the duke they violated territory ruled by the venerable margrave of Baden, father of Alexander’s wife, the Tsarina Elizabeth. The king of Sweden shared the tsar’s indignation: he was married to another of the margrave’s daughters. Alexander declared a period of mourning at the Russian court and issued a note of protest to Paris. The carefully chosen response wounded the tsar deeply, hinting as it did, at Alexander’s own complicity in the murder of his father, Paul I, as well as suggesting British involvement.
1
Unwilling to respond, Alexander called a meeting of the State Council in April 1804, when a decision was taken to issue a series of demands to France. It was August before Bonaparte bothered to issue a repudiation.

Russia put aside her plans for domestic reform and focused attention on drawing together a powerful alliance against France. Talks began with Sweden and Prussia, and discussions with Britain reopened too. There, the resumption of a state of war with France in 1803 had led to mounting pressure on Prime Minister Addington, until, with his support fading away, he resigned in April 1804. William Pitt swept back into office after an absence of three years and resumed his more belligerent stance. Pitt was determined to counter the threat of French invasion, and welcomed this new dialogue with Russia.

In Paris, the plot against Bonaparte’s life focused attention on the vulnerability of his position and created an opportunity for open discussion on
the question of hereditary rule. The argument that its introduction would negate the benefits of Bonaparte’s assassination to any conspirators and provide an effective block to any Bourbon return gained much support, and within two months of d’Enghien’s death, the Senate conferred the title of ‘emperor of the French’ on Bonaparte. The date of 2 December 1804 was set for a magnificent coronation, and First Consul Bonaparte became Emperor Napoleon. On the streets of Paris the failure of the Bourbon conspirators gave rise to the witty adage: ‘They came to France to give her a king, and instead gave her an emperor.’ The old established rulers of Europe looked on with heightened disdain.

Russia’s overtures to Prussia in May 1804 brought about a secret declaration of support if France attempted new inroads into German territory. The following month government ministers in London and St Petersburg were in the early stages of discussing a grand alliance involving Russia, Britain, Austria, Sweden, and if negotiations went well, with Prussia too. But when talks began in earnest, in September, it soon became clear that British and Russian aims were divergent. Russia looked to the establishment of lasting European peace based on a balance of power, secured by Britain and Russia on either flank. But her views on the redrawing of national boundaries on the natural lines of rivers, mountains, and seas were strongly opposed by Britain, which demanded the return of France to her pre-Revolutionary boundaries. And while Russia hoped France would respond positively to a final chance for reconciliation, Pitt remained adamant that only a victorious war would bring peace to Europe: one, of course, that deflected the weight of a threatened French invasion away from Britain’s shores.

During the course of these difficult negotiations Czartoryski confided: ‘We had to make England understand that the wish to fight Napoleon was not in itself sufficient to establish an indissoluble bond between her government and that of St Petersburg.’ Yet Russia did give ground to Britain, aware that without her essential financial subsidies the armies of Europe could never uphold the threat of military action. After weeks of discussion, Britain presented a written response to Russia’s recommendation, which, with elegant diplomatic chicanery, purported to agree with the principles of the Russian proposal, before proceeding to amend them. It arrived at St Petersburg in February 1805.

While these discussions slowly progressed, other diplomatic moves saw Sweden terminate friendly relations with France in September 1804 and sign an agreement with Britain in December. Austria and Russia moved closer together too. In a letter to Kaiser Francis, Alexander excited Austrian fears when he wrote of France gaining strength from the isolation of the great powers, adding that: ‘Bonaparte has no other rule of conduct than an unquenchable thirst of power, coupled with a desire for universal dominion.’ With the Austrian army still lacking the cohesion, organisation, and manpower to present a determined defence against French aggression, Francis agreed a
treaty with Russia in November that provided for mutual support against French aggression. Three months earlier he had taken the opportunity to strengthen his own position by relinquishing the fading dignity of the crumbling Holy Roman Empire. This dated assemblage of German territories, owing limited allegiance to the Habsburg monarchy, no longer held its former strength and inroads by France along the Rhine further threatened its 900-year existence. Already, some fifty years earlier, the eighteenth century French philosopher Voltaire had condemned it as ‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire’. Therefore, Francis II of the Holy Roman Empire loosened his ties and consolidated his realm by assuming the title ‘Kaiser Francis I of Austria’.

After his coronation, Napoleon continued to extend his influence in Italy and on 26 May 1805, he crowned himself ‘king of all Italy’ in Milan. Nine days later, he annexed the Ligurian Republic, with it’s all-important port of Genoa – fertile recruiting ground for the under strength French navy. Europe saw the move as confirmation that Napoleon had not curbed his territorial ambitions …

Anglo-Russian negotiations now reached an impasse. A treaty drawn up in St Petersburg in April 1805 was despatched to London for Pitt’s approval, before providing the basis of an ultimatum to Napoleon. But the Russian understanding of Britain’s position, even after months of discussion, was flawed. There were a number of clauses that angered Pitt, but amongst them there was one that stated Britain would hand over Malta to a Russian garrison. The Russians had not raised this point in discussions and Pitt refused to ratify the treaty. When the news reached St Petersburg, Czartoryski reported that he had never seen the tsar, ‘more dissatisfied and more out of control’.
2
Determined to bring matters to a head, Alexander decided to send the ultimatum to Napoleon anyway, assuring Pitt that Britain would not be committed to any agreement without her assent. But within a few days of its despatch came news of Napoleon’s annexation of Genoa. Alexander recalled the document immediately, exclaiming: ‘This man is insatiable, his ambition knows no bounds; he is a scourge of the world; he wants war; well he shall have it, and the sooner the better.’
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