[At the age of twenty-nine he had played a brilliant part in the
kidnapping of two British intelligence agents, Captain Payne-Best and
Major R. H. Stevens, at Venlo, in Holland. For this he had been
decorated personally with the Iron Cross by Hitler.]
He had known for a long time that there was something up between
Himmler and Langbehn; now he saw the opportunity to put his chief in
a cast-iron frame.
[ Or did he? Professor Trevor-Roper, the leading authority on the
relations between the high Nazis, believes that Schellenberg's
loyalty to Himmler rules this out. The Langbehn episode still has
many un-explained features. But a clue to Schellenberg's attitude can
perhaps be found in his behaviour in the affair of the Jewish trains,
(see Ch. 22.)]
When Langbehn and his wife crossed the border into Germany, they
were immediately arrested on Schellenberg's orders. Thinking at first
that this might be some sort of device to cover their tracks, and
still confident in the patronage of the Reichsführer SS, the
Langbehns consented meekly enough, and made no immediate attempt to
contact Himmler. Schellenberg, meanwhile, had taken the text of the
decoded telegram to "Gestapo Müller," Himmler's
deputy, and a man who made no secret of his ambition to succeed the
National Leader. Müller knew exactly what to do with such an
incriminating document. He showed it immediately to Bormann. That
same afternoon it was on Hitler's desk.
Matters had now gone so far, so fast, that Himmler must have been
considerably taken aback when confronted with the facts concerning an
emissary whom he still fondly imagined to be "conferring"
in Berne. Regrettably, the trail of evidence peters out here, and we
have no knowledge of the last act. Himmler must have talked his way
out of it, as the whole affair blew over. Langbehn remained in jail,
and was later transferred to Mauthausen concentration camp. Himmler
managed to postpone his "friend's" trial on one pretext and
another, so Schellenberg and Müller were unable to get anything
on Popitz. The latter, with considerable courage, twice tried to
approach Himmler and secure Langbehn's release, but the Reichsführer,
not unnaturally, refused to see him.
Then, after the 20th July
attentat
, Popitz was arrested and
Langbehn hauled out and sentenced.
[Some idea of the state of mind of the wretched Popitz at this
time can be gathered from Himmler's own account (
Vierteljahreshefte
fuer Zietgeschicte
Vol. IV, 575):
. . . since that time . . . Herr Popitz looks like a cheese.
When you watch him he is as white as a wall; I should call him the
living image of a guilty conscience. He sends me telegrams, he
telephones me, he asks me what is the matter with Dr. X, what has
happened to him; and I give him sphinx-like replies so that he does
not know whether I had anything to do with what happened or not.
]
Anything the wretched doctor may have said at that time went
unheard in the discordant chorus of the Freisler trials. Even so, the
Reichsführer took precautions. A letter from Kaltenbrunner to
Lammers is a good example of the SS tail wagging the constitutional
dog:
I understand that the trial of the former minister Popitz and
the lawyer Langbehn is to take place shortly, before the People's
Court. In view of the facts known to you, namely the conference of
the
Reichsführer-SS
with Popitz, I ask you to see to it
that as a practical matter the public be excluded from the trial.
I assume your agreement and I shall dispatch about ten of my
collaborators to make up an audience. As to any others present, I
request the right to pass on their admittance.
The SS at last had its fun with Langbehn (after he had been
sentenced to death), and tortured him "in the most barbarous and
horrible manner," finishing by tearing off his genitals.
One curious side issue is that Himmler does not seem to have borne
any ill will against Schellenberg for his part in the affair. It may
be that the Reichsführer never realised who had betrayed his
scheme, or that he blamed only Müller. Two years later, indeed,
Himmler was to make use of Schellenberg himself, casting the head of
the SD in the same role as that which Langbehn had played at
Berne—but that is to anticipate the events of April 1945.
While Dr. Langbehn had been exploring possibilities of a separate
peace in Berne, Army Group South was slowly disintegrating under a
sequence of hammer blows that alternated along the length of its
front. On 2nd August the 4th Panzer Army was monitoring such heavy
traffic with its radio intercepts that it reported to Manstein that a
fresh Russian offensive there was "inevitable within two or
three days." Air reconnaissance also showed that still more
Russian armour was being moved south into Vatutin's command from
Sokolovski, at Orel. Manstein immediately ordered the return of the
3rd Panzer Corps, with its two additional SS divisions, from the
Mius—but the ink was barely dry on the teleprint when Vatutin's
attack broke, at dawn on 3rd August.
The Russians had struck at the junction of the 4th Panzer Army and
Army Detachment Kempf, west of Belgorod. Both these formations were
very short of tanks, and were forced to give ground immediately. The
majority of their vehicles were still under repair or being serviced,
and were overrun in the field workshops. Thrusting down the interarmy
boundary, the Russian armour fanned out to the west and south,
opening a gap between the two German commands which by 8th August had
widened to over thirty miles. The 3rd Panzer Army was still lumbering
along the railway network from Zaporozhe, diverted from Kharkov to
Poltava, then to Kremenchug. "It was clear, however, [Manstein
wrote] that no action by these forces, nor indeed by those of the
Army Group as a whole, could provide any long-term answer to the
problem. Our divisional casualties were already alarmingly high, and
two divisions had broken down completely as a result of the
continuous overstrain. ... It emerged beyond any possible shadow of
doubt that the enemy was now resolved to force an issue against the
German southern wing."
Just before the Russian offensive started, Manstein had asked OKH
for two Panzer divisions to be transferred to the northern wing of
his front from the adjoining command of Kluge's Army Group Centre.
The subject came up at a Führer conference for which an almost
complete transcript exists. Besides the incidental light which is
shed on other matters, this record is of unique interest in showing
how the war in the East was run at the highest level.
Hitler, [who has been holding forth about the situation in Italy]
... I don't know where the Duce himself is. As soon as I find out,
I'll have him brought out by parachutists. In my opinion, that whole
government, like that in Belgrade, is a typical
putsch
government, and one day it will collapse, provided that we act
immediately. I can't take action unless I move additional units from
the East to the West. In case your offensive can't be carried
through, we must make plans for reorganising your line. Are these
your maps?
[The "offensive" referred to was that of the 3rd Panzer
Corps against the Mius bridgehead of Malinovsky.]
Zeitzler:
They are. Marked according to report.
Hitler:
Will you please explain your overall position to
me. The point is I can't just take out units from anywhere. I have to
take politically reliable units. That means, first of all, the 3rd SS
Panzer Division, which I can only take from the Army Group South.
That means that you will have to send other units down, and one can
free those units only by liquidating this whole business, by giving
up this whole bulge. Perhaps the front should also be shortened at
other, minor, places.
Kluge:
Well, my Führer, the present situation is that
a certain pressure from strong elements is being felt here. However,
this has not had the full effect, because they had trouble crossing
the Oka River.
[He means the Russians; very frequently in this conference, "they"
or "he" means the Russians.]
Unfortunately, they were able to score a fairly deep penetration
yesterday, in the area of the 34th Army.
[There is a mistake in the transcript; no German army numbered
higher than 25 existed; probably he meant the 4th Army, which was
fighting in this area.]
However, this is being compensated by counterblow, although our
own forces there are relatively weak. Here was the breakthrough, in
the area of the 297th Division, which could be compensated somewhat
by the withdrawal of the whole line.
Hitler:
Are you on
that
line?
Kluge:
No. On
this
line.
Zeitzler:
The other map shows the exact position today. Up
there is the withdrawal.
Hitler:
Please show it to me on this map.
Kluge:
Well, the present situation is that yesterday there
was a very strong attack here, although it was not as strong as we
had expected. Rather, it was weaker and narrower, and although it
resulted in a certain penetration, it could be stopped. Principally,
there were large tank attacks—here there were 150 tanks, of
which 50 were knocked out. The plan is now to go into this so-called
Oka position, to cross over here, to shorten the Bolkhov
bulge—tonight. I would like to take permission along right away
to move the line away from Bolkhov and to shorten the whole business
here. In general, our intention is to retreat here again, and then to
move into this line. That's the immediate plan. After this minor
withdrawal has been carried out, the general withdrawal should take
place. In preparation for this movement—which has to take place
in a very constricted area, especially here in the north—the
Gross Deutschland
has advanced with its reconnaissance forces;
has thrown back the enemy here; although it struck fairly heavy
resistance here. I don't know how that is going to develop today. At
any rate, they are to reach the edge of this land, which is marked as
swamp. Actually, that is no swamp; unfortunately, it is terrain which
can be crossed safely.
Zeitzler:
This morning the enemy made stronger attacks.
Kluge:
Has he attacked there?
Zeitzler:
Yes, and also an armored brigade.
Kluge:
We knew about that already yesterday. In this area
the enemy has two infantry divisions—that is, two good
ones—plus one armored brigade, and another brigade is being
moved up.
Hitler:
Tell me, where are those hundred Panthers?
Kluge:
They aren't there yet. They are just being assembled
after having been unloaded.
Zeitzler:
The last trains were all there on the 26th.
Kluge:
They are there. Their crews are, too, though not all
of them.
Hitler:
And where are they?
Kluge:
In Berdyansk. Well, there is rather strong pressure
here, which is not limited to this place but unfortunately also
extends to this very weak salient, which, in my opinion, is the most
dangerous place. It is held by some jumbled miscellaneous troops that
first tried to hold this line but have now been pressed back. The
following development could become very unpleasant if the enemy could
take this road to the station at Reseta. We are still using that for
moving from south to north. For that reason I have requested that the
113th Division be committed up here with the 4th Army, next to the
Orel rail line and next to the highway . . .
Zeitzler:
The Führer has already given his permission.
Kluge:
. . . and to compensate for that, I would like to
pull out two divisions; first one division which was supposed to be
sent
there
right away, and then another which we really also
wanted to put into this locality, in order to strengthen this wing;
because
here
we ought not to retreat one step more. That would
be a very unpleasant development.
Here there are strong forces on the advance, which are far
superior to our own—even tanks, but comparatively few of them;
the mass of their tanks is pressing down in this direction, toward
the
Gross Deutschland
, and of course
here
, too.
Hitler:
They must be gradually losing their tanks, too.
Kluge:
Certainly, that is clear. We have knocked out quite
a number of them. Just the same, he is still attacking with strong
tank units so that at present we have our hands full in coping with
this crowd. That is the present situation.
Now we want to withdraw into this shortened Oka line, and on this
basis the evacuation of Orel and everything that belongs to it is
supposed to take place, and then—
Zeitzler:
Then the next point is the
Gross Deutschland
,
sir.
Kluge:
My Führer, I still wanted to add that in order
to create a sound foundation for further movements, Model and I both
feel that the attack of
Gross Deutschland
, which is in
progress, and another attack are necessary and would establish a
solid line.
[Generaloberst Model was then commander of the 9th Army, belonging
to Kluge's Army Group Centre.]
Hitler:
I don't think that this will work any more. Will
the
Gross Deutschland
have to go through the woods?
Kluge:
Certainly not. That would have been forbidden. But
the attack of the 253rd Division—
Hitler:
I want to review the overall situation again. The
problem is to pull out a fair number of units in a very short time.
This group includes, first of all, the 3rd Panzer Division, which I
must take from the Army Group South, which itself has to cover a very
broad front. ... In other words, it is a very difficult decision, but
I have no choice, pown there I can only accomplish something with
crack formations that are politically close to Fascism. If it weren't
for that, I could take a couple of army Panzer divisions. But as it
is, I need a magnet to gather the people together. I don't want to
give up the Fascist backbone, because in a short time we will rebuild
so many things. I am not afraid that we can't manage that, if we can
hold northern Italy.