Believing Bullshit: How Not to Get Sucked into an Intellectual Black Hole (17 page)

Probably not. Evidentialism faces some obvious difficulties. Perhaps the most glaring is this: suppose I believe some claim A because I suppose I have supporting evidence B. But now ought I to believe
that evidence B obtains
? If evidentialism is true, it seems I ought to believe B obtains only if I possess, in turn, evidence for that—C, say. But then I should believe that C obtains only if there is, in turn, evidence for
that
, and so on ad infinitum. Evidentialism seems to entail that,
before I adopt any belief, I must first acquire evidence to support an infinite number of beliefs
—which, as a finite being, I can't do. In short, Clifford's injunction that I ought not to believe anything on the basis of insufficient evidence appears to have the disastrous consequence that I
ought not to believe anything at all
!

A PROBLEM FOR PLATO'S THEORY

Let's now return for a moment to Plato's theory that knowledge is justified true belief. It is widely supposed that Plato's theory runs into a similar problem. The theory says that, in order to know that such-and-such, my belief must be justified. But if my justification is supplied by another belief of mine, then, presumably, I am only justified in believing the first belief if I am justified in believing the second. But then the second belief will require a third belief to justify it, and so on ad infinitum. So, in order to justify even one belief, I will have to justify an infinite number. Being a finite being, I cannot justify an infinite series of beliefs. It seems, then, that I cannot justify any belief and thus
cannot know anything at all
!

How do we escape from this conclusion? The theory of knowledge known as
reliabilism
provides one solution.

RELIABILISM

Here is a simple reliabilist theory of knowledge. In order for person a to know that P,

1) P must be true,

2) a must believe that P, and

3) a's belief that P must be brought about by the fact that P via a reliable mechanism.

You will notice that the first two conditions are the same as for Plato's definition of knowledge. But the third is different and requires a little explanation.

What's meant by a “reliable mechanism”? A reliable mechanism is a mechanism that tends to produce true beliefs. My sense of sight is a fairly reliable belief-producing mechanism. It allows my beliefs to fairly reliably track how things are in my environment.

Suppose, for example, someone puts an orange on the table in front of me. Light bounces off the orange into my eyes, which in turn causes certain cells to fire in my retina, which causes a pattern of electrical impulses to pass down my optic nerves into my brain, eventually bringing about my belief that there's an orange before me. Remove the orange, and that will in turn cause me, by means of the same mechanism, to believe the orange has gone.

The same goes for my other senses—they are fairly reliable belief-producing mechanisms. Blindfold me and put me in a crowded street, and my ears and nose will, in response to the sound of car horns and the odor of hot dogs, cause me to believe I am in a crowded street. Move me to a fragrant garden filled with singing birds, and those same senses will cause me to believe I am in such a garden. My senses of sight, touch, smell, hearing, and taste cause me to hold beliefs that tend to accurately reflect how things actually are around me.

I don't say our senses are 100 percent reliable, of course.
Sometimes we get things wrong. They are occasionally prone to illusion. But they are
fairly
reliable.

Let's now apply our reliabilist definition of knowledge. Suppose someone puts an orange on the table in front of me. I look at the orange and so come to believe there's an orange there. Do I
know
there's an orange on the table?

According to our reliabilist, I do. The simple reliabilist theory says that if (1) it's
true
that there's an orange there, (2) I
believe
there's an orange there, and (3) my belief is produced via a reliable mechanism—for example, sight—by the presence of an orange there, then I
know
there's an orange there.

Now here is an interesting twist to this theory—a twist that will prove relevant to our discussion of psychic powers and George Bush's gut. Notice that, according to reliabilism, in order to know there's an orange on the table, I need not
infer
there's an orange there. I need not arrive at my belief on the basis of good grounds or evidence.
No evidence is required.
All that's required is that I hold the belief and that it be produced in the right sort of way—by a reliable mechanism.

Also notice that if, by saying that a belief is “justified,” we mean we have good grounds for believing it, then reliabilism says that
we can know without justification.
In which case, the regress problem with Plato's theory that knowledge is justified true belief is also sidestepped by reliabilism.

RELIABILISM AND PSYCHIC POWERS

Many contemporary philosophers accept some form of reliabilism (although they have developed it in various ways). You can now see why reliabilism might also appeal to, say, a psychic who believes she “just knows” things about the dead.

Suppose a psychic (notice that by “psychic” I mean someone who is supposed to have psychic powers, whether or not they actually do)—call her Mary—finds herself believing that her dead
Aunt Sarah is currently in the room with her. Also suppose, for the sake of argument, that Mary really does have some sort of reliable psychic sense that dead Aunt Sarah really is in the room with Mary, and that Mary's psychic sense is what is causing Mary to believe Aunt Sarah is present. Then, says our reliabilist theory,
Mary knows that Aunt Sarah is in the room with her.

Notice that Mary doesn't
infer
that Aunt Sarah is present on the basis of
evidence.
Mary just finds herself stuck with that belief that Aunt Sarah is present, caused as it is by her reliable psychic sense. Yet, says our reliabilist, despite the fact that Mary doesn't possess any evidence that Aunt Sarah is present, Mary knows Aunt Sarah is there. In fact, were Mary to claim that she “just knows” that Mary is in the room with her right now,
she'd be right
!

Of course, that they do “just know” such things despite not having any publicly available evidence is a claim psychics make on a daily basis. So, while few psychics will have heard of reliabilism, reliabilism nevertheless opens up at least the
possibility
that these psychics are actually correct—they
do
know, despite not possessing any evidence.

“But hang on,” you may object. “Even if reliabilism is correct and Mary does know her dead aunt is in the room with her, that is not something she
ought
to believe. The fact is, Mary is being downright irresponsible in just accepting at face value this belief that happens to have popped into her head. Clifford is still correct—she
shouldn't
believe it. It's still
unwise
for her to believe it.”

In her own defense, Mary might appeal to a further principle. Surely, Mary may insist,
if something seems very clearly and obviously to be the case, then, other things being equal, it's reasonable to believe it's true.
It's reasonable to take appearance at face value. For example, if it seems clear and obvious to me that there's on orange on the table before me, then surely it's reasonable for me to believe there's an orange there.

This principle does seem intuitively plausible. And it entails that, if it seems just clearly and obviously true to Mary that her dead aunt is in the room with her, then, other things being equal, it
is
reasonable for Mary to hold that belief, whether or not she can provide any publicly available evidence.

RELIABILISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Let's now return to George Bush's gut. Bush believes he can directly know, by means of his gut, what God wants him to do.

Many people believe that they “just know” directly, rather than on the basis of evidence, that God exists and that, say, the Bible is true. Ask them
why
they believe, and they may give reasons and justifications of one sort or another. But typically, even if such grounds are provided, not much weight is placed on them. Many Theists say that they don't believe on the basis of evidence. Rather, they “just know” God exists. They believe they directly experience God, perhaps in something like the way I just directly experience that orange on the table in front of me. To them, it seems perfectly clear and obvious that God exists.

Reliabilism seems to open up the possibility that some people might, indeed, “just know” that God exists. Suppose God has provided us with a sort of
sensus divinitatis
—a reliable, God-sensing faculty (in Bush's case, that would be his gut). On the reliabilist view, it seems that a
sensus divinitatis
could provide such knowledge.

Moreover, a religious person might add, just as, if it seems clearly and obviously true to me that there's an orange on the table, then it is reasonable for me to suppose there's an orange there, so
if it seems clearly and obviously true to someone that God exists, then it's reasonable for them to believe God exists.
There's certainly nothing wrong, or irresponsible, about them taking their experience at face value.

This view about religious experience has been developed by several contemporary Christian philosophers, chief among whom is Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga's version is detailed, but the gist is essentially this, that something like reliabilism is essentially correct, that God has indeed given every one of us a God-sensing
faculty or
sensus divinitatis
, and that consequently, some of us can know, directly and without evidence, that God exists. Indeed, that God exists is an entirely
reasonable
thing for such people to believe, if that's very much how things clearly and obviously seem to them even after careful reflection.
⁶

Plantinga adds that, if there is a God, he probably would want us to know of his existence directly by means of such a reliable God-sensing faculty. So, if there is a God, then some of us probably do know by such means that God exists.

You may be wondering: “But if we all have a
sensus divinitatis
, as Plantinga supposes, why don't we all enjoy such clear and unambiguous God experiences?” Because, Plantinga explains, in many cases our
sensus divinitatis
has been damaged by sin:

Were it not for sin and its effects, God's presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of other minds, physical objects and the past. Like any cognitive process, however, the
sensus divinitatis
can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has been damaged.
⁷

The reason I don't have such God experiences, then, is because my
sensus divinitatis
has been damaged by sin. Obviously, it doesn't follow that if I don't happen to have such experiences, then others aren't, by means of them, able to know that God exists.
⁸

ASSESSING PSYCHIC AND RELIGIOUS CLAIMS TO “JUST KNOW”

We have seen how the reliabilist theory of knowledge appears to open up the possibility that some people might “just know” that their dead relative is in the room with them, or “just know” that God exists. We have also seen that evidentialism has been challenged, and that, according to Plantinga and others, it can be
entirely reasonable for people to take their religious experiences at face value. If it seems just as clearly and obviously true to them that God exists, then it can be entirely reasonable for them to believe God exists, whether or not they possess any evidence. Psychics might say much the same thing about their psychic experiences. Let's now begin to assess these various claims.

Let me say at the outset that I find reliabilism plausible. I suspect that some version of reliabilism may well be correct. Let me also be clear that I do not rule out in principle the possibility that some people might be equipped with reliable psychic powers, or a
sensus divinitatis
, or whatever.

I also agree that evidentialism is probably false, and that, generally speaking, it is indeed reasonable for us to take appearances at face value. If it seems just as clearly and obviously the case that there's an orange on the table in front of me, well, then, other things being equal, it's reasonable for me to believe there's an orange on the table in front of me.

However, I remain entirely unconvinced that anyone who claims to “just know” that the dead walk among us or that God exists knows any such thing. Not only do I think the rest of us have good grounds for doubting their experience; I don't believe it's reasonable for them to take their own experience at face value either. I'll explain this by means of what I call
the case of the mad, fruit-fixated brain scientist.

The Case of the Mad, Fruit-Fixated Brain Scientist

Suppose Jane is shown what appears, quite clearly and obviously, to be an orange on the table in front of her. Surely then, it is, other things being equal, reasonable for Jane to believe there's an orange there.

But now suppose the orange is presented to Jane in a rather unusual situation. Jane is one of several visitors to the laboratory of a mad brain scientist with a weird fruit fixation. She, like the other visitors, is wearing an electronic helmet that can influence what happens in her brain. From his central computer terminal, the mad brain scientist can, by means of these helmets, control what people are experiencing. He can create vivid and convincing hallucinations.