Bombshell (32 page)

In one of his addresses to the Islamic community of believers, bin Laden commented that women's role is just as valuable as that of men, for “you have spurred on and exhorted [men to join jihad], and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produced the squadron of heroic [men who carried out] the raids in New York and Washington.”
⁷²
This is a far cry from Muhammed Atta's last-will-and-testament videotape recorded on January 18, 2000, in which he proclaimed that no women should attend his funeral or touch his body after death.
⁷³

The underlying fear of women's sexuality has driven much of Salafist ideology. Al Zawahiri's comments demonstrate that Al Qaeda is required to walk a fine line in its public-relations approach to, on the one hand, the modern Arab world and, on the other hand, its more conservative constituency. Dozens of the Internet responses to Ayman Al Zawahiri's earlier statement were signed by men who agreed that women should stick to supporting men and raising children.

Dr. Fadl, former mentor of Al Zawahiri, remarked in his book
Al ‘Umda
that women can only partake in military activities to defend themselves against an enemy who has invaded Muslim territory and raided their homes. For this reason, women can receive
basic training so that they can be prepared to repel their attackers.
⁷⁴
The ideologues believe that the success of jihad depends on the support of women, but not as warriors.
⁷⁵

Still, the notion that women are equal to men in the execution of jihad is gaining ground among radical ideologues from both Sunni and Shi'a traditions. Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, the former leader of the Lebanese group Hezbollah, who died on July 4, 2010, emphasized that jihad is not obligatory for women, but expressed no reservations about martyrdom operations carried out by women. In his view, Islam permitted women to fight in the course of a defensive war, and he approved of martyrdom operations by women—if they are necessary.
⁷⁶

According to the leading Sunni religious authorities at Al Azhar University in Egypt, jihad is not obligatory for women, but may be imposed under three conditions: first, if the enemy invades Muslim lands; second, if Muslim leaders call upon the whole
umma
, or community of believers, to perform jihad; and third, if Muslim leaders appoint women to do certain tasks such as monitoring the enemy, burying land mines, and so on. Under such conditions women must carry out the duty entrusted to them.
⁷⁷

Jihadi women cling to the
fatwa
(religious ruling) of ideologist Yusuf al Qaradawi, dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar, who declared that women's participation in jihad does not contradict the
Qur'an
.
⁷⁸
According to Qaradawi, women as well as men can dedicate themselves to Allah, and serve as human bombs. He writes: “I do not think that this is impossible or even difficult. There are genius women just as there are genius men.”
⁷⁹
When jihad is a personal obligation and the enemy seizes Muslim territory, a woman is entitled to take part in jihad alongside men.

It is actually more common to find scholars who endorse female jihadis in the West than in the Middle East. A militant Islamist based in the UK, Hani al Siba'i, approves of women
bombers. Siba'i says that Islamic holy law, the Shari'ah, allows women to take part in jihad and argues that even Al Qaeda does not disapprove of female jihadis. According to his interpretation of the
Qur'an
, men and women are equal in terms of their obligation (
fard
) and personal responsibility for holy war and are rewarded equally for their actions. It is only because of the practical limitations that restrict women's movements in Islamic societies that most of the women who carry out martyrdom operations are related to male jihadis.
⁸⁰
Siba'i's justifications mirror the rulings of Qaradawi, who has endorsed female suicide bombers throughout the Islamic world.

However, Al Qaeda's leaders continue to resist the interpretations promulgated by Fadlallah, who, as a supreme Shi'a leader and Grand Ayatollah, was considered a greater Satan than George W. Bush. The others, like Al Qaradawi and Siba'i, who advocate a greater role for women, remain on the outer fringes of the organization. According to the strictest interpretation of Salafi ideology, a woman's place remains in the home and not on the battlefield. The ideological split within Al Qaeda over the issue of women jihadis is one of the really significant fault lines within the organization.

There is not even a consensus about the use of men as self-destroying agents. While attacks in Chechnya, Palestine, and other places are called
amaliyyat istishadiyya
(martyrdom operations), in Iraq, they are often referred to as
amaliyyat intihariyya
(suicide operations). In Islam, as in all major monotheistic faiths, suicide is a cardinal sin. So while Islamists throughout the region praise attacks against Israel, they are equally critical of attacks in Iraq aimed against Muslim Iraqis. Dr. Muhammed al Habash, a Syrian Islamist, praises martyrdom in defense of the homeland—for example, as part of the Palestinian intifada against the Israeli occupation—but criticizes its recent proliferation in Iraq by both men and women:

The honorable sons of Palestine used to halt the advancing criminal tanks with their booby-trapped bodies, protecting the lives of hundreds of people who could have been crushed by the invading tanks and their bombs. They planted martyrs on the land so that their children could enjoy the orange tree, the blessing of the school, and the smile of life … But the mad work we see today in the sectarian strife that the occupation created in Iraq is the biggest distortion of martyrdom and martyrs, when the death industry became the best selling industry in Iraq, with male and female suicide bombers blowing themselves up in condolence houses, funeral processions, markets, or restaurants … these have nothing to do with the culture of martyrdom.
⁸¹

While most terrorist organizations provide some benefit to their constituents in the form of benevolent organizations, infrastructure, hospitals, or clinics in order to ingratiate themselves with the civilian population, Al Qaeda in Iraq makes no such effort. In fact, other than bin Laden's charitable works in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Al Qaeda does not build or create anything: it is merely an organization seeking to kill the maximum number of civilians, be they Western or Muslim. As time has gone on, Al Qaeda has focused as much of its violence against its own people—those who oppose its ideology or methods—as it has against foreigners. In this sense, the organization has become self-cannibalizing. While the “surge” of American military forces has undoubtedly helped decrease violence in Iraq, the plummeting popularity of Al Qaeda has also had a significant impact.

Al Qaeda's manipulation of Iraqi women will have negative effects on the Iraqi state that will continue to be felt long after the war is over. Involving women in preventing women from carrying out terrorist attacks by expanding the Daughters of Iraq is a useful
step in the other direction. It is important to support women's civil society to provide alternative mechanisms for their political mobilization. It is also vital to highlight Al Qaeda's insidious tactics of raping and kidnapping Arab mothers and daughters, and to use any means available to help drive a wedge between Al Qaeda and its global supporters, who view it through rose-tinted glasses. They need to know that the organization they think is fighting evil is, in fact, the very embodiment of evil.

THE FOUR Rs PLUS ONE

The time is now. Arm your women and children against the infidel!

—Osama bin Laden, Tora Bora, 2001
¹

THE THREAT WOMEN POSE

Only a handful of countries have taken into consideration the danger posed by female terrorists. Even agencies that should know better are surprised and unprepared for the threat women pose. The common assumption that women are inherently nonviolent remains fixed in people's minds. Even when women are implicated in violence, there is a tendency to assume that they are merely the pawns of men, despite the fact that there have been plenty of cases of women's involvement in terrorist groups going as far back as the 1960s, and in spite of the emergence of female suicide bombers since 1985. Even in the super-security-conscious United States in the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security failed to include women on its list of potential attackers. The unofficial terrorist profile developed by the department to assist officials scrutinizing visa-seekers did not include women even after two women bombers attacked U.S. forces in Iraq.
²
The 2009 Transportation Security Administration training manual, which
was leaked to the press, does not explain specifically how to handle female terrorists or those pretending to be pregnant in order to smuggle an explosive device through airport security.

Not until a Western woman attacked U.S. forces in Iraq did counter-terrorism officials begin to take notice of female suicide bombers. Muriel Degauque's detonation in November 2005 was supposed to change the way the American military looked at women. Yet on the ground, in 2006, U.S. forces were still unaware of the threat women bombers posed, and were never told what to do when faced with a suspected female operative.
³
The fact that Muriel was a European convert to Islam from a modern “egalitarian society” was highlighted in almost every analysis of the attack. Commentators seemed to think that a traditional Arab or Muslim woman could never do such a thing. Views have changed, finally, with the recent upsurge of Muslim bombers, but we need to understand the women better to fully understand the threat. This book has provided the reader with some preliminary ideas about what causes women to mobilize into terrorist groups and the variety of roles they play within such groups. This research is no more than a prologue to what will be an ongoing chronicle of women and violence.

THE FOUR Rs PLUS ONE

Part of the challenge in understanding a woman's motivations to kill depends on whether we consider that she joined the terrorist organization by coercion or by choice. As the detailed case studies in this book have shown, the distinction is not always clear-cut and shades of gray proliferate. The spectrum of coercion includes everything from subtle community pressure to brute force. Some women find themselves in impossible situations and in cultures that value them in death as they could never be valued alive. Some experience multiple motivations simultaneously or sequentially. At
times, they might not even know themselves what has led them to act. Gender stereotypes provide part of the explanation; occupation provides another part; religion yet another. The reality is often a complicated mix of personal, political, and religious factors that are sparked at different times by different stimuli.

This book has shown that women across a number of conflicts and in several different terrorist groups tend to be motivated by one or several of the four Rs:
revenge, redemption, relationship
, and
respect. Revenge
for the death of a close family member is most often cited as the key factor that inspired a woman to get involved in the first place.

Some of the women appear to need
redemption
for past sins. There have been reports that recruiters approach their targets by making romantic advances, literally seducing them into joining the group and then involving them in suicide operations. A woman caught up in a romantic relationship might consider martyrdom an attractive option, particularly if the relationship is illicit (involving a family member, for example) or if it is considered in some way scandalous. Anat Berko, an Israeli criminologist and author of the book
The Path to Paradise
, claims that a woman's martyrdom wipes away all of her sins and stigmas.
⁴
A
shahida
is transformed from being an embarrassment to her family to a source of great pride with just one act of violence.

Relationship
, the third R, is particularly crucial in understanding how women are mobilized. The best single predictor that a woman will engage in terrorist violence is her relationship with a known insurgent or jihadi. The relative provides the entrée to the organization and also vouches for her reliability, an important consideration for terrorist leaders who need to guard against government infiltration. In some groups, family and kinship ties are used deliberately to construct a cohesive network. At the same time, marriage into the organization allows it to “force” women to perpetrate acts of
violence. In some cultures, men dictate women's actions and have the power of life or death over them.

Finally, although usually in conjunction with other motives, women often seek the
respect
of their community. By engaging in violence they can demonstrate that they are just as dedicated and committed to the cause as men. Women bombers are held up as role models. Little girls grow up wanting to be just like them. After their deaths, schools, parks, streets, even Girl Scout troops are named after particularly successful bombers. These women would never have achieved this kind of fame in life, and yet in death they become heroines and superstars. It is a powerful pull factor for a young woman to want to do something great with her life, especially if the life she leads is difficult or, worse, a source of pain and fear.