Brave Battalion (37 page)

But they would have a fresh division, for the British 32
^nd
Division was now committed to advance alongside 4
^th
Division—the two passing through the front lines won the day before. This assault began at 0930 with the 32
^nd
moving through the 1
^st
and 3
^rd
Division lines and 4
^th
Division past the 2
^nd
Division.
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The sudden appearance of the British troops caught the Canadian Scottish by surprise when “out of the vanishing fog, large bodies of cavalry, guns and infantry in close order suddenly burst into their view. As these units came forward they gradually opened out into battle formation in spectacular fashion, as if they were on the manoeuvre field. Their men were in high spirits, the staffs were all business, everybody concerned was confident of success.

“The attacking battalions passed out of sight into the haze, and later in the morning, after the mist had cleared, further bodies of cavalry and horse artillery went through. In the distance, to the east, the smoke of burning towns or dump could be seen rising in the sky, but whether it had reference to the advance of the earlier hours 16
^th
Battalion did not know. No news of the operation was received until the late afternoon, when rumour began to whisper dark tales of its failure, which found some confirmation in the gloomy looks and depressed men of the personnel of the brigade headquarters established in the field near at hand,” the battalion's historian noted.

By midday, the advance had been checked. The 32
^nd
Division gained virtually no ground this day and the 4
^th
did only somewhat better. That night, the Canadian Scottish advanced a mile into a series of old French trenches east of Rouvroy. They moved past “derelict tanks, demolished by direct hits—‘the inside of them like charnel houses'—the dead men and dead horses scattered everywhere around, told very surely of its location and fate. The 32
^nd
British Division had met with disaster in the old system of trench defences, in use from the beginning of trench warfare until the Germans broke through in March-April 1918.”
³³

Despite Fourth Army's and that of the French on its flank the day before, plans were hatched for a renewed offensive on August 11. But the Amiens offensive was spent and there were few gains. The 4
^th
Canadian Division moved not at all, instead forced to parry three separate German counterattacks. Because of this, Currie decided “that it was inadvisable to try to progress mainly by Infantry fighting, and recommended that the operations should be slackened to give time to organize a set piece attack on a broad front.”
³⁴
Only limited objectives were set for an attack scheduled to begin either on August 15 or 16 wherein Canadian Corps would cover the French army's left flank during a drive on Goyencourt, which lay two miles short of Roye.

After several cancellations, this attack materialized on August 16. As part of Fourth Army's limited participation Currie instructed 1
^st
Division to secure Fresnoy-les-Roye and La Chavette with 2
^nd
Division advancing immediately to the left.
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Having learned only early that morning that the offensive was proceeding, Currie's orders did not reach 1
^st
Division headquarters until mid-morning. Maj.-Gen. Archie Macdonnell quickly assigned seizing Fresnoy-les-Roye to 1
^st
Brigade and La Chavette to 3
^rd
Brigade. At 1130 hours Brig. George Tuxford urgently phoned the commanders of the 13
^th
and 16
^th
Battalions with orders that the former was to attack La Chavette with the latter covering its left flank.

None of the battalion commanders had expected a battle; Lt.-Col. Peck had instructed his company commanders they were to merely maintain a holding pattern. It was a clear, hot morning that promised a scorching afternoon. Everyone was looking forward to happily sitting the day out in relative peace. The battalion was currently disposed with Nos. 2 and 3 Companies holding the line respectively from right to left. No. 4 Company was in close support and No. 1 was farther back in reserve. As seizing La Chavette was assigned to 13
^th
Battalion, Peck considered the Canadian Scottish role relatively limited.

Peck summoned the officers from No. 4 Company to his headquarters and said only that unit would go forward. Brigade intelligence indicated the German strength across the Amiens front was weakening, which was why the offensive was being undertaken. Because the ground was dead level with little natural cover, the platoons would advance by means of a series of old communication trenches running from the battalion's current front lines in fairly straight lines to beyond La Chavette. These trenches passed on either flank of the only tactically important ground. This was Schwetz Wood, a small copse of scrubby trees and dense gorse about 700 yards east of the Canadian Scottish front. Peck wanted the company to surround the wood and pin any Germans there in place so they were unable to interfere with the Royal Highlanders of Canada's capture of La Chavette. To this purpose No. 13 and No. 14 Platoons would pass through No. 2 Company's lines and outflank the wood to the south via two parallelling trenches while No. 15 and No. 16 Platoons shoved out from No. 3 Company's lines and followed two parallelling trenches that passed to the north of the wood.

Less than an hour after the briefing, the four platoons moved warily up the communication trenches. No. 13 Platoon, under Sgt. Alexander Reid, was in the most southerly trench while Lt. William Douglas Macpherson's platoon followed one, codenamed Regulus Alley, which lay 250 yards south of the wood. Reid's men surprised a small German position, captured one soldier, and sent the others scampering just a few minutes after they entered the trench. Not long afterward, the platoon came to an intersection and Reid realized their intelligence had been wrong and the trench had trended north rather than running in a straight line past the wood. The platoon was now in Regulus Alley. Reid saw the back of No. 14 Platoon out ahead and sent a runner to find out what Macpherson wanted him to do. Macpherson replied that Reid's platoon should follow his in line.

The two platoons snaked along the trench until they were well past Schwetz Wood and Macpherson could see Fresnoy-les-Roye to his right. West of the village, a series of trenches were crowded with German infantry who looked to be forming up for an advance right toward his position. Realizing his force was badly outnumbered, but would likely be detected if they tried to withdraw, Macpherson ordered Reid to deploy his men in the trench while he slipped No. 14 Platoon out to the left into a string of shell holes. This established the men in an L-shaped formation that enabled them to cover their flanks and also be positioned to try blocking the Germans if they advanced toward Schwetz Wood. Macpherson had no intention of provoking the Germans into action. He ordered the men to stay hidden.

North of the wood, No. 15 and No. 16 platoons, respectively under Lt. William Houston and Lt. Edward Payson Thompson, had snuck along parallel trenches to where they intersected the southern terminus of Chavette Trench and the westward terminus of Sottises Alley. Chavette Trench was the main defensive work running in front of the village of La Chavette, while Sottises Alley provided a protected route for the Germans to bring supplies and reinforcements up to the front from their rear areas well to the east of Schwetz Wood. According to the brigade plan, the Royal Highlanders should have, by this time, launched their attack on La Chavette. So the two Can Scot lieutenants expected Chavette Trench to have been cleared of Germans. But as they led their men past the junction and into the entrance to Sottises Alley, a large German force burst out of Chavette Tunnel and attacked their rear. At the same time more Germans charged toward them from Sottises Alley. A desperate close-quarters fight ensued as the forty-five Canadian Scottish tried to open an escape route back through the Germans behind them. Both Thompson and Houston were killed in the fight's opening seconds.

Back on the battalion's front lines, No. 3 Company commander Captain Ernest Otto Rietchel heard the sharp gunfight, gathered a rescue party, and headed toward the action. The thirty-two-year-old Rietchel had come to the battalion in April 1915, been wounded a month later, and returned the following October with a lieutenant's rank. In March 1918 he had been awarded the Military Cross for bravery. Deeply religious, Rietchel made it plain that he loathed war. But his sense of duty and “abhorrence of what was wrong … overruled his private dislike of going to war to kill.” Rietchel acted with his normal decisiveness, running out into No Man's Land at the head of the rescue party. Moments later a machine-gun burst killed the officer. His men faltered, pulling back to the safety of their trenches. After a while the remains of the two No. 4 Company platoons escaped into the lines. They numbered just twenty-five of the original forty-five and reported having to abandon their wounded.

Back at headquarters, Peck realized that the Germans were determined to make a stand at Schwetz Wood and ordered a two-company attack to clear them out. No. 2 Company was directed at the wood while No. 3 Company advanced to the trench junction north of it where the two platoons had been ambushed. When Peck phoned No. 2 Company commander Major James Scroggie, he simply said: “Get Schwetz Wood.” “Yes, sir” was all Scroggie replied. “Good man,” Peck added and hung up.

Scroggie was gathering his men when a runner from Lieutenant Macpherson reported that the No. 4 Company officer had surreptitiously withdrawn his two platoons back down Regulus Trench from where they had been originally hiding in sight of the Germans in the trenches near Fresnoy and established another L-shaped position that extended toward the wood's southwestern corner. Scroggie was heartened by this news, as it meant Macpherson would be covering No. 2 Company's right flank as it attacked the wood. With no time to tee up covering artillery or mortar fire, Scroggie simply formed two platoons into a line and led a 700-yard charge straight across open ground. Not a shot opposed them and the men crashed into Schwetz Wood to find it undefended. After struggling through the tangled undergrowth, Scroggie and several men stepped out of the other side of the wood and immediately came under heavy machine-gun fire. Ducking back into cover, Scroggie sent word that he would need artillery support before any advance beyond the wood could be made. When the shells started falling, 2
^nd
and 3
^rd
Companies went forward together about 300 yards beyond the wood and took control of the Chavette Trench-Sottises Alley junction. North of this position, the Canadian Scottish could hear the Royal Highlanders heavily engaged in front of La Chavette. The 13
^th
Battalion made three attempts to gain a toehold inside the village, but was repulsed each time. Not until the following day would the Royal Highlanders take La Chavette.

At the trench junction the Canadian Scottish discovered some of the wounded No. 4 Company had been forced to abandon. The Germans had bandaged the men's wounds and, when they withdrew, left them to be recovered. This reduced the 16
^th
Battalion losses, which still totalled sixty with three officers and fifteen other ranks killed, thirty-three other ranks wounded, and nine of the men from the two overrun No. 4 Company platoons lost as prisoners.
³⁶

This action marked the end of 16
^th
Battalion's role in the Amiens offensive, which sputtered to conclusion on August 22. By then, Canadian Corps was once again on the move, this time to join British First Army in the Arras sector. The Canadians left the Amiens area proudly, knowing that although the offensive had cost a total of 11,822 casualties they had given better than they received. Currie wrote that his corps had “fought against 15 German Divisions: of these 10 were directly engaged and thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one of their battalions; the five other Divisions, fighting astride our flanks, were only partially engaged by us.

“In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 guns of all calibres, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars.

“The greatest depth penetrated approximated to 14 miles and an area of over 67 square miles containing 27 towns had been liberated.… Considering the number of German Divisions engaged, and the results achieved, the [Canadian] casualties were very light.”
³⁷

Unlike so often in the past the Germans were to be allowed no opportunity to regroup or regain the ground lost. “If we allow the enemy a period of quiet,” Haig warned the General Staff in London, “he will recover, and the ‘wearing out' process must be recommenced.” The Germans were on the ropes and his gut “feeling [was] that this is the beginning of the end.” Amiens had proved that boldly executed offensives could bring victory. Haig cautioned his subordinates that they would never again “advance step by step in regular lines as in the 1916-17 battles. All Units must go straight for their objectives, while Reserves should be pushed in where we are gaining ground.”
³⁸