Authors: Stephen Dando-Collins
Tags: #Historical
He launched the operation immediately, just as the year was ending.
It was December 25, 47 b.c., following the Saturnalia, a religious festival that would become Christmas in the Christian era, when all Romans traditionally did no work and spent carefree time at leisure. Caesar set sail from Sicily with his German cavalry bodyguard and elements of six legions, including the cohorts of the 10th Legion that had joined him from southern Italy.
There are many parallels between the civil war of 49–45 b.c. and the Second World War of a.d. 1939–1945. The amphibious landings, the amphibious evacuations. And here was another. On July 10, 1943, at Licata, a little east of Marsala, the Allies began the invasion of Sicily from North Africa, the reverse of Caesar’s invasion of North Africa from Sicily.
Caesar endured a slow crossing of the narrow stretch of the Mediterranean separating Sicily from North Africa, caused by indifferent winds that also scattered his fleet. On December 28 he landed unopposed on the east coast of Tunisia near the small port of Sousse, Roman Hadramentum, with just 3,150 men. Anxiously he waited for his other ships to arrive with the rest of his invasion force, as Pompeian cavalry began to move along the coast toward him.
Sousse closed its gates and the residents prepared to defend their walls, but when the rest of his fleet still didn’t arrive after thirty-six hours Caesar moved on, posting his best men, his few 10th Legion cohorts, as rear guard. A large force of Numidian cavalry now arrived at Sousse and gave chase. But when Caesar’s handful of cavalry charged into them, the Numidians scattered.
On the first day of the new year, Caesar set up camp outside the town of Ruspina. Some two miles from the nearest port, it would become his operational headquarters for the campaign. Today the ruins of Ruspina lie three miles to the west of the modern Tunisian town of al-Munastir. Caesar set up a supply base a few miles away, at Leptis Minor on the coast, and sent his warships looking for the missing transports of the invasion fleet. Early on January 4, most of the missing troopships arrived and disembarked their troops at Leptis Minor. Caesar now had four full legions ashore, the 25th, 26th, 28th, and 29th, as well as most of the 5th and c15.qxd 12/5/01 5:29 PM Page 152
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several cohorts of the 10th. The main contingent of the 10th Legion, along with those of the 7th, 8th, and 9th, had yet to reach the embarkation camp in Sicily; they were all still marching down from Rome.
Reinforced, and having come across from Sicily with limited rations, that same day Caesar took 30 mixed cohorts of infantry, including his men of the 10th Legion, supported by 400 cavalry and 150 archers, and advanced inland to cut ripened wheat from the wheat fields that covered the plain around Ruspina. Colonel Pollio accompanied Caesar on several later sorties from Ruspina, so it is probable he also went along on this mission as his second-in-command, and it was from his memoirs that Appian and Plutarch took their version of events on this particular day.
Just before 11.00 a.m., and three miles from his base, Caesar was caught in the open by a large enemy flying column led by his former good friend and deputy and now his implacable enemy Major General Titus Labienus.
After commanding Pompey’s cavalry at the Battle of Pharsalus, Labienus had regrouped sixteen hundred of his Gallic and German troopers and taken them to Buthroton, from where they’d been among the first of Pompey’s troops evacuated to Tunisia. Labienus’s force here on the Ruspina plain consisted of his regular cavalry plus local light infantry and archers.
Caesar’s troops, caught tramping along with their helmets slung around their necks, shields over their shoulders, and packs on their back containing scythes and wicker baskets for harvesting wheat, hurriedly donned their helmets on Caesar’s command and formed a skirmish line as Labienus lined up his troops in front of them. For a long time there was a stalemate, with each side trying to stare down the other, before Labienus’s cavalry suddenly spurred their steeds into action and tried to envelop Caesar’s flanks. At the same instant, his Numidian light infantry dashed forward to attack in the center.
The fight dragged on for hours, with Caesar’s force surrounded. Every time one of his cohorts made a sally against Labienus’s cavalry they advanced too far and were almost cut off, so Caesar ordered his men to advance no more than four feet from their line. In the end he had to form an
orbis,
the circular formation of last resort.
General Labienus rode up and down his line bareheaded, cheering on his men. As recorded by the author of
The African War,
the work possibly written by and certainly edited by Caesar’s staff officer Aulus Hirtius and added to Caesar’s memoirs, Labienus occasionally yelled caustic comments to Caesar’s troops.
“What do you think you’re doing, recruit?” the general called, fixing his gaze on one particular short, fresh-faced legionary in Caesar’s line. “Little c15.qxd 12/5/01 5:29 PM Page 153
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fire-eater, aren’t you? Are you another one who’s had his wits befuddled by Caesar’s fine words? I have to be honest with you, he’s brought you into a desperate situation. I’m sorry for you.”
“I’m no raw recruit, Labienus,” the soldier called back. “I’m a veteran of the Tenth!” A veteran who must have served under the general in Gaul, what was more.
“The Tenth?” Labienus retorted with a laugh in his voice. “I don’t recognize the standards of the Tenth anymore. Let’s see what you’re made of!”
“You’ll soon see what I’m made of,” the 10th Legion man angrily declared, ripping off his helmet. “Here! See my face? Remember it!” With that, he flung the javelin in his right hand with all his might.
The range was extreme, and as the combatants watched the javelin’s flight, as if in a dream, it appeared it would fall short of the target. Instead it plunged into the chest of General Labienus’s charger. The horse reared up in pain and fear, throwing the unprepared Labienus from the saddle.
He landed heavily.
A cheer rose from Caesar’s men.
“Maybe that’ll help you recognize a soldier of the Tenth in the future, Labienus,” the legionary called, bringing laughter from his 10th Legion comrades.
As General Labienus lay prostrate on the ground, men of his bodyguard hastily gathered around him. He was moving, dazed, and hurt by the fall as he was carried away. The general’s men continued the attack after he’d gone, but in his absence their enthusiasm waned a little. But at the same time most of Caesar’s surrounded troops were losing heart. The men of the newer legions were constantly looking around for Caesar as he strode around the inside of the circle directing the defense, and many now merely dodged opposition missiles without going on the offensive themselves.
Realizing he had to seize the initiative, Caesar formed his thirty cohorts up so he had fifteen facing one way and the fifteen behind them facing the other. Both groups then charged forward at the same time, on his command, splitting the attacking force in two and breaking the encirclement. Caesar then called his men back, and before the other side could re-form he quickly advanced through one of the gaps he’d opened up and marched for Thapsus at the double.
Caesar’s column had gone only a few miles, harried by Labienus’s troops all the way, when another opposition force swept into its path. Led by the fiery General Marcus Petreius, who’d escaped from Spain with General Afranius and then from Greece with Labienus, this force of sixteen hundred c15.qxd 12/5/01 5:29 PM Page 154
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picked Numidian cavalry and a number of light infantry cut off Caesar from his base. Caesar had no choice but make a stand, and to gain the advantage of high ground he edged his beleaguered force to a low, bare hill, the only rise on the otherwise monotonously flat plain.
The battle lasted all through the afternoon, with Caesar surrounded and taking heavy casualties. It was looking like Julius Caesar’s last stand.
At one point the eagle-bearer from one of the new legions broke ranks and tried to flee, but Caesar personally grabbed him and spun him around.
Plutarch says that Caesar angrily yelled, “Look, that’s the way to the enemy!” and pushed the soldier back toward the fighting.
Aulus Hirtius, who was made a major general this year by Caesar, himself admitted that he hadn’t served in the African campaign. He said that part of what he knew of the campaign he learned from later conversations with Caesar, although he hadn’t made notes, as he had no plans at the time to put the story on record. Hirtius’s other Caesarian writings are at times more deliberately one-eyed than merely inaccurate, and this episode in
The African War
is no different—it has Caesar’s troops escaping back to Ruspina late in the day after seriously wounding Petreius and victoriously driving off the enemy.
In contrast, Cassius Dio writes that many of Caesar’s men were killed in this action, while Appian says that Caesar’s troops were routed on the plain. Dio’s and Appian’s versions ring truest. Appian also states that Caesar was only saved when, late in the day, as the sun was setting, General Petreius instructed his troops to disengage, adding, “Let’s not rob our commander Scipio of the victory.”
So the Pompeian troops pulled out, and Caesar and his surviving men gratefully stumbled back to their camp in the darkness, carrying their numerous dead and wounded among them. Caesar’s notorious luck had held good yet again. Seventy-five years later, Nero’s chief secretary, the philoso-pher Seneca, would say that luck never made a man wise, but Julius Caesar learned from his lucky escape on the Ruspina plain. After discovering the inadequacies of the men under his command—other than his few 10th Legion veterans—he wisely decided not to allow himself to be dragged into another major engagement until reinforced by his best legions.
:
With the winter just around the corner, the two forces faced off. Scipio advanced his army to the vicinity of Thapsus and penned Caesar in an area of six square miles. Over the coming months there were occasional c15.qxd 12/5/01 5:29 PM Page 155
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skirmishes, with General Labienus losing a number of German and Gallic cavalrymen in one engagement, but although Scipio frequently lined up his army in battle order, Caesar would not come out and play his game.
He kept his troops behind the walls of their defenses and awaited the arrival of reinforcements. Impatient as always, according to the author of
The African War
he was forever looking out to sea for the arrival of the next convoy, even accusing the navy and the army of deliberately putting off its sailing. In particular Caesar was waiting for his veteran legions. He had little confidence in the newer units, which had already shown their lack of fighting qualities in the battle on the Ruspina plain at the beginning of the month.
In the third week of January a second convoy finally arrived from Sicily and landed the seasick 13th and 14th Legions plus cavalry, auxiliary light infantry, and badly needed supplies. The bloody nose Caesar’s forces had received on the plain outside Ruspina and stories about a huge Pompeian army complete with elephants had caused many of Caesar’s young soldiers to start talking of mutiny rather than take on Scipio’s forces, but now the arrival of these veteran reinforcements bolstered flagging spirits.
Several ships of the second convoy fell into enemy hands, including a troop-carrier with two colonels aboard and a cruiser carrying another pair of colonels, a centurion and the last contingent of young Spanish recruits of the 5th Legion, and a centurion and veterans of the 14th. Most of the senior men were put to death, while the enlisted men were pressed into Scipio’s army.
King Juba was now forced to withdraw most of his troops to put down a rising back in Numidia. Despite his reduced numbers Scipio was prepared to take on Caesar in a full-scale battle, but still Caesar preferred to wait for his favored Spanish legions before he ventured too much too soon. He was moving camp every few days, slowly advancing down the coast toward the town of Uzitta, daily fighting off attacks by detachments of Scipio’s troops. In mid-February, a third convoy arrived, this time bringing the rest of the 10th Legion and the men of the 9th.
Caesar had been seething about the way the 10th had turned against him after Pharsalus and then led the mutiny and looting rampage at Rome. Never one to forget, yet no doubt conscious of warnings from his staff that it might rebound on him if he were to punish the men, he was still determined to make an example of the 10th. So he chose instead to single out several of the legion’s officers for special treatment, having been given a list of the officers who’d encouraged their men to mutiny. One of the culprits seemed particularly determined to earn his commander’s c15.qxd 12/5/01 5:29 PM Page 156
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censure—Colonel Gaius Avienus had taken one of the ships in the latest convoy and loaded it with his personal slaves and horses, bringing not a single soldier of the legion with him across from Sicily.
The men of the 10th had gone through a lengthy, hazardous voyage during which their water supply had run out after the convoy shied away from the Tunisian coast on seeing warships in their path. They’d barely had time to reunite with the cohorts of the legion who’d preceded them in the first convoy when, the day following their arrival, Caesar called an assembly of the tribunes and centurions of the 10th and all his other legions now in North Africa. Once the officers, upward of six hundred of them, had lined up, Caesar strode from his praetorium, then stepped up onto the tribunal, looking severe. His words are quoted in
The African War
.
“I would have thought,” he began, “that people might at long last have put an end to their impertinence and insubordination, and ceased to take advantage of my leniency, moderation, and patience. But since they won’t themselves set any bounds or limits, then I’ll make an example, in accordance with military practice, to teach the others to mend their ways.”