Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (65 page)

as McNamara’s war, 267

McNamara-Taylor visit (1963) and report, 409–11, 412, 413

McNamara visit (1962), 274–76

misinformation on, 274, 275, 277–78, 280–82, 284, 345–46, 396

as a muddle without a solution, 405–7

NIE report on, 348

Nolting and Diem, 230–31, 266

Nolting as ambassador, 163, 243, 244, 265, 274, 275, 337, 340, 343, 344–45, 348

partition of, 163

Pentagon officer inspection trip (1963), 340

press and, 20, 265, 267, 276–77, 285, 286, 336, 337–38, 342, 344, 345, 392, 393–98, 412–13

press censorship, 286, 408, 409

press complaints, 263, 264–65

public dissent against war, 281

reporter Sheehan in, 275–76

Rostow and, 92, 229–30

Rusk memo opposing Taylor-Rostow report, 241–42

Sorensen memo on, 165–66

“A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” (Hilsman), 262

Strategic Hamlets Program, 277, 282, 283, 336, 338, 347–48, 349, 392, 406

supporters of military victory in, 343, 347–48

supporters of political initiative, 344

Taylor-Rostow report, 239–40, 241, 242

U.S. casualties in, 404

U. S. critics of war, 346–47

U. S. debate over, 343–45

U. S. military advisers in, 171, 240, 245, 261–62, 338, 348, 349

U. S. Special Forces in, 165

as war against communism, 159, 166–67, 169, 245, 247, 261, 272, 276, 286–87, 343, 405

Wheeler report, 341–42

White House fact-finding trip (1961), 237–40

White House press release promising withdrawal of troops, 411–12

Volcker, Paul, 432

von Brentano, Heinrich, 184

Vu Van Mau, 280

Wahl, Nicholas, 189

Wallace, George, 352, 432

Washington, George, ix, x, 1, 108

Webster, Daniel, 14

Westmoreland, William, 431

“What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia” (Harriman), 277

Wheeler, Earle, 316, 340, 341–42, 343, 346

White, Byron, 122, 123

White, Lincoln, 324–25

White, Theodore, 235, 248, 422

White House Historical Association, 125

Why England Slept
(JFK), 12

Wiesner, Jerome, 209, 356

Wilkie, Wendell, 218

Wilkins, Roy, 176, 251, 402

Wilson, Woodrow, 22, 25, 26, 93–94, 127, 380

Wofford, Harris, 119–20, 123

fate of Bowles and, 153

JFK’s presidential campaign, 120

as point man for JFK’s civil rights agenda, 60, 119–22, 175

World War II

Chamberlain’s appeasement, 8, 161

Eisenhower’s staff in, 68–69

firebombing of Tokyo, 86

Humphrey’s lack of service, 19

JFK as hero, 37

Joe Kennedy, Jr.’s death in, 9–10

Joe Kennedy, Sr. as ambassador to Great Britain, 7

Lovett in, 84

McNamara and, 85–86

O’Brien in, 112

Power in, 73

RFK in, 39

Rostow in OSS, 91

Rusk and, 97–98

Shriver in, 129

Taylor in, 157

Young, Kenneth T., 239

Photo Insert

Rose and Joe Kennedy: JFK said of his father, “He made it all possible.”

President Kennedy and brother Bobby, his closest confidant and most forceful advocate.

Ted Sorensen, the brilliant thirty-three-year-old wordsmith who crafted most of Kennedy’s best lines during their eleven-year association.

In March 1962, former president Dwight Eisenhower saw Kennedy as too young and inexperienced to master Cold War challenges.

President Kennedy and Bobby with Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The Kennedys lacked confidence in their judgments and consigned them to the fringes of the administration.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was a leading liberal voice in the White House and the person best prepared to recount its accomplishments after Kennedy’s death.

McGeorge Bundy, former Harvard dean and White House national security adviser, reflected Kennedy’s affinity for the most brilliant men he could find to staff his administration.

Kennedy discusses the Alliance for Progress with Latin American representatives. The Alliance reflected Kennedy’s hopes of winning “hearts and minds” in the contest with communism in the developing world.

Kennedy with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who enjoyed Kennedy’s high regard after their successful collaboration in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and General Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy’s choice as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor was the only one of the military chiefs he fully trusted.

Sorensen in a later meeting with Fidel Castro, who outlasted all administration efforts to bring him down.

President Kennedy with Allen Dulles and John McCone, the former and new head of the CIA. Kennedy had grave doubts about their advice, but kept them on to mute conservative political opposition.

President Kennedy with Adlai Stevenson and United Nations representatives. Kennedy’s failure to consult Stevenson about the Bay of Pigs invasion embarrassed and angered him.