| | In other words, these translations seemed to endorse too smoothly the notion that patriarchy is a monolithic, transhistorical social form. As a consequence, they suggest that patriarchy is unavoidable; they blame ancient Judaism for our being saddled with it; they even obscure the "otherness within," that is the pluralities of modern society in relation, precisely, to patriarchy. Specifically, modern translations of the ancient text are comparable to Western narratives about Eastern behavior, of which Geertz's account is an example. In both cases, our source of knowledge is a narrative, which by definition imperialistically filters the utterances of the other.
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| | (1990, 734)
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There are two important points being made in this brief quotation. The first point is that there is the same obligation to the ancient text and people that there is to the "Eastern" people, to avoid as much as possible an imperialist filtering of the utterances of the other. In the past decade a trenchant critique of "Orientalism" in anthropology has been leveled, beginning with Edward Said's paradigm-making workOrientalism being the descriptive reification of the ''Other" (Said 1979). It is vitally important that the same critique of Orientalism now be transferred to the study of our own past. When we are describing an ancient culture, it is important to maintain the same ethical standards that anthropologists have been working so hard to develop in their work with living culturesthat is, to avoid assuming a position of cultural superiority from which to judge or blame the ''Other." 3 Yet when that ancient culture is powerfully (and painfully) effective in producing aspects of our current social practice, an important part of our descriptive work must be to criticize the culture. To pretend to an objectivity in describing biblical or talmudic gender practices, for example, is, in effect, to further bolster the effects that those practices still have (Boyarin 1990d). Cultural critique involves then, in my view, precisely the ability to contextually and historically understand practices of the past "Other"who is ourselvesin such a way that that culture can serve us well in constructing our own social practices, providing the richness of belonging to the past without constricting us in forming more liberatory and egalitarian practices in the present. By generous critique, I mean, then, a mode of analysis that is not apologetic and yet maximizes our understanding of the needs and drives
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| | 3. After writing this paragraph I discovered that Page duBois has made nearly the same point in almost the same language (duBois 1988, 2526).
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