Authors: John Mannion
This had indeed been the work of a master planner and the attacks executed by highly trained and/or dedicated individuals.
Out of the shadows of the night slipped the silhouetted ninja-like figures, as if transiting from a dream or parallel time and space into another world. Harbingers of death.
Captain Matt Thomas and the seven other men in his SAS assault team crawled into their forward positions as they awaited zero hour (at 0400). The team had been divided into two four man sections; one under the command of Steve Zaslawski, the other under Captain Thomas. Each man had his own thoughts, personal reflections and fears. But all had one imperative in common – that the mission must succeed.
Lying in the long grass, waiting for the ‘Go!’ command, Steve remembered his grandfather’s reminiscences about the storming of Monte Casino in Italy during World War II. That had been a bloodbath. Many had died during the assault in which his grandfather had taken part, as had been the case in previous assaults on the heavily fortified German position. His grandfather had lost many friends that day – the gunfire and artillery had been random in its choice of victim. His grandfather only spoke to him about this particular action – it was as if he was telling Steve that he understood his type of work, what it involved and the particular courage and selflessness it demanded. In that moment Steve experienced a surge of confidence. He knew this mission would succeed and would be one he’d tell his grandchildren about.
The air was freezing and the wind howling in from the estuary was relentless as the men waited. Matt and Steve were in secure communications voice contact with each other and the other team members. They were also linked through the command centre nearby with Joint Force Command at Northwood.
As they waited for the ‘Go!’ order, all were dreading a last minute ‘abort’ instruction. In the preceding hours they had gone over the detail with a fine toothcomb. There were four male hostages and six terrorists in the confined space. Speed of action was imperative, as it always was in these situations. The captain and his men trained hard for this type of operation. Well equipped to operate in such an environment, they were psyched up and itching to go. The scene at Oldbury was being mirrored at the other eight nuclear power facilities across the country.
Inside the workshop, Ahmed and his team were all feeling exhausted. The adrenalin-fuelled events of the last few days were now beginning to take their toll. There had been the stress of the final preparations for the attack, coupled with fears for the success of their long awaited mission. Finally, elation. Not only at their own success, but the knowledge, through the media, that their mission was part of a greater co-ordinated attack which had struck at the heart of the enemy.
The terrorists had taken it in turn to keep watch on the outside world through slits in the blinds covering the windows. As time went by they began seeing things in the darkness. Inanimate objects seemed to move. Shadows took on human form. Ahmed decided it was time for his team to wind down their guard a little. He feared that these night-time hallucinations could trigger a panic reaction in one of his men and bring a premature end to their propaganda coup. He was very pleased with the current situation – food and water were being provided; the hostages weren’t causing problems; all seemed quiet outside. He felt in control.
At precisely 0400hrs the SAS commanders at each of the nine sites received the order: ‘Go! Go! Go!’
Capt Thomas immediately repeated the order to his own group. Matt and his team, weapons trained, stood their ground, concealed from view in the overgrown foliage several yards from the workshop’s only entrance. Steve signalled. His team split into pairs. Two troopers broke cover and stealthily headed for the window to the left of the entrance. Steve and the other trooper moved to the window on the right.
Positioned in a cordon amongst the undergrowth, SFSG personnel – using night vision equipment – kept watch over the assault team.
On Steve’s signal, one of the troopers positioned at each of the windows stepped back, took aim and fired stun grenades through the single-glass panes. The silent night air was assaulted by two resonating bangs in quick succession. Glass shattered. Suddenly the inside of the workshop lit up, then two deafening explosions. As the explosions rang out, Capt Thomas and his team attacked the door. Once inside, each man urgently scanned the room to identify the terrorist targets. The SAS men then opened fire. Two shots for each of the ‘X-rays’.
Two members of Ahmed’s cell had just nodded off to sleep. Another two sat on the floor close to the four hostages, who were huddled in a corner. Ahmed and Imran were standing talking in hushed tones close by the door. Suddenly the windows on either side of the door exploded inward, showering glass everywhere through the now gaping blinds. Blinding flashes, followed by deafening explosions from the grenades reverberated in the confined space. The building shook. Rooted to the spot, Ahmed and his comrades were unable to react to the sudden attack. Completely disorientated, they had no time to gather their thoughts, let alone respond. In the darkness that had returned, they became aware of shadowy figures – then death struck them down.
It was all over in seconds. The SAS rescuers led the terrified and disorientated hostages, ears ringing from the explosions, out into the open and freedom.
The operations at the other eight sites were all successfully concluded, albeit with differing degrees of success. But all had the same end result. All nine power stations were now back under the control of the authorities. After the police completed their investigations at these crime scenes, the site engineers and technicians would get to work assessing the damage and reporting their findings to higher authority.
The least satisfactory conclusion occurred at the Hartlepool facility in the North East of England, where two of the six man terrorist attack cell had been killed in the fire fight during the initial assault. Just seconds after the ‘Go!’ order was given, one of the four surviving terrorists holed up in a small office building close by the perimeter road surrounding the reactor building, spotted movement outside. Nerves already frayed, he fired through the window from which he was observing, hitting an assault team member as he approached. The SAS man dropped instantly, dead before he hit the ground. In a panic and amidst screams and shouts, the four terrorists opened fire on their hostages in a merciless fusillade of automatic gunfire. The three hostages were murdered in seconds, their torsos shredded. This automatic fire, released as it was without aimed shots, resulted in bullets ricocheting around the small room and hitting two of the terrorists, killing one and wounding another. The SAS assault team outside immediately fired stun grenades into the building and battered their way through the front and rear doors, killing the three surviving terrorists inside.
Their job done, the SAS teams and the troops of the Special Forces Support Group packed up their equipment, handed control back to the civil authorities at each site and left. Back in control, the police immediately set about the task of dealing with the dead and injured from the operation and commencing the forensic examination at each location. The only civilian casualties during the operations to neutralise the terrorist threat were the three unfortunates killed in the Hartlepool assault. One SAS trooper also died at this location. All the remaining terrorists were killed.
There was relief throughout the nation as news of the successful operation was relayed through the media to the public. The military were rightly proud of yet another successful counter terrorist operation. There were sighs of relief in Government circles at the successful outcome. Now they awaited the reports from the site technical teams on damage to the reactors and estimates of how long it would be before normal power generation could safely be resumed. They also knew that the public’s reluctant acceptance of the nuclear option for power generation would be severely tested, as the inevitable questions were aired as to how the terrorists could pull off such an audacious assault on such a massive and co-ordinated scale.
The mood in the COBR meeting was a mixture of relief and anxiety. The success of the military operation had obviously been well received by the public and government alike.
As expected, however, in the few hours since the successful military operation ending the sieges, questions were already being asked in Parliament and in the media about how such a thing could have come to pass. Why had there not been enough security? When would normal electricity supplies be resumed? Why had there been no warning from the security and intelligence community? How could something on this scale have happened? Could it happen again?
The Prime Minister addressed the gathering:
‘Before proceeding, I would like to congratulate our Armed Forces for the successful conclusion of the operation against the terrorist cells holding the nuclear power stations. I will be announcing a public inquiry into the events of the last few days. The questions. How could this have happened? Could it happen again? What are the implications for the nuclear industry? What were the reasons for the security failure at the sites, and the broader question as to the failure of the Intelligence and security services to give a timely warning as to the threat? Can we please have the casualty figures for the last few days? And perhaps an initial response to some of these questions. The number of targets they were able to attack, the planning and co-ordination that must have been involved. How could they manage to recruit so many, as I understand is likely to be the case, young British-born Muslims for such an outrage?’ The Prime Minister was looking at the Home Secretary.
The harassed and exhausted looking Home Secretary responded:
‘Prime Minister, the final death toll from the nine attacks is one hundred and thirty-nine. Eighty-four civilians, mostly employees on the sites. Fifty-four members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and one member of the SAS. In addition, all surviving members of the fifty-four strong terrorist assault teams involved in the attack were killed during the relief operation.There were two hundred and fifty injuries sustained by individuals – twenty people are seriously ill in hospital. It is a fact that, given the nature of the current wave of terrorist activity, it would require a battalion of infantry troops to give a reasonable degree of protection to essential infrastructure targets, such as the nuclear power plants. On the international scene, Al Quaeda has a record of well planned and highly co-ordinated attacks on several targets at once. Bearing in mind that the security forces have two thousand or more terror suspects under surveillance at any time, the numbers involved in these recent attacks, although alarming, is not so surprising when looked at in this context. The threat from these Islamic terrorists is exacerbated by the fact that they do not require an exit plan. When the IRA was the main threat, we knew with a degree of certainty that they would be deterred from attacking targets with an armed and highly trained security force deployed, simply for the reason that the odds were against their survival. This is why they tended to go for so called ‘’soft targets” – shopping centres, transport infrastructure, unarmed off-duty military personnel, etc. The ‘’soft target” only option does not apply with this new threat. These people do not value life, even their own. Quite the reverse, in fact! They seek martyrdom! We will therefore, in reality, be extremely vulnerable no matter what we do. We must also take into account the fact that what we now see emerging is the use of disillusioned British-born Muslim youth. These people are of average, or above average, intelligence and have not previously come to the attention of the security forces in any significant way. A bit like the ‘’lily whites” the IRA came to use later on in their campaign! In addition, the cell structure they use imposes serious limitations to our intelligence gathering operations. In short, the people we are now dealing with are highly professional, highly motivated and with no fear of death. I think we can, to a great extent, say goodbye to the amateur Islamic terrorist we have seen so much of in the past. Enthusiastic, poorly trained and often misfits, leaving a trail of evidence behind them as they went along, resulting in early detection, their attacks being thwarted, and explosives failing to detonate.’
Looking glum, the Prime Minister responded, ‘Thank you for your candour, Home Secretary.’
The Prime Minister looked over the large conference table at the Energy Secretary. ‘Bob. Do you have some good news for me?’
The Energy Secretary shuffled uncomfortably in his chair, not making eye contact with the Prime Minister as he replied,
‘Prime Minister, unfortunately I am not in a position to provide much in the way of good news at this time. All nine nuclear power stations remain out of operation for the moment while examination continues to be made of the reactors, the steel and concrete structures housing them and other plant equipment on the sites. Reports suggest that at three of the sites no damage would appear to have been sustained, either to the reactors at those locations or to any vital plant or equipment. It is, therefore, anticipated that these three facilities will be operational once again within a matter of days. However, the reactor buildings at six of the sites have sustained damage, although no damage appears to have been sustained by the reactors themselves. Nevertheless, these reinforced structures exist not only to protect the reactors housed within. They are also there to protect the environment outside. It would, therefore, be unthinkable for these reactors, even though undamaged themselves, to be brought back into operation until work has been done on the structures around them. It is going to be some time before a clear picture can be produced as to how long they will remain out of operation. In the medium term, with an anticipated loss of power generation from six of the nine nuclear plants, I have been advised that a significant loss of power within the national power supply can be expected.