Command and Control (41 page)

“
We have no bases in Cuba, and we do not intend to establish any,” Khrushchev had assured Kennedy in a personal note. That promise was later repeated by the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, during a meeting with Robert Kennedy. On September 11, TASS issued a flat-out denial: “
Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.” A month later photographs taken by an American U-2 spy plane revealed Soviet missile sites under construction in the countryside near San Cristobal, about fifty miles west of Havana. Kennedy had warned the Soviets that the United States would not tolerate the deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba. Now he had to figure out what to do about them.

•   •   •

F
OR
THE
NEXT
THIRTEEN
DAYS
, the Kennedy administration debated how to respond, worried that a wrong move could start a nuclear war. Many of the crucial discussions were secretly recorded; the president and
his brother were the only ones at the meetings who knew that a tape recorder was running. At first, President Kennedy thought that the Soviet missiles had to be destroyed before they became operational. Most of his advisers felt the same way. They disagreed mainly on the issue of how large the air strike should be—confined solely to the missiles or expanded to include Cuban air bases and support facilities. As the days passed, doubts began to intrude. A surprise attack had the best chance of success; but it might anger America's allies in Europe, especially if Khrushchev used it as a pretext to seize West Berlin. A small-scale attack might not destroy every missile and nuclear weapon on the island; but getting them all might require a full-scale invasion. And a blockade of the island would prevent the Soviets from delivering more weapons to Cuba; but it might have little effect on the weapons already there.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that the Soviet missiles had to be attacked at once, without any warning. Like the Jupiters in Italy and Turkey, the missiles in Cuba weren't protected by concrete silos. From a strictly military point of view, they were useful only for a Soviet first strike. And
their strategic purpose seemed to be a decapitation attack against the military and civilian leadership of the United States. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was oriented to the north and the east, not the south. Missiles launched from Cuba might not be detected until their thermonuclear warheads hit American targets three or four minutes later. The Joint Chiefs recommended a massive air strike against the Soviet missiles, planes, and weapons in Cuba. A limited strike would not only be more dangerous, they argued, it might be worse than doing nothing at all. Missiles that survived the attack would probably be hidden or launched—and the one opportunity to destroy them, lost.

The strategic implications of the missiles meant less to President Kennedy than the intangible threat they posed. “
It doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away,” he said the day after the missiles were discovered. Failing to destroy them or to force their removal would make America look weak. It might encourage the Soviets to move against Berlin. But attacking the missiles brought a whole new set of risks. At a meeting with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on October 19, four days into the crisis, after the president and his brother and his national security advisers had gone back and forth discussing what sort of action to take, the stark differences between America's civilian and military leadership were exposed.

“
If we attack Cuba, the missiles, or Cuba, in any way then it gives [the Soviets] a clear line to take Berlin,” President Kennedy said.

General LeMay disagreed.

“
We've got the Berlin problem staring us in the face anyway,” LeMay said. “If we don't do anything to Cuba, then they're going to push on Berlin and push
real hard
because they've got us on the run.”

LeMay thought the Strategic Air Command was so overwhelmingly powerful, and America's nuclear superiority was so great, that the Soviets wouldn't dare to attack Berlin or the United States. Anything short of an air strike on Cuba, he told Kennedy, would be “
almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich” that led to the Second World War. The remark was especially pointed: Kennedy's father had long been criticized for supporting that appeasement of Hitler. An extraordinary exchange soon occurred between America's commander in chief and one of its most prominent generals:

L
EMAY
:
I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I'm sure a lot of our own citizens would feel the same way. In other words, you're in a pretty bad fix at the present time.

P
RESIDENT
K
ENNEDY
:
What did you say?

L
EMAY
:
You're in a pretty bad fix.

P
RESIDENT
K
ENNEDY
:
You're in there with me. [
Slight laughter, a bit forced.
] Personally.

When the meeting ended, Kennedy left the Cabinet Room, unsure about what to do. The tape recorder was still running. General David Shoup, commandant of the Marine Corps, turned to LeMay. “
I just agree with you,” Shoup said. “I agree with you a hundred percent.”

On the evening of October 22, America's television networks interrupted their regularly scheduled programming to broadcast a special message from
the president. Appearing somber and grim behind his desk in the Oval Office, Kennedy informed the nation that Soviet missiles had been spotted in Cuba. He called upon Khrushchev to “
eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace.” He reminded viewers that a policy of appeasement, of allowing aggressive conduct to go unchallenged, had led to the Second World War. And he declared that the United States was imposing a modified blockade, a “quarantine,” on the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba. The Soviet missiles had to be removed, and Khrushchev had to “
move the world back from the abyss of destruction.” Otherwise, Kennedy said, the United States would take further, unspecified actions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had established five defense readiness conditions (DEFCON) for the armed forces. DEFCON 5 was the state of military readiness during normal peacetime operations; DEFCON 1 meant that war was imminent. As Kennedy spoke to the nation, the Joint Chiefs ordered American forces to DEFCON 3. Polaris submarines left their ports and headed for locations within range of the Soviet Union. Fighter-interceptors patrolled American airspace with Genies and Falcons, atomic antiaircraft rockets, in case Soviet planes tried to attack from Cuba.
Nearly two hundred B-47 bombers left SAC bases and flew to dozens of civilian airports throughout the United States—to Portland, Spokane, and Minneapolis; to Chicago and Detroit; to Birmingham, Philadelphia, and Tulsa. Dispersing the bombers from SAC bases made them less vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Aircrews slept on the ground beside their planes, which were loaded with hydrogen bombs, as commercial airliners took off and landed on nearby runways.

The number of B-52s on airborne alert was increased more than fivefold.
Every day about sixty-five of the bombers circled within striking distance of the Soviet Union. Each of them carried a Hound Dog missile with a thermonuclear warhead, as well as two Mark 39 or four Mark 28 hydrogen bombs. On October 24, when the quarantine of Cuba took effect, the Strategic Air Command was placed on DEFCON 2 for the first time in its history. “
I am addressing you for the purpose of reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation this nation faces,” General Power said in a message
transmitted to all his commanders worldwide. “We are in an advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies. . . . I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm judgment during this tense period.” Sent by radio, without any encryption, his announcement that SAC was ready for war could also be heard by the Soviets.

One quarter of a million American troops prepared for an invasion of Cuba. Secretary of Defense McNamara worried that, with thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert, something could go wrong. President Kennedy had recently approved the installation of permissive action links. But his executive order applied only to weapons in the NATO atomic stockpile—and none of the locks had been installed yet. U.S. Air Force units in Europe were kept at DEFCON 5, and the readiness of NATO forces wasn't increased. Any sign of a mobilization in Europe might alarm the Soviets, creating another potential trigger for nuclear war. McNamara also worried that if the United States attacked the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union might retaliate by attacking the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
The American custodians of the Jupiters were ordered to render the missiles inoperable, somehow, if Turkish officers tried to launch them without Kennedy's approval.

The lack of direct, secure communications between the White House and the Kremlin, the distrust that Kennedy felt toward the Soviet leader, and Khrushchev's impulsive, unpredictable behavior complicated efforts to end the crisis peacefully. Khrushchev felt relieved, after hearing Kennedy's speech, that the president hadn't announced an invasion of Cuba. Well aware that the Soviet Union's strategic forces were vastly inferior to those of the United States, Khrushchev had no desire to start a nuclear war. He did, however, want to test Kennedy's mettle and see how much the Soviets could gain from the crisis. Khrushchev secretly ordered his ships loaded with missiles not to violate the quarantine. But in private letters to Kennedy, he vowed that the ships would never turn around, denied that offensive weapons had been placed in Cuba, and denounced the quarantine as “
an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward . . . a world nuclear-missile war.”

Bertrand Russell agreed with the Soviet leader and sent President
Kennedy a well-publicized telegram. “
Your action desperate,” it said. “Threat to human survival. No conceivable justification. Civilized man condemns it. . . . End this madness.” Khrushchev's first public statement on the missile crisis was a cordial reply to the British philosopher, proposing a summit meeting. While the Kennedy administration anxiously wondered if the Soviets would back down, Khrushchev maintained a defiant facade. And then on October 26, persuaded by faulty intelligence that an American attack on Cuba was about to begin, he wrote another letter to Kennedy, offering a deal: the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from Cuba, if the United States promised never to invade Cuba.

Khrushchev's letter arrived at the American embassy in Moscow around five o'clock in the evening, which was ten in the morning, Eastern Standard Time. It took almost eleven hours for the letter to be fully transmitted by cable to the State Department in Washington, D.C. Kennedy and his advisers were encouraged by its conciliatory tone and decided to accept the deal—but went to bed without replying. Seven more hours passed, and Khrushchev started to feel confident that the United States wasn't about to attack Cuba, after all. He wrote another letter to Kennedy, adding a new demand: the missiles in Cuba would be removed, if the United States removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Instead of being delivered to the American embassy, this letter was broadcast, for the world to hear, on Radio Moscow.

On the morning of October 27, as President Kennedy was drafting a reply to Khrushchev's first proposal, the White House learned about his second one. Kennedy and his advisers struggled to understand what was happening in the Kremlin. Conflicting messages were now coming not only from Khrushchev, but from various diplomats, journalists, and Soviet intelligence agents who were secretly meeting with members of the administration. Convinced that Khrushchev was being duplicitous, McNamara now pushed for a limited air strike to destroy the missiles. General Maxwell Taylor, now head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a large-scale attack. When an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot, the pressure on Kennedy to launch an air strike increased enormously. A nuclear war with the Soviet Union seemed possible. “
As I left the White
House . . . on that beautiful fall evening,” McNamara later recalled, “I feared I might never live to see another Saturday night.”

The Cuban Missile Crisis ended amid the same sort of confusion and miscommunication that had plagued much of its thirteen days. President Kennedy sent the Kremlin a cable accepting the terms of Khrushchev's first offer, never acknowledging that a second demand had been made. But Kennedy also instructed his brother to meet privately with Ambassador Dobrynin and agree to the demands made in Khrushchev's second letter—so long as the promise to remove the Jupiters from Turkey was never made public. Giving up dangerous and obsolete American missiles to avert a nuclear holocaust seemed like a good idea. Only a handful of Kennedy's close advisers were told about this secret agreement.

Meanwhile, at the Kremlin, Khrushchev suddenly became afraid once again that the United States was about to attack Cuba. He decided to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba—without insisting upon the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Before he had a chance to transmit his decision to the Soviet embassy in Washington, word arrived from Dobrynin about Kennedy's secret promise. Khrushchev was delighted by the president's unexpected—and unnecessary—concession. But time seemed to be running out, and an American attack might still be pending. Instead of accepting the deal through a diplomatic cable, Khrushchev's decision to remove the missiles from Cuba was immediately broadcast on Radio Moscow. No mention was made of the American vow to remove its missiles from Turkey.