Elsewhere in Plato we hear nothing about Eudicus, the third speaker of the dialogue, except in
Greater Hippias,
where Hippias says Eudicus has invited him to give the exhibition on Homer that provides the occasion for our dialogue. From this evidence he would appear to be Hippias’ host in Athens, and so one of his more prominent Athenian admirers—though he is not mentioned in
Protagoras
among those attending him.
J.M.C.
E
UDICUS
: Why are you silent, Socrates, after Hippias has given such an
[363]
exhibition? Why don’t you either join us in praising some point or other in what he said, or else put something to the test, if it seems to you anything was not well said—especially since we who most claim to have a share in the practice of philosophy are now left to ourselves?
S
OCRATES
: Indeed, Eudicus, there
are
some things in what Hippias said just now about Homer that I’d like to hear more about. For your father [b] Apemantus used to say that the
Iliad
of Homer is a finer poem than the
Odyssey
, to just the extent that Achilles is a better man than Odysseus; for, he said, one of these poems is about Odysseus and the other about Achilles. I’d like to ask about that, then, if Hippias is willing. What does he think about these two men? Which of them does he say is the better? For in his [c] exhibition he’s told us all sorts of other things both about other poets and about Homer.
E
UDICUS
: It’s plain that Hippias won’t object to answering any question you ask him. Right, Hippias? If Socrates asks you something, will you answer, or what will you do?
H
IPPIAS
: Well, it would be strange behavior if I didn’t, Eudicus. I always go from my home at Elis to the festival of the Greeks at Olympia when it [d] is held and offer myself at the temple to speak on demand about any subject I have prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions anyone wants to ask. I can hardly flee now from answering the questions of Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: What a godlike state of mind you’re in, Hippias, if you go to
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the temple at every Olympiad so confident about your soul’s wisdom! I’d be amazed if any of the athletes of the body goes there to take part in the contests as fearless and trusting about his body as you say you are about your intellect!
H
IPPIAS
: It is reasonable for me to be in that state of mind, Socrates. Ever since I began taking part in the contests at the Olympic games, I have never met anyone superior to me in anything.
[b] S
OCRATES
: A fine reply, Hippias. Your fame is a monument for wisdom to the city of Elis and to your parents. But what do you say to us about Achilles and about Odysseus? Which do you say is the better man, and in what respect? When there were many of us inside, and you were giving your exhibition, I couldn’t keep up with what you were saying, but I hesitated to keep asking questions. There were so many people inside, and I didn’t want to hinder your display by raising questions. But now, since there are fewer of us and Eudicus here urges me to question you, [c] speak, and instruct us clearly. What were you saying about these two men? How were you distinguishing them?
H
IPPIAS
: Well, I am glad to explain to you even more clearly than before what I say about these men and others, too. I say that Homer made Achilles the “best and bravest” man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.
S
OCRATES
: What? Hippias, will you do me the favor of not laughing at [d] me if I have difficulty understanding what you are saying and often repeat my questions? But try to answer me gently and in a good–natured way.
H
IPPIAS
: It would be shameful, Socrates, if I, who teach others to do that very thing and demand a fee for it, should not myself be lenient when questioned by you and answer gently.
S
OCRATES
: Finely put. But really, when you said that the poet made Achilles the “best and bravest,” and when you said that he made Nestor [e] the wisest, I thought I understood you. But when you said that he made Odysseus the wiliest—well, to tell you the truth, I don’t know in the least what you mean by that. But tell me this; maybe it’ll make me understand better. Doesn’t Homer make Achilles wily?
H
IPPIAS
: Not in the least, Socrates, but most simple and truthful; for in the “Prayers,” when he has them conversing, he has Achilles say to Odysseus:
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Son of Laertes, sprung from Zeus, resourceful Odysseus,
I must speak the word bluntly,
How I will act and how I think it shall be accomplished,
For as hateful to me as the gates of Hades
[b]
Is he who hides one thing in his mind, and says another.
As for me, I will speak as it shall also be accomplished.
1
In these lines he clearly shows the way of each man, that Achilles is truthful and simple, and Odysseus is wily and a liar;
2
for he presents Achilles as saying these words to Odysseus.
S
OCRATES
: Now, Hippias, it may be that I understand what you mean. You mean that the wily person is a liar, or so it appears.
H
IPPIAS
: Certainly, Socrates. Homer presents Odysseus as that kind of [c] person in many places, both in the
Iliad
and in the
Odyssey
.
S
OCRATES
: So Homer, it seems, thought the truthful man was one kind of person, and the liar another, and not the same.
H
IPPIAS
: How could he not, Socrates?
S
OCRATES
: And do you yourself think so, Hippias?
H
IPPIAS
: Certainly, Socrates. It would be very strange if it were otherwise.
S
OCRATES
: Let’s dismiss Homer, then, since it’s impossible to ask him [d] what he had in mind when he wrote these lines. But since you’re evidently taking up the cause, and agree with what you say he meant, answer for both Homer and yourself.
H
IPPIAS
: So be it. Ask briefly what you wish.
S
OCRATES
: Do you say that liars, like sick people, don’t have the power to do anything, or that they do have the power to do something?
H
IPPIAS
: I say they very much have the power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.
S
OCRATES
: So according to your argument they are powerful, it would [e] seem, and wily. Right?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Are they wily and deceivers from dimwittedness and foolishness, or by cunning and some kind of intelligence?
H
IPPIAS
: From cunning, absolutely, and intelligence.
S
OCRATES
: So they are intelligent, it seems.
H
IPPIAS
: Yes, by Zeus. Too much so.
S
OCRATES
: And being intelligent, do they not know what they are doing, or do they know?
H
IPPIAS
: They know very well. That’s how they do their mischief.
S
OCRATES
: And knowing the things that they know, are they ignorant, or wise?
H
IPPIAS
: Wise, surely, in just these things: in deception.
[366]
S
OCRATES
: Stop. Let us recall what it is that you are saying. You claim that liars are powerful and intelligent and knowledgeable and wise in those matters in which they are liars?
H
IPPIAS
: That’s what I claim.
S
OCRATES
: And that the truthful and the liars are different, complete opposites of one another?
H
IPPIAS
: That’s what I say.
S
OCRATES
: Well, then. The liars are among the powerful and wise, according to your argument.
H
IPPIAS
: Certainly.
S
OCRATES
: And when you say that the liars are powerful and wise in [b] these very matters, do you mean that they have the power to lie if they want, or that they are without power in the matters in which they are liars?
H
IPPIAS
: I mean they are powerful.
S
OCRATES
: To put it in a nutshell, then, liars are wise and have the power to lie.
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: So a person who did not have the power to lie and was ignorant would not be a liar.
H
IPPIAS
: That’s right.
[c] S
OCRATES
: But each person who can do what he wishes when he wishes is powerful. I mean someone who is not prevented by disease or other such things, someone like you with regard to writing my name. You have the power to do this whenever you wish to. That’s what I mean. Or don’t you say that one in such a condition is powerful?
H
IPPIAS
: I do.
S
OCRATES
: Now tell me, Hippias: aren’t you experienced in calculating and arithmetic?
H
IPPIAS
: Most experienced of all, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: So if someone were to ask you what three times seven hundred is, couldn’t you tell him the truth about this most quickly and best of all, if you wished?
[d] H
IPPIAS
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: Because you are most powerful and wisest in these matters?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best in those things in which you are most powerful and wisest, that is, in arithmetic?
H
IPPIAS
: Best also, for sure, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: Then would you tell the truth most powerfully about these things?
[e] H
IPPIAS
:
I
think so.
S
OCRATES
: But what about falsehoods about these same things? Please answer with the same nobility and grandeur you showed before, Hippias. If someone were to ask you what three times seven hundred is, could you lie the best, always consistently say falsehoods about these things, if you
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wished to lie and never to tell the truth? Or would one who is ignorant of calculations have more power than you to lie if he wished to? Don’t you think the ignorant person would often involuntarily tell the truth when he wished to say falsehoods, if it so happened, because he didn’t know; whereas you, the wise person, if you should wish to lie, would always consistently lie?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes, it is just as you say.
S
OCRATES
: Is the liar, then, a liar about other things but not about number—he wouldn’t lie about numbers?
H
IPPIAS
: But yes, by Zeus, about numbers, too.
[b] S
OCRATES
: So we should also maintain this, Hippias, that there is such a person as a liar about calculation and number.
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Who would this person be? Mustn’t he have the power to lie, as you just now agreed, if he is going to be a liar? If you remember, you said that one who did not have the power to lie could never become a liar.
H
IPPIAS
: I remember. I said that.
S
OCRATES
: And were you not just now shown to have the most power to lie about calculations?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes. I said that, too.
S
OCRATES
: Do you, therefore, have the most power to tell the truth [c] about calculations?
H
IPPIAS
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: Then the same person has the most power both to say falsehoods and to tell the truth about calculations. And this person is the one who is good with regard to these things, the arithmetician?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Then who becomes a liar about calculations, Hippias, other than the good person? For the same person is also powerful, and truthful, as well.
H
IPPIAS
: Apparently.
S
OCRATES
: Do you see, then, that the same person is both a liar and truthful about these things, and the truthful person is no better than the [d] liar? For, indeed, he is the same person and the two are not complete opposites, as you supposed just now.
H
IPPIAS
: He does not appear to be, at least in this field.
S
OCRATES
: Do you wish to investigate some other field, then?
H
IPPIAS
: If you wish.
S
OCRATES
: All right. Are you not also experienced in geometry?
H
IPPIAS
: I am.
S
OCRATES
: Well, then. Isn’t it the same way in geometry? Doesn’t the same person have the most power to lie and to tell the truth about geometrical diagrams, namely, the geometer?
H
IPPIAS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Is anyone else good at these things, or the geometer?
H
IPPIAS
: No one else. [e]
S
OCRATES
: The good and wise geometer, then, is the most powerful in both respects, isn’t he? And if anyone could be a liar about diagrams, it would be this person, the good geometer? For he has the power to lie, but the bad one is powerless; and one who does not have the power to lie cannot become a liar, as you agreed.
H
IPPIAS
: That’s right.
S
OCRATES
: Let us investigate a third person, the astronomer, whose craft you think you know even better than the preceding ones. Right, Hippias?
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