Down to the Sea (34 page)

As for his two lost destroyers, Mercer said that on the morning of December 18, “when
Monaghan
reported inability to come to the southerly [fleet] course,” he considered “offering her some advice” but decided not to “in view of the communications situation and my inability to visualize what was happening in the ship.” He did not suggest what nature of advice he might have given. As for
Hull,
“I never knew she was in difficulties.” Mercer testified that
Dewey
had received the message by light signal from
Tabberer
on the night of the eighteenth that she was “picking up some survivors,” although Mercer said it was unclear to him at that time which ship had gone down. In defending his decision to withdraw
Dewey
from the search for men in the water, Mercer said: “
Dewey
was on a course about 220, speed 3 knots, and although we would have attempted to rescue survivors had we seen any, I did not consider it advisable to make a search.”
*

Once again, the search for survivors seemed to be a lower priority.

One of the first questions asked of Mercer was whether
Spence
had been under his tactical command. He confirmed that she had been until he turned over command of the task unit about 10:00
A.M.
on December 18.

“At any time during that period did you receive any indication that
Spence
might be in trouble?”

“No, none other than she was unable to fuel,” said Mercer.

“Have you anything to say regarding the seamanship of
Spence
during the time that she was under your tactical command?”

“I noted nothing unusual, except that she dropped behind when my task unit headed south at about 8:20
A.M.
on the morning of the 18th.
With the communication difficulties being encountered at that time, I didn't think it remarkable that a ship had failed to receive a change of course signal, and I believe that she reported she was making the fleet speed on the fleet course after she fell out of position.”

Mercer was asked to “compare the experience and capabilities” of the commanding officers of
Hull
and
Monaghan,
Jim Marks and Bruce Garrett, respectively.

“The commanding officer of
Monaghan
was in the squadron for such a very short time that I had practically no opportunity to make a sound estimate. He handled his ship well in formation, kept her on station in the screen, but that was the limit of my opportunity to observe him. The commanding officer of
Hull
has been separated from my squadron a great deal [while
Hull
was assigned to other units]. Likewise, when she was with us for a very short time, his ship was handled well, and I have no criticism whatever of his ability. [Marks] has served in the North Atlantic and experienced very heavy weather, but perhaps he did not appreciate that
Hull
was not as stable as previous destroyers in which he was embarked. I believe the commanding officers of
Monaghan
and
Hull
have at least average ability and judgment compared with their contemporaries.”

This line of questioning continued for several exchanges.

Q: “How does the service experience of the commanding officers of your squadron compare with that of the commanding officers of other squadrons?”

A: “The commanding officers of the ships of my squadron are the most junior in destroyers, being of the Naval Academy class of 1938. The commanding officer of
Spence
was in the class of 1937, and now there are a few commanding officers of the class of 1938 in other destroyers.”

Q: “I gather from your answer that these destroyer commanders of the class of 1938 are the junior ones in the fleet. Is that correct?”

A: “That's right, sir. They are just beginning to send a few of them to other ships.”

Q: “Would you venture an opinion, or could you state, which destroyer squadron of the fleet has [ships with] the least stability?”

A: “There is no question in my mind but that it is Destroyer Squadron One.”

Inexplicably, the judge advocate had just provided Mercer with cover in the event anyone in authority questioned how and why two of his squadron's destroyers—the oldest destroyers in the fleet, being commanded by the youngest skippers—and a third, newer destroyer temporarily assigned to him had been lost on December 18 while so many other ships, some also low on fuel, managed to survive the typhoon.

Mercer was not questioned about failing to join
Tabberer,
seemingly the one ship in the fleet that put a top priority on rescue, in the search for survivors in the water—men who happened to be from his own squadron.
*

 

T
HE THIRD DAY
of the court of inquiry began with admirals.

Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, Annapolis class of 1910 and a former submarine commander during World War I who later became a naval aviator, was one of the Third Fleet's most experienced seamen and now served as one of Halsey's carrier division commanders. Like other admirals called to the stand, his questioning was conducted by the admirals on the court rather than handed over to the judge advocate, a mere captain.

Q: “Did you have timely warning or know that a severe storm was approaching?”

A: “I wouldn't say that I did, no. The aerologist on my staff kept reporting a typhoon 500 miles to the northeast. That was on the 17th.
The wind was about 060 and increasing, the barometer was falling, which according to my experience, indicated a storm. I put it to the southeast and much closer than 500 miles.”

Q: “You were the northern task group of [Third Fleet], therefore probably the storm went as close to you as any of the others.”

A: “I think it went closer except for some of the tankers and destroyer escorts that were northeast of us right in the path of the storm.”

Q: “There were three fueling rendezvous set for the morning of the 18th. In view of the fueling rendezvous set for the morning of the 18th, did you feel that the storm would strike your task group?”

A: “I was not particularly happy over the last rendezvous.”

Q: “Did you make your ideas on this matter known to any higher authority?”

A: “No, sir.”

Sherman described his group's unsuccessful attempts to fuel two destroyers low on fuel the morning of the 18th. The refuelings were “called off by higher authority” after an hour due to the “line of weather getting worse.”

Asked if he had any further observations he would like to make about the storm, Sherman did not hesitate to speak a piece of his mind. “Without meaning any particular criticism of our present day aerologists, I'm inclined to think that they have been brought up to depend on a lot of readings they get from other stations. I think they are much weaker than older officers in judging the weather by what they actually see. Whether anything can be done along these lines to either encourage or instruct them to watch weather that is then existing without waiting for reports from Pearl Harbor or other stations, I don't know. I think they should be taught to judge the weather by what they actually see.”

Another of Halsey's carrier group commanders, Rear Admiral Gerald Bogan, testified to being told early on the afternoon of the 17th by the aerology officer of the carrier
Lexington,
his flagship, about a “cyclonic storm forming to the northeast of us.”

Bogan gave testimony similar to Sherman's regarding his uneasi
ness over the setting of the final fueling rendezvous on the morning of the eighteenth. This time when the question was asked as to whether he had so informed “high authority,” the response was quite different: “Yes, sir.”

“Please tell the court what it was.”

“I sent a signal to [Halsey] stating that the
Lexington
weather estimate indicated that improved conditions would be found further to the southward.”

Instead, the fleet had plowed northward into the path of the typhoon that morning in an unsuccessful attempt to fuel.

Vice Admiral John S. McCain (Annapolis 1906), Halsey's task force commander, came to the witness stand next. Even though he was Halsey's highest-ranking subordinate, McCain claimed not to have been involved in any of the fleet's decisions to set fueling rendezvous. He could “only venture a guess” as to why certain decisions were made by Halsey, but no one on the court was much interested in having McCain provide such speculation.

Q: “At what time did storm considerations begin to govern the disposition and movement of your task force, if at all?”

A: “The morning of the 18th, I believe.”

Q: “You had no cause for alarm until the weather markedly deteriorated the morning of the 18th?”

A: “That's true as far as I was individually concerned, yes.”

An admiral on the court now told McCain something he might not have known, given that all testimony had been behind closed doors and after the first witness had been “classified as secret.”

“There has been testimony that indications were plain to certain commanders that the storm was approaching and increasing in violence during the 17th and that perhaps aerographers in the fleet did not estimate on local conditions sufficiently, but relied mostly on reports from outside stations. What is your opinion of this?”

McCain sounded surprised. “I have no opinion of value on that.” When it came to providing illumination to the subject of the inquiry, McCain had been of no value, either.

The next witness was the one man who would be unable to claim that he was not part of the decision-making process involving the Third Fleet or otherwise not responsible for any of its actions or movements. When the name was called by the judge advocate, an orderly hurried from the room to summon the witness, who was waiting in the passageway. Everyone watched the door. Soon it opened, and a barrel-chested admiral, tieless and in pressed khakis like the other officers in the wardroom, strode forward. Once seated, the witness was asked by the judge advocate to state his name, rank, and present station. It would be the last question asked by Gates, as all further questioning would be handled by the court's own admirals: “William F. Halsey, admiral, U.S. Navy, commander Third Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet.”

Q: “Admiral, did you consider that you had timely warning or did you know that a severe storm was approaching around the 16th and 17th of December?”

A: “I did not have timely warning. I'll put it another way. I had no warning.”

Q: “There has been testimony from other commanders that the local conditions indicated the approach of the storm. Was that evident to you?”

A: “The local conditions commencing on the 17th were very bad. So bad that I ordered the destroyers that were alongside tankers and heavy ships [for fueling] to clear. A disturbance was indicated, but whether it was a severe storm or merely a local disturbance, there was no way of determining. We still thought it was a storm that had curved away to the northward and eastward and we determined to get away from it.”

Q: “When fueling had to be stopped on the 17th of December due to increasing bad weather, what were your considerations?”

A: “The general picture was sour. I had numerous destroyers that were very short of fuel. I was under obligation to make a strike on Luzon, but of course a strike could not be made until the fleet was fueled. I was also obligated to avoid by that time what I considered a storm the magnitude of which I did not know…. Up to the forenoon of the 18th
December, when an unsuccessful attempt had been made to fuel, I was still under the impression that the tropical disturbance would curve to the northward and the eastward and its severity was not indicated.”

Q: “At what time did the storm considerations begin to govern the disposition and movement of the fleet, if at all?”

A: “On the forenoon of the 18th it was very definitely apparent that we were very close to a violent disturbance which I believed was a typhoon. We were completely cornered and in the dangerous semicircle. The consideration then was [to find] the fastest way to get out of the dangerous semicircle and get to a position where our destroyers could be fueled.”

When asked what was “wrong with the weather service,” Halsey characterized it as “nonexistent” and went on to describe late and missing weather reports from outside sources. “As I recollect, there was only one report of a disturbance that came in…. It is the first time in the four months that I've been operating in this area that I haven't had reports to enable me to track a storm.”

“Had you any idea there were any vessels in your force that were very low in stability when low on fuel?”

“Having spent a great many years in destroyers and having been in some very severe weather in ships ranging from 160 tons to 1200 tons, I knew there had been grave doubts as to their stability from time to time, particularly when in a light condition,” Halsey answered. “I believe that some time before we got into the worst of this storm we sent out a general signal advising everybody to ballast down.”

Halsey had stated something not mentioned by any other witness during the course of the proceedings. The suggestion that the Third Fleet sent out a “general signal” recommending ships take on seawater ballast “before we got into the worst” of the typhoon was offered by Halsey alone. No copy of such a communiqué from Halsey or his Third Fleet staff was ever produced.

Q: “Comparing the conditions of the 17th fueling with those of the early morning of the 18th, what is your estimate of the weather conditions?”

A: “On the morning of the 17th I was under the impression that we were on the fringes of a disturbance. On the morning of the 18th there was no doubt in my mind that we were approaching a storm of major proportions and that it was almost too late to do anything.”