Authors: Professor Michael Hardt,Antonio Negri
Tags: #Philosophy, #Political, #Political Science, #General, #American Government
ofthe imperial ordering supports the exercise ofpolice power, while
at the same time the activity ofglobal police force demonstrates the
real effectiveness of the imperial ordering. The juridical power to
rule over the exception and the capacity to deploy police force
are thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model
ofauthority.
Universal Values
We might well ask at this point, however, should we still use the
juridical term ‘‘right’’ in this context? How can we call right (and
specifically imperial right) a series oftechniques that, founded on
a state ofpermanent exception and the power ofthe police, reduces
right and law to a question of pure effectiveness? In order to address
these questions, we should first look more closely at the process of
imperial constitution that we are witnessing today. We should
emphasize from the start that its reality is demonstrated not only
by the transformations of international law it brings about, but also
by the changes it effects in the administrative law of individual
societies and nation-states, or really in the administrative law of
cosmopolitical society.27 Through its contemporary transformation
ofsupranational law, the imperial process ofconstitution tends either
directly or indirectly to penetrate and reconfigure the domestic
law ofthe nation-states, and thus supranational law powerf
ully
overdetermines domestic law.
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T H E P O L I T I C A L C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E P R E S E N T
Perhaps the most significant symptom ofthis transformation
is the development ofthe so-called
right of intervention.
28 This is commonly conceived as the right or duty ofthe dominant subjects
ofthe world order to intervene in the territories ofother subjects
in the interest ofpreventing or resolving humanitarian problems,
guaranteeing accords, and imposing peace. The right ofintervention
figured prominently among the panoply ofinstruments accorded
the United Nations by its Charter for maintaining international
order, but the contemporary reconfiguration ofthis right represents
a qualitative leap. No longer, as under the old international ordering,
do individual sovereign states or the supranational (U.N.) power
intervene only to ensure or impose the application ofvoluntarily
engaged international accords. Now supranational subjects that are
legitimated not by right but by consensus intervene in the name
ofany type ofemergency and superior ethical principles. What
stands behind this intervention is not just a permanent state of
emergency and exception, but a permanent state ofemergency and
exception justified by
the appeal to essential values of justice.
In other words, the right ofthe police is legitimated by universal values.29
Should we assume that since this new right ofintervention
functions primarily toward the goal of resolving urgent human
problems, its legitimacy is therefore founded on universal values?
Should we read this movement as a process that, on the basis of
the fluctuating elements ofthe historical framework, sets in motion
a constitutive machine driven by universal forces of justice and
peace? Are we thus in a situation very close to the traditional
definition ofEmpire, the one promulgated in the ancient Roman-
Christian imaginary?
It would be going too far to respond affirmatively to these
questions at this early stage in our investigation. The definition of
the developing imperial power as a science ofthe police that is
founded on a practice of just war to address continually arising
emergencies is probably correct but still completely insufficient. As
we have seen, the phenomenological determinations ofthe new
global order exist in a profoundly fluctuating situation that could
W O R L D O R D E R
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also be characterized correctly in terms ofcrisis and war. How can
we reconcile the legitimation ofthis order through prevention and
policing with the fact that crisis and war themselves demonstrate
the very questionable genesis and legitimacy ofthis concept of
justice? As we have already noted, these techniques and others like
them indicate that what we are witnessing is a process ofthe material
constitution ofthe new planetary order, the consolidation ofits
administrative machine, and the production ofnew hierarchies of
command over global space. Who will decide on the definitions
ofjustice and order across the expanse ofthis totality in the course
ofits process ofconstitution? Who will be able to define the concept
ofpeace? Who will be able to unify the process ofsuspending
history and call this suspension just? Around these questions the
problematic ofEmpire is completely open, not closed.
At this point, the problem ofthe new juridical apparatus is
presented to us in its most immediate figure: a global order, a justice,
and a right that are still virtual but nonetheless apply actually to us.
We are forced increasingly to feel that we are participants in this
development, and we are called upon to be responsible for what
it becomes in this framework. Our citizenship, just like our ethical
responsibility, is situated within these new dimensions—our power
and our impotence are measured here. We could say, in Kantian
fashion, that our internal moral disposition, when it is confronted
with and tested in the social order, tends to be determined by the
ethical, political, and juridical categories ofEmpire. Or we could
say that the external morality ofevery human being and citizen is
by now commensurable only in the framework of Empire. This
new framework forces us to confront a series of explosive aporias,
because in this new juridical and institutional world being formed
our ideas and practices ofjustice and our means ofhope are thrown
into question. The means ofthe private and individual apprehension
ofvalues are dissolved: with the appearance ofEmpire, we are
confronted no longer with the local mediations of the universal
but with a concrete universal itself. The domesticity of values, the
shelters behind which they presented their moral substance, the
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T H E P O L I T I C A L C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E P R E S E N T
limits that protect against the invading exteriority—all that disap-
pears. We are all forced to confront absolute questions and radical
alternatives. In Empire, ethics, morality, and justice are cast into
new dimensions.
Throughout the course ofour research we have found our-
selves confronted with a classic problematic of political philosophy:
the decline and fall of Empire.30 It may seem paradoxical that we
address this topos at the beginning, at the same time that we treat
the initial construction ofEmpire; but the becoming ofEmpire is
actually realized on the basis ofthe same conditions that characterize
its decadence and decline. Empire is emerging today as the center
that supports the globalization ofproductive networks and casts its
widely inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within
its world order—and yet at the same time it deploys a powerful
police function against the new barbarians and the rebellious slaves
who threaten its order. The power ofEmpire appears to be subordi-
nated to the fluctuations oflocal power dynamics and to the shifting,
partial juridical orderings that attempt, but never fully succeed, to
lead back to a state ofnormalcy in the name ofthe ‘‘exceptionality’’
ofthe administrative procedures. These characteristics, however,
were precisely those that defined ancient Rome in its decadence
and that tormented so many ofits Enlightenment admirers. We
should not expect that the complexity ofthe processes that construct
the new imperial relationship ofright be resolved. On the contrary,
the processes are and will remain contradictory. The question of
the definition ofjustice and peace will find no real resolution; the
force of the new imperial constitution will not be embodied in a
consensus that is articulated in the multitude. The terms ofthe
juridical proposal ofEmpire are completely indeterminate, even
though they are nonetheless concrete. Empire is born and shows
itselfas crisis. Should we conceive this as an Empire ofdecadence,
then, in the terms Montesquieu and Gibbon described? Or is it more
properly understood in classical terms as an Empire ofcorruption?
Here we should understand corruption first ofall not only in
moral terms but also in juridical and political terms, because accord-
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ing to Montesquieu and Gibbon, when the different forms of gov-
ernment are not firmly established in the republic, the cycle of
corruption is ineluctably set in motion and the community is torn
apart.31 Second, we should understand corruption also in metaphysi-
cal terms: where the entity and essence, effectiveness and value, do
not find common satisfaction, there develops not generation but
corruption.32 These are some ofthe fundamental axes ofEmpire
that we will return to later at length.
Allow us, in conclusion, one final analogy that refers to the
birth ofChristianity in Europe and its expansion during the decline
ofthe Roman Empire. In this process an enormous potential of
subjectivity was constructed and consolidated in terms ofthe proph-
ecy ofa world to come, a chiliastic project. This new subjectivity
offered an absolute alternative to the spirit of imperial right—a new
ontological basis. From this perspective, Empire was accepted as
the ‘‘maturity ofthe times’’ and the unity ofthe entire known
civilization, but it was challenged in its totality by a completely
different ethical and ontological axis. In the same way today, given
that the limits and unresolvable problems ofthe new imperial right
are fixed, theory and practice can go beyond them, finding once
again an ontological basis ofantagonism—within Empire, but also
against and beyond Empire, at the same level oftotality.
1.2
B I O P O L I T I C A L P R O D U C T I O N
The ‘‘police’’ appears as an administration heading the state, to-
gether with the judiciary, the army, and the exchequer. True. Yet
in fact, it embraces everything else. Turquet says so: ‘‘It branches
out into all ofthe people’s conditions, everything they do or under-
take. Its field comprises the judiciary, finance, and the army.’’ The
police
includes everything.
Michel Foucault
From the juridical perspective we have been able to
glimpse some ofthe elements ofthe ideal genesis ofEmpire, but
from that perspective alone it would be difficult if not impossible
to understand how the imperial machine is actually set in motion.
Juridical concepts and juridical systems always refer to something
other than themselves. Through the evolution and exercise ofright,
they point toward the material condition that defines their purchase
on social reality. Our analysis must now descend to the level of
that materiality and investigate there the material transformation of
the paradigm ofrule. We need to discover the means and forces
ofthe production ofsocial reality along with the subjectivities that
animate it.
Biopower in the Society of Control
In many respects, the work ofMichel Foucault has prepared the
terrain for such an investigation of the material functioning of
imperial rule. First ofall, Foucault’s work allows us to recognize a
historical, epochal passage in social forms from
disciplinary society
to B I O P O L I T I C A L P R O D U C T I O N
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the
society of control.
1 Disciplinary society is that society in which social command is constructed through a diffuse network of
dispositifs
or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and pro-
ductive practices. Putting this society to work and ensuring obedi-
ence to its rule and its mechanisms ofinclusion and/or exclusion
are accomplished through disciplinary institutions (the prison, the
factory, the asylum, the hospital, the university, the school, and so
forth) that structure the social terrain and present logics adequate
to the ‘‘reason’’ of discipline. Disciplinary power rules in effect
by structuring the parameters and limits ofthought and practice,
sanctioning and prescribing normal and/or deviant behaviors.
Foucault generally refers to the ancien re´gime and the classical age
ofFrench civilization to illustrate the emergence ofdisciplinarity,
but more generally we could say that the entire first phase of
capitalist accumulation (in Europe and elsewhere) was conducted
under this paradigm ofpower. We should understand the society
ofcontrol, in contrast, as that society (which develops at the far
edge ofmodernity and opens toward the postmodern) in which
mechanisms ofcommand become ever more ‘‘democratic,’’ ever
more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains
and bodies ofthe citizens. The behaviors ofsocial integration and