Read Enemy at the Gates Online
Authors: William Craig
He had phoned Gen. Albert Jeschonnek back in East Prussia to make that charge. But Jeschonnek "formally disclaimed all responsibility" for the order. Now Richthofen confided this conversation to Manstein. Both men were appalled by the decisions being made from the safety of the Wolf's Lair, more than a thousand miles away.
By the time dinner ended, the two were in agreement; they were "like a couple of attendants in a lunatic asylum."
After dinner, OKW's decision to transfer the Stukas back to the upper Don suddenly became clear. Another Russian attack had routed two Italian divisions from their positions fifty miles west of Serafimovich. No one yet realized that this was the opening of Stalin's second great attack, aimed at seizing the port city of Rostov and trapping the entire German army in Southern Russia. Reports so far were sketchy, but Manstein added what fragmentary information he possessed to his pessimistic appraisal of the future. He was well aware of the disaster the news implied. If the Italian Army failed to hold, his German divisions would have to go to their rescue. The result: Sixth Army at Stalingrad would be lost. Overwhelmed by a sense of onrushing catastrophe, the field marshal fixed his attention on the men in the
Kessel,
whose time for deliverance was at hand.
For days, Manstein had bombarded Hitler and Gen. Kurt Zeitzler about the need to issue a Führer Order for Operation
Donnerschlag
("Thunderclap"). The order would call for the complete evacuation of the
Kessel.
It would also mean the mass movement of the Sixth Army across the steppe, during which time, the Germans would have to fight the Russians on every flank.
No matter how bloody the outcome of this retreat might be, at this stage of the battle, Manstein considered Operation Thunderclap the only practical solution. The airlift had obviously failed: Hoth's rescue force could only channel a few days' worth of supplies into the pocket.
To date, however, Hitler had agreed only to Operation Winter Storm, the physical linkup by Hoth's forces to resupply the Sixth Army. The Führer still forbade Paulus to withdraw from the
Kessel.
For Hitler, retreat from Stalingrad was out of the question, and his reasoning was typically arrogant, "Too much blood had been spilled there by Germans!"
When General Zeitzler agreed with Manstein on the need for Thunderclap, and promised to get approval from Hitler within a matter of hours, Manstein regarded Hitler's agreement as a foregone conclusion. Thus, on December 17, he briefed his intelligence chief, Major Eismann, on the situation and ordered him to fly into the
Kessel
to discuss strategy with the Sixth Army chiefs.
The next afternoon Paulus made an inspection tour of the front. It left him extremely depressed, for he saw multiplying evidence of his troops' physical decline. The men moved slowly and were indifferent to commands. Their faces had become pinched. With eyes sunken behind protruding cheekbones, many just stared into space.
Returning to Gumrak, he found Major Eismann and greeted him cordially, as did Arthur Schmidt, who had campaigned with Eismann in France in 1940. Eismann quickly made it clear that Hoth's relief column could only continue its drive for a very limited period. He referred specifically to apparent bad news from the Italian front, and warned that Hoth's divisions might have to be shifted away from the drive to the
Kessel
in order to save that puppet army. Eismann also went on to say that even under optimum conditions, it was doubtful whether Hoth's tanks could advance more than twenty miles beyond the Mishkova River, to Businovka, where Paulus had hoped to make the linkup. He asked Paulus to extend his own drive another twenty-five kilometers south.
Paulus and Schmidt reaffirmed their intention to break out as soon as possible. But they argued that Operation Winter Storm, the linkup, was not feasible until Sixth Army received enough fuel for its tanks. There was only enough gas for a sortie of twenty kilometers, not nearly enough to reach the 6th Panzer Division at the Mishkova. Under these conditions, it was impossible to extend the drive. Both generals strongly urged that Thunderclap, the plan calling for the withdrawal of the entire Sixth Army from the Volga, had to be initiated at the same moment as Winter Storm. Then, the full weight of Sixth Army's waning power could be focused at one point. It was the sole hope for the breakout's success.
Eismann pressed them about accepting the risks of making the linkup, even on unfavorable terms. But Paulus and Schmidt steadfastly refused to begin Operation Winter Storm without more supplies. Schmidt was particularly stubborn on this point. He called the airlift the chief stumbling block to success. Half in jest, he told Eismann, "The army would hold its positions until Easter if it were supplied better."
With the situation still unresolved, the meeting adjourned. The discouraged Paulus went to his quarters, where he wrote a letter to his wife, Coca. Never one to burden her with his own troubles, he asked the usual questions about her welfare and that of his children, then closed optimistically: "Just now we are having a very hard time indeed. But we'll survive. And after the winter, there is another May to follow…."
For several weeks, German signal officers inside the
Kessel
had been trying to establish a reliable form of voice contact with Manstein, 150 miles to the southwest. Denied regular phone service by Russian cable cutters, they had created a minor technological miracle.
At the perimeter of the pocket they raised a 120-foot high antenna beacon that linked Gumrak with Novocherkassk by means of a radiotelephone combined with an ultra shortwave decimeter set that could not be mbnitored by the enemy. Constantly shelled and repaired, the beacon transmitted messages to relay stations installed in German-occupied territory. But one by one the relays fell to Russian tank columns. The radiotelephone link failed, and only a teleprinter remained to record the words produced by the decimeter machine. As the time arrived for Manstein and Paulus to make a final agonizing appraisal of their options, the chattering keys of the teleprinter became their only contact.
If the two men had been able to hear each other's voices, certain intonations or inflections might have helped resolve the crisis. But as the situation stood, Major Eismann reported to Manstein that he did not believe Paulus would break out under prevailing conditions, and Manstein could sympathize with Paulus's reasoning. However, Manstein was beginning to wonder whether or not General Schmidt was exerting undue influence on Paulus's decision not to try a breakout without a proper quantity of fuel. To the field marshal, positive action was necessary within hours. Haggling over gasoline supplies was a luxury Sixth Army could not afford, especially since Manstein was being pressured to do something, anything, to save his own left wing.*
Unable to communicate the emotions of the moment, Paulus stood beside the teleprinter machine in the operation bunker at Gumrak shortly after midnight on December 19, and waited for its impersonal clickety-clack keyboard to begin moving. The machine hummed and leapt into life:
+++ Here Chief of Staff Army Group Don [General Schulz]....
+++ General Paulus answering….
+++ The field marshal [Manstein] requests your opinion regarding the following question:
What is your estimate of the possibility of a sortie toward the west in the direction of Kalach?...It has been ascertained the enemy is consolidating his position vis-a-vis the south front….
[Confused, Paulus asked]: +++ Consolidation opposite which south front is meant? Opposite south front 6th Army or Group Hoth?
[Schulz hastened to clarify:] +++ Opposite south front 6th Army….
[Paulus hesitated to give a quick answer:] +++ [I will] Reply by radio…
[Schulz:] +++ Any further questions?
[The teletype operator answered for Paulus:] +++ The general said no and has gone….
But Paulus was back shortly with his opinion, sent on to Manstein by wireless.
Number 404
19 December 1942, 0135 hours
TOP SECRET
To Army Group Don
Sortie toward the south at present still easier, since Russians vis-a-vis south front of Army even less prepared for defense and weaker than in direction Kalach….[to the west]
Paulus
Forty-five miles south of the
Kessel,
the German 17th Panzer Division rushed to position itself on the left flank of the 6th Panzer Division, trying to break through to Paulus. Finally released into action by Hitler, the 17th added the extra firepower needed to break down Russian resistance, and in the early afternoon of December 19, the German tanks went back to Verkhne-Kumski, where hundreds of Red Army men suddenly climbed from their rifle pits and raised their hands in submission. While the tankers waved these prisoners to the rear, the 6th Panzer Division received new orders: Strike quickly for the bridge at Vassilevska, fifteen miles northeast at the Mishkova River. The Stalingrad
Kessel,
its tanks and artillery readied, was only twenty-five air miles beyond that town.
As early winter darkness intruded, the rejuvenated Germans raced off on an ice-coated road. In front of them, the horizon began to blink with muzzle bursts from concealed Russian artillery emplacements.
At Novocherkassk, Erich von Manstein carefully prepared his summation on how Sixth Army might be saved. The plea was directed to Adolf Hitler.
Teletype! 19 Dec. 42, 1425 hrs.
TOP SECRET, "Chefsache," Transmittal by officers only.
To Chief of General Staff of the Army
for immediate submittal to the Führer.
The situation…has developed in such a manner, that a relief of the Sixth Army cannot be expected in the foreseeable future.
Because of the shortage of available aircraft as well as the inclement weather, an air supply and thus the maintenance of the Army…are not possible—as was proven during the four weeks since the encirclement….The Armored Corps alone evidently cannot clear a channel to the Sixth Army and can far less keep such a channel open.
I now believe that a sortie by the [Sixth] Army toward the southwest is the last possibility, to save at least the mass of the Army's soldiers and still mobile weapons.
The immediate objective of the sortie will be the establishment of contact with the 57th 'Armored Corps [6th Panzers, etc.] approximately on the…Mishkova river. This can only be accomplished by fighting their way free toward the southwest, and gradually shifting the entire Army in such a manner that section by section of the fortified area in the north is given up as ground is gained in the southwest. It is imperative that, in the course of this operation, the air supply of the Army by fighter and fighter-bomber forces is ensured…
In case of a further delay, before long the 57th Armored Corps will be stalled on or north of the Mishkova river and this would exclude the possibility of a simultaneous attack from within and without. Anyway, prior to assembling for the attack, the Sixth Army will need several days for regrouping and refueling.
Provisions in the pocket will last until 22 December. The men already show symptoms of debilitation….According to an Army report, the mass of horses cannot be used because they are starved or else have been eaten.
Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group Don
von Manstein
Manstein was almost demanding the evacuation of the
Kessel
and the complete withdrawal from Hitler's "passion," the city of Stalingrad.
Now less than forty miles south of the
Kessel's
perimeter, the 6th Panzer Division was moving across unfamiliar terrain. Rushing ahead recklessly, it had no choice but to run a murderous gauntlet of armor-piercing shells. Tracer bullets reached out from both sides of the road and riddled the buttoned-up tanks. Inside the turrets, crewmen were dazzled by close bursts that flooded the tank interiors with intense light.
"Don't stop!" The command echoed through the formation, and the panzers rammed ahead into the night. Finally they passed through the artillery zone and were cruising steadily into the unknown. Behind them, a swarm of German tanks burned and exploded.
Now the teleprinter linking Manstein and Sixth Army began tapping out the words of another conference:
19 Dec 42, 1750 hours
[Manstein:] +++ Are you gentlemen present?
+++ Yes, sir.
+++ Please give me a brief comment on report Eismann.
[Paulus began a meticulous analysis of his options:]
Case 1—
Sortie [to the south] beyond Businovka with the objective of joining Hoth is possible only with armored vehicles. We are short of infantry forces and, otherwise, the defense of Stalingrad and long new flank are jeopardized.
If this solution is chosen, all reserves will leave the fortress….
Case 2—Breakthrough
without establishing contact with Hoth only in an extreme emergency. Loss of large amounts of material must be accepted. Precondition is previous arrival of sufficient air supplies [provisions and fuel] in order to improve the state of health of the troops prior to the attack. It would facilitate this solution if Hoth should be able to establish contacts temporarily in order to pour in tractors. The Infantry Divisions at present are practically immobile and more divisions are becoming so every day because we are compelled to slaughter horses continuously.
Case 3—In
view of the present situation, further defense depends on supplies and sufficient reinforcements. Supplies so far were absolutely inadequate. At the present supply rate it will not be possible to hold the fortress much longer….
[Manstein wanted more precise information:] +++ What would be the earliest date on which you could form up for solution 2 [Thunderclap]—the complete withdrawal from the
Kessel?