Exit the Colonel (50 page)

This, of course, was completely unacceptable to the easterners, who saw the NTC's actions as a reversion to Gaddafi-era dominance by western interests, at their expense. In the view of those in the east, they were the ones who initiated the revolution, and furthermore, they were the ones with most of the oil. The southern regions, more disadvantaged than Benghazi to the west in terms of population, added their voices against proportionality. Thus came calls—largely from the east—for “federalism,” which meant widely different things to different people. In the east, many
federalist advocates pointed to the United States and the United Arab Emirates as possible examples. In any case, this was a solution, used in the 1950s, according to which the regions would secure their own interests until such time as the national government could stand on its own. In the west, federalism elicited the specter of outright secession in many, with South Sudan as a case in point. Again, the NTC reversed itself. Not only was the amendment reversed to accommodate equal representation, further plans were mooted to divide regions into smaller units, in a move that would end the anachronistic east-west-south setup that had prevailed during the monarchy.

This process of enacting and retracting electoral laws continued when the NTC outlawed participation by any party based on tribal, religious, or ethnic grounds, which, of course, sent the religious parties into a rage. Even for secularists, the idea that “parties might be good, but Islamist parties were bad,” conjured up the aborted Algerian elections of 1991, when a military countercoup caused a ten-year bloodbath.

As wrangling over representation continued at the NTC and transitional government, the people started to show signs of serious impatience; “we will take matters into our own hands,” many former
thuwwar
could be heard saying. The word
federalism
reentered the political arena like a stray grenade, conjuring up, at best, images of the early monarchy period when Libya was divided into three provinces, each with its own capital. Federalism had become something approaching an obscenity for many, representing either a return to the anachronistic Libyan Federation of King Idris, which was hardly a success, or a prelude to outright secession. In March and April 2012, weeks after the first anniversary of the revolution, the entire country appeared to be consumed by talk of the evils or benefits of federalism, without really agreeing on what the term meant or what underlying regional grievances fed the argument.

Arguments over federalism heated up further after a group of three thousand Benghazi residents, nominally led by former political prisoner Ahmed Al-Zubeir Al Senussi (a direct descendant of King Idris), declared on March 6 their intention to proclaim an independent state, under Senussi's leadership. In short order, federalism came to be seen as code for an attack on the sacred notion of a unified Libya, for which the 17th February
Coalition and the NTC been fighting all along. The NTC saw calls for federalism as a manifestation of a popular no-confidence vote on its ability to govern, which was certainly deepening across the country every day. By March 6, 2012, Abdeljalil said that he would be prepared to enforce unity by force, despite the fact that NTC at this point barely controlled the Tripoli airport. The dean of an academic department at a major Benghazi university called the efforts of the “autonomy-seekers” crazy, and suggested that Senussi had Alzheimers.
¹⁵

In an attempt to diffuse the growing talk of disunion, Prime Minister Al Keeb announced in early March 2012 that his government would pursue a strategy of “decentralization”—a concept that had been floating about since Gaddafi and Jelloud tried to devolve some limited budgetary authority back to local administrative districts (
sha'abiyat
) in the early 1990s.
¹⁶

Not everyone was convinced of the evils of federalism or even of decentralization. Civic leaders within cities like Misurata and Barqa Benghazi said that they did not necessarily believe federalism was the optimal path for Libya, but that some form of robust local governance had simply become necessary, given the NTC's lack of control (here again, the issue may be one of semantics, as this could be called “temporary local governance”).
¹⁷
As of May 17, Misurata, Zintan, and Benghazi had all held elections for local governing councils, meaning the process of decentralization had already begun, with regions electing local councils to replace those that formed organically during the revolution. Self-identified proponents of federalism argued that a weak center would be far worse than a number of stronger regional governments—again, in the interim.
¹⁸
Many pointed to Somalia and Yemen as the “next step” for Libya; after all, in the wake of its revolution (flawed, in that Saleh still has not completely relinquished power), provinces in Yemen's south have been saying they would accept nothing less than a federal structure for Yemen. They were being infiltrated by Al Qaeda.
¹⁹
(Of course, in the case of Yemen, South Yemen was previously an independent country, and since a flawed union in 1993, many in the south have been actively pushing for secession, which is not exactly the situation between eastern and western Libya.)

A principal complaint from those living outside Tripoli was that, under the current version of centralization, for any basic transaction involving a national identification, bank transfer, passport, and so on, people had to travel to Tripoli, often at considerable expense in time and money. Once there, they experienced the instability of a city under siege by representatives
of every possible regional interest group, using whatever influence they could to exact services from a ruling apparatus in a city whose own administration had trouble ensuring that the trash was collected regularly.

“Whatever happens in Egypt and Tunisia, we will likely follow,” proclaimed one Benghazi resident in late 2011. An Islamist government, led by the Ennahda (“revival”) party in Tunis, was elected in January 2012,
²⁰
and Islamist parties took 72 percent of the parliamentary seats. The same month, in Egypt's parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood took 47 percent of the seats, and Al Noor and other extremist or Salafist parties took 25 percent. The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi was elected president over former air force general Ahmed Shafiq in Egypt on June 17.
²¹
Thus, the diverse Islamist movement clearly has an advantage, even as suspicions of backroom deals with the military council and the supreme court, which dissolved the Egyptian parliament on June 14, left in doubt the question of exactly who will rule Egypt.

Yet Libya has always been different. Gaddafi saw to it that the Salafis
²²
and even the Brotherhood never had a formidable presence in Libya, despite the fact that whatever happened across the border in Egypt had a strong impact on subterranean political discourse in Libya. At the same time, according to a prominent centrist activist, “The people are very simple, they don't think much nor do they think big, and will support simple people who suit their taste. They also, as in Egypt, would rather be in the shade of what they know, i.e., Islam and the Muslim Brothers, rather than venture into the new world of unknown parties like that of Jibril's.”
²³

Libya in the 1980s and 1990s had followed the same trends as the rest of the Muslim world, with increasing numbers of educated women donning the
hijab
(headscarf). Many local women articulated this as an expression of a preference for Islamic values, in defiance of a leadership that used the vocabulary of Islam but were nonetheless thoroughly corrupt, as well as what they perceived as an encroaching materialism and the intrusion of foreign values through satellite media. An October 2011 poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 68 percent of residents in eastern Libya preferred that the national government have some religious affiliation.
²⁴
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan frequently attributes the success of his moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (Turkish
initials AKP) to its moderate Islamic morals and social platform, fused with recognition of the secular nature of the state.
²⁵
Turkey's experience, born of a particular (and successful) historical experiment launched by the founder of modern Turkey Kemal Atatürk in the wake of World War I, is a concept alien to Libyan tradition and unlikely, at least in the near term, to be a practical model, despite a large number of self-defined secularists or liberals who have expressed admiration for Turkey's experience.

On the other hand, even for those with a more conservative view of the role of religion in politics, the Algerian example (where the military's cancellation of an imminent Islamist victory at the polls in 1991 led to a decade of particularly bloody civil conflict) remains very much in mind, as was seen in the framing of the struggle between the military command council and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. There is no Libyan military to speak of, but the NTC and the future government cannot afford to dismiss the organized Islamic movements, the extremists, or the Gaddafi loyalists. Some feel the process underway in Libya is fundamentally flawed: “Libya does not need another provisional government,” they say. “It needs a constitution.”
²⁶
The same activist echoed others interviewed, “We actually had hoped the elections would have been postponed until after we wrote our constitution and elect a parliament—and not another transitional government that is already mapped by the NTC and will do either the same or worse. I look at Iraq and fear the long-term transitional governments and what their impact can do.”
²⁷

On May 28, Mustafa Abdeljalil suggested, then confirmed a few days later, that the National Assembly elections might indeed be delayed, citing the need to address appeals from previously disqualified candidates (which satisfied few, particularly among the Islamists and those who felt that a snap election was the fastest path to near-term stability). Some said this was yet another ruse by the NTC—and Abdeljalil himself—to hang on to power or consolidate their own influences over electoral candidates. The foreign press admonished the NTC president not to push his luck: “The NTC, which has been overseeing the country's affairs since the end of Col. Gaddafi's rule, had long promised to exit politics for five years once a permanent government was in place. But many have doubted it from the beginning and any delay is likely to feed conspiracy theories.”
²⁸

Many in the liberal camp, however, welcomed the delayed opportunity to expose the Islamists as having hidden agendas and foreign backing, and to close liberal ranks, particularly through one yet-to-be-named party.

If it were not for the problem of institution building, Libya's overall macroeconomic situation looks good (as it always has). Gaddafi did not, like Saddam, set afire or booby-trap the oil fields and pipelines (though loyalist forces did attempt to blow up the Tubruk pipeline early in the conflict). The Libyan oil infrastructure emerged from the uprising reasonably intact. Output fell to 22,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July 2011, but Libya was able to get its oil production up to half preconflict levels by the end of the year,
²⁹
and more or less preconflict levels (1.29 million bpd) by May 16, 2012.
³⁰
The Eastern Crescent refinery at Ras Lanuf is still not on line at the time of writing, as feedstock is sought from the Sarir and Messila fields.

While liquidity was the major issue as late as January 2012, it is no longer the country's major concern. As of April, there were no foreign exchange shortages, and most of the assets frozen by Western countries had been released to the NTC by December 16, though many billions were still missing and potentially at the disposal, although not en masse, of elements loyal to the previous regime. Foreign banks have bought into the Libyan system, increasing liquidity. Libya's Bank of Commerce and Development, based in Benghazi, approved the Qatari National Bank (QNB) Group as strategic partner. This would increase the bank's capital, which could support growth.
³¹

Financial outflows are and will be large, and must be managed. Compensating the fighters, healing the war wounded, and rebuilding the basic infrastructure are necessarily top priorities. On March 15, the NTC approved an annual (2012) budget of approximately €42 billion—Libya's largest budget ever. Consistent with the need for normalization of key civilian enterprises, the largest single line item in the budget was for “Project and Development Programmes and Reconstruction.” A bare majority of these funds were allocated to salaries and food and fuel subsidies, with the remainder for reconstruction and development. In the context of a raging debate over the relevance—and meaning—of federalism, the government tacitly acknowledged with its 2012 budget that, given the state of current administrative capacity, much of the decision making would of necessity need to be devolved to the regions.

As perhaps expected, given the scale of these efforts and what the NTC had to deal with, scandals emerged in short order, with tales of individuals who had not fought flying to Jordan and Europe on full government expense
for non-urgent surgeries. Another plan to compensate former fighters with basic stipends with which to cover basic necessities was abruptly cut off after the NTC accused the fighters (
thuwwar
) and the leaders of various militias of embezzling large amounts of money by collecting payments on behalf of deceased or fictitious persons. Abdeljalil's decision to temporarily suspend payments until the system could be reformed created an enormous outcry, which led to further calls for him to step down and to direct attacks by the
thuwwar
on the NTC headquarters.