Fear Itself (105 page)

185
Once the USSR was invaded, the status of Jews changed, as they were mobilized to fight the Nazi invader. Notably, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was formed, led by the famous Yiddish actor Solomon Mikhoels, which sought to rally Jewish support both within the country and outside, especially among Jews in the United States.

186
Atina Grossman, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers,”
October
72 (1995): 42–63; Mark Naimark,
The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Ian Kershaw,
The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–45
(New York: Penguin, 2011).

187
Dallas Morning News,
October 24, 1943, cited in Hopkins, “Bombing and the American Conscience During World War II,” p. 461.

188
Soviet troops were advancing in East Prussia after a successful winter offensive, though suffering great numbers of casualties, and were preparing to move on to Berlin, where they would arrive first; American and British troops had just repulsed the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, at high cost.

189
For a discussion that comments on the character of pro-German military activity and the scale and often horrific results of the deportation, see V. Stanley Vardys, “The Case of the Crimean Tartars,”
Russian Review
30 (1971): 101–10; Grégory Dufaud, “La déportation des Tatars de Crimée et leur vie en exil (1944–1956): Un ethnocide?”
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire
, no. 96 (2007): 151–62.

190
The reconstruction of the severely damaged palace was undertaken in a month under the direction of Lavrentiy Beria, the commissar of internal affairs, who directed the Gulag and would soon direct the successful postwar effort to build a Soviet atomic bomb.

191
Cited in Martin Gilbert,
Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill, 1942–1945
(London: Heinemann, 1986), p. 1174.

192
Ibid.

193
Walter Lippmann,
U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p. 164.

194
“The Crimean Conference: Text of the Communiqué Issued by President Roosevelt, Prime-Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin on February 11, 1945,”
World Affairs
108 (1945): 54.

195
On his return to Britain from Yalta, Churchill reported to his war cabinet that it was “impossible to convey the true atmosphere of discussions between the [Big] Three. Stalin I’m sure means well to the world and Poland.” Cited in Roberts,
Masters and Commanders,
p. 557.

196
Cited in S. M. Plokhy,
Yalta: The Price of Peace
(New York: Viking, 2010), pp. 331–32, 328, 238.

197
The classic study remains Diane S. Clemens,
Yalta
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), a book that persuasively stresses how each of the three leaders gained his most significant objectives.

198
There had been two Soviet compromises concerning the United Nations. The USSR retracted its initial insistence on an absolute Security Council veto and accepted the U.S. proposal that the veto could not be exercised by any party to a given dispute. It also reduced its demand for sixteen seats in the General Assembly for its various republics, to three—Russia, White Russia, and Ukraine. For a discussion, see Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley,
FDR and the Creation of the U.N.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 174–75. Roosevelt believed it crucial to offer “Moscow a prominent place” in the new organization, “by making it, so to speak, a member of the club” in order to effect “containment by integration.” See John Lewis Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 9.

199
In August 1942, William Bullitt, who had served as the first U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933–1936) after Roosevelt initiated diplomatic relations, cautioned the president about the “domination of Europe by Stalin’s Communist dictatorship.” FDR replied, “I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of man. . . . I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.” Cited in Wilson D. Miscamble,
From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 52.

200
Just two weeks after Yalta, Andrei Vyshinsky traveled to Bucharest to enforce a change to a pro-Soviet government. See Lukacs,
Legacy of the Second World War,
pp. 80–81.

201
An emphasis on Anglo-Soviet relations, as distinct from U.S. interests, is a central theme in Fraser J. Harbutt,
Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), a book that emphasizes the existence of “two distinct systems of behavior and styles of diplomacy as the two great political arenas, non-Nazi Europe and the United States, moved uneasily together toward victory” (p. 237). This view, underscoring British-U.S. tensions, provides a useful corrective to positions stressing tensions between the USSR and the democracies, but its place within a larger frame is hard to grasp. For a more measured view of British and American wartime cooperation and tension, see Roberts,
Masters and Commanders.
See also the discussions of Yalta in Warren F. Kimball,
The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 170–77; Hastings,
Winston’s War,
pp. 441–49.

202
W. Gordon East, “The New Frontiers of the Soviet Union,”
Foreign Affairs
29 (1951): 597.

203
For a discussion, see Lukacs,
The Legacy of the Second World War,
pp. 170–74.

204
William T. R. Fox,
The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), pp. 3, 9, 119.

205
McGeorge Bundy, “The Test of Yalta,”
Foreign Affairs
27 (1949): 618–19. At the time, Bundy was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group that was considering the history and effectiveness of the Marshall Plan. After serving as dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University (1953–1960), he became national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson from 1961 to 1966, when he joined the Ford Foundation as its president.

206
Walter Lippmann,
U.S. War Aims
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1944), p. 142.

207
In 1944, eight out of every ten Americans thought the United States should cooperate with the USSR after the war, surveys conducted by Princeton University’s Office of Public Opinion Research reported. See Jerome S. Bruner,
Mandate from the People
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), p. 109. See also Ralph B. Levering,
American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939–1945
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976). Levering shows how, by 1943, harsh opinion about the Soviet Union had mitigated and was replaced by strong sentiments of solidarity.

208
For an assessment of how the character and interactions of the three key personalities at Yalta affected the end of the wartime Grand Alliance and the start of the Cold War, see Frank Costigliola,
Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

209
Sumner Welles, “Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit,”
Foreign Affairs
29 (1951): 182–204.

210
Dimitri Antonovich Volkognov,
Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
(New York: Random House, 1996), p. 501. For overviews of the summit, see J. Robert Moskin,
Mr. Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World
(New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 197–242; Miscamble,
From Roosevelt to Truman,
pp. 191–217.

211
James F. Byrnes,
Speaking Frankly
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 86–87.

212
Perhaps emblematic of the new ambivalence was the way Truman informed Stalin about “a new weapon of unusual destructive force,” without specifying that it was an atomic weapon. See Bernstein, “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb,” p. 47.

213
See Bruce Kuniholm,
The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Jamil Hasanli,
Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).

214
See http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Sinews_of_Peace. For a history of the concept, which originated in the fire curtain used in British theaters, see Patrick Wright,
Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

215
The bombs were exploded underwater, contaminating some ten million tons of seawater, which was blown in the air, thus transporting lethal radiation. See A. G. L. McNaughton, “National and International Control of Atomic Energy,”
International Journal
3 (1947/1948): 12.

216
Lloyd T. Graybar, “The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting,”
Journal of American History
72 (1986): 904, 905.

217
For a discussion along these lines, see Edward A. Shils,
The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), pp. 61–62.

218
David Brody, “The New Deal and World War II,” in
The New Deal—The National Level
, vol. 1, ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), p. 272.

CHAPTER 10
PUBLIC PROCEDURES, PRIVATE INTERESTS

1
George E. Hopkins, “Bombing and the American Conscience during World War II,”
Historian
28 (1966): 472.

2
For an overview, see Joel Davidson, “Building for War, Preparing for Peace: World War II and the Military-Industrial Complex,” in
World War II and the American Dream,
ed. Donald Albrecht (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 195–217. See also Donald M. Nelson,
Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), Gerald T. White,
Billions for Defense: Government Financing by the Defense Plant Corporation during World War II
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1980); Gregory Hooks,
Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

3
A summary, “Planning for the Great Demobilization,” can be found in James Stokes Ballard,
The Shock of Peace: Military and Economic Demobilization after World War II
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 27–72. See also John C. Sparrow,
History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1952).

4
On the GI Bill, see Ira Katznelson,
When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), pp. 113–41. See also Suzanne Mettler,
Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Kathleen Frydl,
The G.I. Bill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

5
Walter Lippmann, “The American Destiny,”
Life,
June 5, 1939, p. 47; reprinted in Walter Lippmann,
The American Destiny
(New York: Life Magazine Press, 1939), p. 4.

6
Erich Hula, “Constitutional and Administrative Readjustments,”
Social Research
6 (1939): 284, 245–46.

7
For an overview, see the essay written for the British Foreign Office in 1942 by the socialist intellectual R. H. Tawney, “The American Labour Movement,” in
The American Labour Movement and Other Essays,
ed. J.M. Winter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 1–110.

8
Louis Stark, “The New Labor Movement,” in
America Now: An Inquiry into Civilization in the United States,
ed. Harold E. Stearns (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938), p. 145.

9
For important scholarly accounts of the political role of unions, especially the CIO, within the Democratic Party, see J. David Greenstone,
Labor in American Politics
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), William H. Riker, “The CIO in Politics, 1936–1946” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1948). For a summary by a union activist, see Joseph Gaer,
The First Round: The Story of the CIO Political Action Committee
(New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944).