Read Final Fantasy and Philosophy: The Ultimate Walkthrough Online
Authors: Michel S. Beaulieu,William Irwin
All life bears death from birth. Life fears death, but lives only to die. It starts with anxiety. Anxiety becomes fear. Fear leads to anger . . . anger leads to hate . . . hate leads to suffering. The only cure for this fear is total destruction. Kuja was a victim of his own fear. He concluded he could only save himself by destroying the origin of all things—the crystal.
So Necron believes people cannot escape the fear of death they feel. If Kuja’s actions prove this, then Epicurus’s theory of happiness accounts for why the fear of death destroys the purpose of life. This follows because if happiness is the source of all life’s purpose, then no one can ever satisfy its purpose so long as he or she fears death.
Necron differs from Epicurus in thinking that people cannot remove the fear of death. If Epicurus had become convinced that people could not avoid the fear of death, then he may well have agreed with Necron that life should end because it lacks purpose. After all, Necron is attempting to do nothing more than remove all possible harm.
As for Epicurus’s argument that harm cannot result from death, there are ways to oppose this argument. Perhaps the most promising attack on the Epicurean argument is to claim that people can be deprived of happiness or at least the potential for achieving happiness by death. To see the force of this position, all we have to do is think of things that make us happy in life that we will not be able to enjoy in death, such as love, yummy frogs, Chocobo hot and cold, and the festival of the hunt.
But the Epicurean presents a challenge to the defender of a deprivation argument: if death can harm us, then it must harm us at some time, but since we can only be harmed if we can experience pain, then when does death harm us?
3
A Formula to an Answer
The question of whether death harms Vivi comes down to which values we attribute to him; what objective values, if any, we believe exist in
Final Fantasy IX
; and what is the state of value satisfaction these values possess relative to Vivi at the time that he stops. The scope of this chapter stops short of claiming what values are objective in the world of
Final Fantasy IX
, as well as of giving a definitive answer to the sum total and degree of values that Vivi holds. But, of course, none of this was really about Vivi anyway, was it? Ultimately, Vivi is just a vehicle for thinking about what you value and whether you should fear death. And in the end, only you can answer those questions.
NOTES
1
See Epicurus,
The Essential Epicurus
, translated by Eugene O’Connor (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993).
2
See Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits,
Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance
(Rochester, NY: RIT Cary Graphic Arts Press, 2003).
3
See James Warren,
Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). Contemporary defenders of deprivation arguments differ in their stances with regard to the timing of death’s harm. Some of the claimed times when harm occurs are at the moment of death (Julian Lamont), before death (Joel Feinberg and George Pitcher), throughout all eternity (Fred Feldman), and at no particular time (Thomas Nagel). The arguments for each of these would take far too much time to expound here, but their
existence
reveals the increasing complexity of the question of whether death can justifiably harm Vivi.
14
WHAT’S IN A NAME? CID, CLOUD, AND HOW NAMES REFER
Andrew Russo and Jason Southworth
Final Fantasy
is one of the longest-running video game series of all time, and an interesting feature of these games is that the worlds in which they take place are rarely connected to one another. Despite the lack of coherence across
FF
games, some peculiar features may arouse curiosity from a longtime fan. For instance, the name “Cid” appears in many of the
FF
games. More paradoxical is the case of Cloud Strife, who appears to be the same individual, referred to by the same name, in different
FF
worlds—
FFVII
and
FF Tactics
. Intuitively, we think that the name “Cid” refers to a different individual in each
FF
world. The name “Cloud Strife,” however, seems to refer to the same individual across the
FFVII
world and the
FF Tactics
world. Although most fans make these observations and move on, philosophers of language see an opportunity to begin a discussion of how names refer to certain objects in the world. Can the best theories of how names refer to various objects accommodate these intuitions concerning the names “Cid” and “Cloud Strife”?
1
If Names Are Arbitrary, Is Cloud? The Direct Reference Theory
The simplest theory of the way names connect to things in the world is known as the direct reference theory. We call it “direct” because it takes for granted the relationship between the name and what it denotes. Simply put, according to the direct reference theory, names are just arbitrary
labels
. Much like “
Final Fantasy X
” written on a disc labels what game content is on the disc, names are labels for whatever falls in their extension. Due to such arbitrariness, there need not be any special relationship between, for example, two individuals with the name “Cid” or the name “Cloud Strife.”
A flaw with the direct reference theory concerns identity statements. For instance, the protagonist of
FFVIII
, known as Squall Leonheart, appears in
Kingdom Hearts I
and
II
with the name “Leon.” If these individuals are identical, then the following is a true statement: Squall = Leon. This identity statement contains two proper names, which pick out the same individual. If the direct reference theory of names is correct, then the identity statement is trivial—it gives us no new information. It merely states that this individual is identical to himself. This runs counter to our intuitions about identity, however, because the statement does seem to be informative. If a logical consequence of the direct reference theory of names is in conflict with our intuitions about certain identity statements, then maybe we should inquire into an account that attempts to square with these intuitions. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) offered a descriptivist theory that endeavors to do just that.
2
According to Russell’s descriptivism, names are simply
abbreviations
for definite descriptions. A definite description is a description that applies to one and only one person or thing, while an indefinite description applies to more than one person or thing. The definite description associated with the name “Cloud Strife” might be:
(1) The Materia blade-wielding protagonist of
FFVII
.
This description does not fit anyone besides Cloud Strife, so it is definite, whereas the description “a protagonist of
FF
” could apply to several people in addition to Cloud Strife, such as Yuna and Tidus, and therefore is considered indefinite. Russell argued that the proper name “Cloud Strife” means the same thing as (1). Therefore, “Cloud Strife” is simply an abbreviation of (1). When someone says, “Cloud Strife just used Omnislash,” we could replace that statement with “the Materia blade-wielding protagonist of
FFVII
just used Omnislash,” with no loss of meaning.
To fully comprehend Russell’s descriptivism, it is important to understand how Russell dealt with definite descriptions by themselves. He told us that appearances are deceptive when it comes to the “superficial structure” of definite descriptions. They appear to be very simple claims, when in fact they make a set of more complex ones. The complex set of claims results from the article “the” in the definite description. Consider the following:
(2) The Materia blade-wielding protagonist of
FFVII
is blond.
Here, we are attributing the property of blondness to the referent of (1), Cloud Strife. Statement number (2) hides the following set of claims:
(a) At least one person wields a Materia blade and is the protagonist of
FFVII
,
and
(b) At most, one person wields a Materia blade and is the protagonist of
FFVII
,
and
(c) Whoever wields a Materia blade and is the protagonist of
FFVII
is blond.
As Russell saw it, (a), (b), and (c) are necessary so long as (2) is true. If the Materia blade-wielding protagonist of
FFVII
is blond, then there must be at least one Materia blade-wielding protagonist. If there were more than one blond blade-wielding protagonist, then an indefinite description should have been used, for example:
a
Materia blade-wielding protagonist of
FFVII
is blond. So, there is at most one Materia blade- wielding protagonist. Finally, if the Materia blade-wielding protagonist is blond, then it follows that a claim stating such is true. Therefore, for Russell, names are simply abbreviations for a set of claims of the form of (a) through (c).
3
So far, we have concentrated on the semantics of proper names, but what about Russell’s theory of referring? How does Russell explain the fact that the name “Cloud Strife” refers to Cloud Strife instead of to someone else? Because the name “Cloud Strife” abbreviates the definite description in (1), then the referent of “Cloud Strife” is determined to be whatever satisfies (1). In other words, the referent of a proper name is whatever is described by the definite description of which the name is an abbreviation. Here is another example to make things clearer. Take the following definite description:
(3) The gunblade-wielding protagonist of
FFVIII
.
What is the name of the individual who satisfies (3)? It is “Squall Leonheart,” and simply by satisfying (3), the individual Squall Leonheart is referred to by the name “Squall Leonheart.”
Remember, the reason that we rejected the direct reference theory was that it was counterintuitive concerning identity statements such as “Squall = Leon,” and Russell fares much better in this respect. This may not be obvious, so let’s take it step by step. First, take the name “Squall” and (3), a definite description that offers the same semantic contribution as “Squall.” Second, take the name “Leon” and a definite description that offers the same semantic contribution to it, something like:
(4) The man from Radiant Garden who helps guide Sora in the fight against the Heartless.
Because (3) and (4) offer the same semantic contribution to “Squall” and “Leon,” respectively, we can form the unabbreviated identity statement as:
(5) The gunblade-wielding protagonist of
FFVIII
= the man from Radiant Garden who helps guide Sora in the fight against the Heartless.
By making explicit the logical reality behind the names “Squall” and “Leon,” we can see how (5) is informative. The new information we learn is that the protagonist of
FFVIII
, who wields a gunblade, is also from Radiant Garden and helps Sora battle the Heartless. In this way, Russell’s descriptivism offers both an intuitive account of the semantic contribution of names and a simple theory of how the referent of a name is determined.
What does Russell’s descriptivism say about the relationship between the referents who share a proper name across the
FF
worlds? The name “Cid” would abbreviate different definite descriptions given the different games. In the world of
FFVII
, the name “Cid” would abbreviate “the pilot of the
Highwind
”; in
FFIX
, “the King of Lindblum”; in
FFIX
, “the brother of Rikku”; and so on. Given that the name “‘Cid”’ is an abbreviation for these various definite descriptions in different
FF
worlds, and that the individuals who satisfy the definite descriptions in each world are different (for instance, the individual who is the King of Lindblum is not the same individual as the pilot of the
Highwind
), it follows that the referents who share the proper name “Cid” have no special relation to one another. This is good for Russell, as it conforms to our intuitions.
Interestingly, Zidane appears to be using Russell’s descriptivism at one point in
FFIX
. Although it’s a small moment in the game, most
FF
fans remember when, in a weapon shop, Zidane sees a sword that looks exactly like Cloud’s Materia blade. Zidane says, “I remember a guy with spiky hair who carried something like this.” This was a way of saying to the players of the game, “I remember Cloud Strife,” and that is exactly how the audience took the utterance. “The guy with spiky hair who carried a Materia blade” is a definite description that is abbreviated by “Cloud Strife.”
Would the Real Cloud Strife Please Wave His Blade?
One problem for Russell’s descriptivism is that in the case of Cloud Strife, it does not come to a determinate conclusion. Depending on what definite description a speaker associates with the name “Cloud Strife,” the referents of the name in
FFVII
and
FF Tactics
might or might not be identical. This indeterminacy is counterintuitive, because we think that surely we should be able to determine whether two referents who share a proper name are the same individual. In order to make this point explicit, let’s associate the definite description with the name “Cloud Strife.” If (6) is so associated, then we can see that both the individual in
FFVII
and the individual in
FF Tactics
satisfy (6), hence making the referents identical.
(6) The Materia blade-wielding man with spiky blond hair
If, instead, we use we see that the individual who satisfies (7) in
FFVII
is not identical to the individual who satisfies (7) in
FF Tactics
. This is because the referent of “Cloud Strife” in
FF Tactics
has the astrological sign Aquarius, and it is not possible to be both a Leo and an Aquarius.
(7) The Materia blade-wielding man with the astrological sign Leo
The failure of Russell’s descriptivism to determine which definite description out of many is
the one
associated with a proper name has led philosophers such as John Searle (1932-) to question Russell’s theory.
4
The problem Searle recognized is that for any particular utterance of a proper name, there has to be some particular definite description that the speaker has
in mind
. A moment’s reflection will show that there are many possible definite descriptions, even when we stay within one
FF
world. Take the name “Tidus” from
FFX
. The definite description could be “the rising blitzball star from the Zanarkand Abes,” “the son of Jecht,” “the guardian of the Summoner Yuna who looks like Shuyin,” or many others. This leads to two problems. First, often when we use a proper name, we have no particular definite description in mind—we are thinking of a general set of descriptions. Second, the speaker and the listener might have different definite descriptions in mind. This is a problem, because you might mean one thing when your utterance contains the name “Tidus,” while I think you mean something else because I have associated a different definite description with “Tidus.”
An additional objection to Russell’s account comes from Saul Kripke (1940-).
5
Consider the following example to get the gist of Kripke’s objection. Imagine that we are in Spira, and the Summoner Braska is on his pilgrimage to defeat Sin. In our Spira, however, Braska does not defeat Sin. Rather, before Braska can begin the summoning of his Final Aeon to defeat Sin, Schmidt defeats Sin instead but dies mysteriously afterward, without anyone learning that it was he who brought about the Calm.
6
The Summoner Braska uses the situation to his advantage and deceives the whole of Spira into believing that he defeated Sin. Obsessed with fame and glory, Braska ends his own life in order to keep up the deception that he and his Aeons brought about the Calm. His success in this trickery garners him the accolade of High Summoner, a title posthumously given only to individuals who defeat Sin.
Now, most Spirans know Braska as
the fifth High Summoner
and therefore associate the name “Braska” with the definite description “the fifth High Summoner.”
7
It should also be clear that when they utter the name “Braska,” they successfully refer to Braska and not to the unknown Schmidt. This is a counterexample to Russell’s claim that a name refers in virtue of that referent satisfying a definite description associated in some way with the name. For, in this case, we have a name, “Braska,” associated with the definite description “the fifth High Summoner,” and the referent of “Braska” is not Schmidt, even though it is Schmidt who satisfies the definite description of “the fifth High Summoner.”