Gettysburg (26 page)

Kelley and Hall, the Illinois privates on vedette duty, would recall that it was around 7:00
A.M.
when they sighted the flash of red indicating “the old Rebel flag”—the colors leading Archer’s section of the column. The two soldiers looked for Sergeant Levi S. Shafer, to whom they were supposed to report, but he was nowhere to be found. Kelley decided to ride to the reserve position, and either there or somewhere on the way, he met Private George Heim, who in turn located Lieutenant Marcellus E. Jones, commanding the detail. Jones had been expecting just such a report, so as he mounted his horse to investigate, he issued a preliminary order: “Get the entire command to the outpost.”

On reaching the advanced vedettes, Jones dismounted, confirmed the sighting, and dispatched a report to the regimental commander. By now Sergeant Shafer had appeared. Jones asked the noncom for his carbine and, propping it on the fork of a handy rail fence, sighted toward the enemy column, a good half mile distant. Jones aimed at a man on horseback near the Confederate flag, knowing he had virtually no chance of hitting him.

At about 7:30
A.M.,
a moment he would never forget, Marcellus E. Jones fired a single shot.

T
he cannoneers assigned to Captain Edward A. Marye’s Fredericksburg Artillery knew their business. Per Pegram’s orders, the first gun in the Virginia battery was quickly set up for firing in the yard of the Lohr farm. Seeing the commotion, the farmer ran out of his house and exclaimed, in what would prove to be a grand understatement, “My God, you are not going to fire here, are you?” The gunners ignored the interruption and hurriedly finished their preparations. At a nod from the battery commander, the cannon flashed flame, hurling the first shell into the sticky morning air.

Columns of troops were moving all across the region. Even though none had yet been summoned to Gettysburg, most were already headed in that direction. From camps around Scotland, Pennsylvania, northeast of Chambersburg, Johnson’s Division of Ewell’s Corps headed toward the Cashtown Gap. “Reveille at 5 a.m. Marched at 7,” scribbled a Stonewall Brigade diarist. “The weary miles were slowly unreeled that hot July day, for the road was blocked by a long train of wagons,” noted a Maryland soldier, “but finally that obstruction was passed and the march became easier.” North of Gettysburg, Rodes’ Division (also in Ewell’s Corps) was in motion as well. “We left camp at 6 a.m.,” a Tarheel foot soldier wrote. A brigade staff officer would recollect that the men marched “without thinking any danger was at hand.”

On the Union side, the First Division of the First Corps was bustling. Because Cutler’s brigade was camped nearest to Wadsworth’s headquarters, its troops were on the road before the Iron Brigade (which was actually camped closer to Gettysburg) could draw in its pickets to get off. Of the six regiments under Cutler, one, the 7th Indiana, remained behind to guard the wagons. As the other men started out, a soldier in the 84th New York (whose members preferred to call their unit the 14th Brooklyn,
after its initial state militia designation) announced to anyone who would listen that the red sunrise was “the prophecy of a hot July day.”

Even as Pegram’s gunners loosed a second and then a third round at the Federals scattered ahead of them, skirmishers from Archer’s Brigade were pushing through the tangled, swampy underbrush along Marsh Creek. If any of them noted that first shot fired by Marcellus E. Jones, none ever mentioned it. Coming up behind them on their left was a spread-out line from Davis’ Brigade, about two hundred picked men forming a sharpshooter battalion.

The combined force was more than Jones could manage, so the officer ordered his vedettes to retreat, working their carbines with care.
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They had not backed up far when reinforcements arrived from the 8th Illinois Cavalry’s Company E, under Captain Amasa E. Dana, who now took charge. The captain estimated that the Rebel skirmish line covered “a distance of a mile and a half, concealed at intervals by timber.”

The tactics employed by this vedette line differed markedly from usual practice. The widely dispersed and unsupported outposts were normally expected to “fire and flee” upon the enemy’s approach, but this morning Buford’s troopers were being stubborn. Dana ordered his men “to throw up their carbine sights and [we] gave the enemy the benefit of long range practice[;] the firing was rapid from our carbines, and at the distance induced the belief of four times our number of men actually present. … This was evident because the [enemy skirmish] line in our front halted.”

Henry Heth’s string of command errors continued. Even though his skirmish line was engaged and some of his artillery were already in action, Heth decided to keep most of his troops in column rather than deploy them into lines of battle. Still anxious to effect a quick passage into Gettysburg, he was reluctant to shift his men out of the compact marching formation that would enable him to accomplish his objective. Sooner or later, he reasoned, the Yankee cavalry would have to withdraw, leaving the road wide open; he wanted to be ready when that happened.

Well back along the pike, Heth’s smallest brigade, John M. Brockenbrough’s all-Virginia unit, was completing the column. A chaplain riding near the 47th Virginia’s Colonel Robert M. Mayo, who was accompanying Brockenbrough, saw one of Henry Heth’s staff officers gallop up. According to the cleric, the aide reported, “General Heth is ordered to move on Gettysburg, and fight or not as he wishes.” After the man passed along, the chaplain heard one of the officers say, “We must fight them; no division general will turn back with such orders.”

More and more units were in motion by 8:00
A.M.
The Union Iron Brigade marched about fifteen minutes behind Cutler’s men. The 2nd Wisconsin led the way, followed by the 7th Wisconsin, the 19th Indiana, the 24th Michigan, the 6th Wisconsin, and a brigade guard of one hundred men (twenty from each regiment). As the Michigan regiment was getting ready, its cleric held a prayer meeting. “During Chaplain [W. C.] Way’s invocation,” recollected one soldier, “cartridges and hardtack were distributed among the men.” Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin pronounced the boys “in the highest spirits.” When some Milwaukee Germans in one of Dawes’ companies lustily sang a “soul stirring song,” they were cheered by their comrades and answered by boys from Juneau County who offered a humorous army ditty. A Wisconsin soldier thought it “odd for men to march toward their [possible] death singing, shouting and laughing as if it were [a] parade or holiday.”

Perhaps a mile west, the Third Division of the First Corps was on a parallel track. One New York officer noted that “a hundred rumors circulated through the camp as to what was going on or what would happen.” Some members of the 80th New York had discovered to their astonishment that the locals were not disposed to be generous toward outsiders. So this day the New Yorkers had a plan: they would tell anyone they met on the march that they were a Pennsylvania regiment.

Miles south of the First Corps, the Eleventh was on the march by 8:30
A.M
.A small band of precipitation must have been targeting these troops, for a diarist in the 154th New York recorded that they “traveled very hard in the rain and mud.” Word of the march was slow in getting to the gunners of Battery 1, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, known as Dilger’s Battery after their commander. Roused late, the men hurried but did not rush. The feeling was that they would meet Rebels today, and no one wanted to go into action unprepared.

Powerful Confederate columns were also stirring. North of Gettysburg, following the less circuitous track he had preferred, Jubal Early led his division toward Heidlersburg, where he picked up the Harrisburg Road on his way to a more direct route to Cashtown.
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There was no urgency to Early’s pace. It was nearly 8:00
A.M.
before the main column uncoiled; while some units had started earlier, others would not move until after 9:00
A.M.

Eight miles west of the front of Heth’s procession, Pender’s Division was joining the line. The hasty departure bothered at least one of Pender’s brigade commanders. Watching his men scramble into columns, Colonel Abner Perrin of South Carolina concluded “from the hurried & confused manner of our getting out of camp that the enemy was not far off.” A Georgia soldier described this day as “warm,” with “some rain.” He noticed that the supply wagons were being left behind, which usually meant that an engagement was anticipated.

Officers with Henry Heth’s advance would later refer to the process of pushing back the Yankee vedettes this morning as “driving” them. It was at best a slow, cautious drive, however. The Illinois troopers were hard to move, forcing Heth’s skirmishers to undertake the time-consuming task of fixing the enemy line in place, then working parties around its flanks or into any other chinks they could find. The steady pressure in front coupled with the deadly threat posed by flanking or infiltration parties invariably compelled the outnumbered, dismounted troopers to retreat. While the cavalrymen’s breech-loading carbines gave them a slightly faster rate of fire than their opponents, they were outranged by the infantry’s muzzle-loading rifles. But even when they were rousted, Buford’s men never left the field; instead they merely sifted back a short distance to take another stand.

Illinois Cavalry Captain Amasa Dana later recounted the action from his point of view: “The true character and length of our line soon became known to the enemy, and they promptly moved upon our front and flanks. We retired and continued to take new positions, and usually held out as long as we could without imminent risk of capture. We were driven from three positions successively in less than one hour.” One of Dana’s
soldiers remembered that the Federal vedettes “fought with the enemy overwhelming us in numbers and pressing us at every point.”

On the Chambersburg side of the Cashtown Pass, James Longstreet’s corps was starting its passage east. A soldier who saw Lee this morning thought he “was looking in perfect health & seemed happy as the troops cheered him.” Longstreet remembered that Robert E. Lee “was in his usual cheerful spirits …, and called me to ride with him.”

As the command group approached the western entrance to the pass, it became apparent to the generals that the single roadway through could not sustain all the traffic at once. Johnson’s Division of Ewell’s command, under orders to join its parent unit, was already waiting impatiently. Lee decided that allowing Ewell to complete his concentration near Cashtown was more important than interposing the First Corps, so he told Longstreet to hold back until the Second Corps infantry and wagons had cleared out. The officers dismounted and stood for a while, watching the columns pass. Then, as Longstreet recalled, “General Lee proposed that we should ride on.”

It was about 8:00
A.M.
when Captain Daniel W. Buck of the 8th Illinois Cavalry rode into Buford’s field headquarters looking for the general. Buford was in town, so Major John L. Beveridge received Buck’s report that “the enemy was advancing in force in two columns.” Beveridge ordered out reinforcements to the picket line and told the bugler to sound “Boots and Saddles.” The commotion brought Buford back from town, along with William Gamble, who approved Beveridge’s actions.

At Buford’s direction, Gamble began to deploy his entire brigade to meet Heth’s advance. The native Irishman and veteran of the British Army was a stern taskmaster whose well-drilled unit was ready for combat. A main line of battle was established along McPherson’s Ridge, while John Calef’s six cannon were rolled into firing positions astride the pike. Couriers raced off to spread the news along the chain of command.

Gamble had another scheme up his sleeve. Having delayed the Rebel advance by repeatedly holding until they were forced to retreat, his backpedaling vedettes were almost at Herr’s Ridge, the best defensible location west of McPherson’s Ridge. Their commander now turned Herr’s Ridge into a strong point by sending forward some 400 men to
form a thick skirmish line there. Gamble was matched to his right by Thomas Devin, who bolstered his advance with another 100 cavalry. “Our orders were to hold [the enemy] back,” recollected one of Gamble’s men.

The sudden appearance of the Federal line caused the Rebel skirmishers to stop and request fUrther instructions. Discounting horseholders,
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perhaps 550 Union troopers now confronted 400 Confederate voltigeurs. Henry Heth considered the changed odds before deciding fully to deploy his two leading brigades. Aides rode along the halted columns with the new orders as bugles blared and drums rattled.

Once the heretofore fluid skirmishing lines were locked into firm contact, serious casualties began to occur.
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On Gamble’s front, an unidentified trooper riding a gray horse galloped beyond the cover of his skirmishers and was dropped by alert Alabama riflemen. Several in the 5th Alabama were hit, including Private C. L. F. Worley, who lost a leg.

To help protect the helpless columns while they were reforming into battle lines, William Pegram set his cannon working from whatever positions the cannoneers could find. As Archer’s men deployed, the 7th Tennessee established the line with its left resting on the pike. The spaces to its right were then filled by the 14th Tennessee, the 1st Tennessee, and the 13th Alabama, while the 5th Alabama Battalion kept up skirmishing duty. Davis’ Brigade was meanwhile filing into the fields on the northern side of the pike, with the 42nd Mississippi setting its right on the road, followed by the 2nd Mississippi (which had hustled to catch up) and finally the 55th North Carolina. It was a slow process, taking the better part of an hour to complete.

John Calef was moving his six guns into their appointed place, straddling the Chambersburg Pike on the western spur of McPherson’s Ridge. He deemed the position “a good one for artillery, with the exception that a railway cut existed near the right flank.” Then new instructions came from John Buford, who had conceived a different strategy. Buford wanted Calef to post only four of his cannon by the pike and instead send the other two south along the eastern spur of the ridge, to a point just
southeast of the Herbst Woods. “It was part of General Buford’s plan to cover as large a front as possible with my battery (his only artillery) for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to his strength,” Calef later recalled. Two cannon under Sergeant Charles Pergel started off toward the designated position.