Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (24 page)

Hannibal’s strategy relied critically on local recruitment: he was able both to pick up soldiers along the way and to attract deserters from the Roman alliance. After each victory many more joined the cause of the Carthaginian commander. It was also essential for Hannibal to acquire the support of the Italian cities, the crucial allies of the Romans, for without urban support his campaign would be unsustainable.
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A considerable number of the different ethnic and language groups that populated the Italian peninsula had been battling the Romans for centuries and many were happy to take up Hannibal’s
fight. There is a fascinating inscription of an Etruscan man named Felsnas who lived to be 106 years old and claimed in his epitaph to ‘have fought with Hannibal’s men’ at Capua. Felsnas was one of a multitude who joined Hannibal. What is remarkable, considering his long life, was that this was presumably what he was best remembered for: the glory acquired by fighting ‘with Hannibal’s men’.
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As so much of the story of Hannibal comes to us through Roman eyes, we can see how deeply Hannibal’s myths had infiltrated the city in Rome’s response to the calamitous defeat at Trasimeno. The reaction at Rome was dramatic and the Romans did not ‘bear the reverse with moderation and dignity’ (Polyb. 3.85.9). When news of the cavalry defeat followed three days later, more desperation took hold. One consul was dead, an army had been annihilated and few families in Rome would have been untouched by the loss (Livy 22.7.6–14).
⁴⁹
The Roman political system allowed for the appointment of a dictator – who would have absolute power in civil and military affairs in times of crisis. However, the appointment of a military dictator had ‘been neither needed nor employed for a long time’. Normally a dictator would be chosen by the consuls but Flaminius was dead and Servilius cut off from Rome by Hannibal’s armies, so ‘the people took the hitherto unprecedented step of appointing a dictator themselves’ (Polyb. 3.86.7; Livy 22.8.5–7).

The threat of Hannibal resulted in the dictatorship of Quintus Fabius Maximus. He was chosen by the
comitia centuriata
(the people’s assembly) and had held the dictatorship in a civil capacity once before, and twice been consul. Marcus Minucius was chosen as his second in command, designated Master of the Horse (
magister equitum
), and was ‘his successor when the dictator is otherwise occupied’ (Polyb. 3.87.9). The unusual nature of this dictatorship is suggestive of rivalries between families at Rome in face of the threat of Hannibal. Fabius Maximus as dictator would normally choose his own Master of the Horse but the election of Minucius, who was a political opponent of the dictator, indicates some wrangling among different factions in this time of crisis.
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At Rome the religious response to the crisis was of equal significance to the political. So much so that Fabius Maximus ‘on the day of his entry into office convened the Senate opening the session with matters of religion …’ The consul Gaius Flaminius was condemned more for his ‘disregard for ritual and auspices than his recklessness and incompetence’ (Livy 22.9.7). The Romans declared that the cause of the defeat was the anger of the gods, who needed appeasement, and Fabius Maximus and the Senate made the decision to ‘consult the Sibylline Books’ so that the gods’ wishes could be understood
(Livy 22.9.8).
⁵¹
Following the orders of the sacred books, games were vowed to Jupiter, two new cults would be introduced to Rome and temples established for their worship.
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One of the new temples promised at Rome was intended to directly counter the threat of Hannibal. It was to be dedicated to Venus Erycina, the goddess whose cult centre was in north-west Sicily on Mount Eryx (Livy 22.9.7). Venus Erycina was a Latinized name for the goddess worshipped by the Carthaginians as Astarte, who was syncretized to Aphrodite by the Greeks and Venus by the Romans. Her cult centre in Sicily may, in origin, have been connected to Melqart and had played a strategic part in the First Punic War.
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In the final phase of the First Punic War the Romans had held firm to her sanctuary in the face of fierce opposition by Hamilcar Barca. The establishment of a cult to the goddess in Rome can be seen as a means of appropriating the power of Astarte/Aphrodite/Venus for use against the Carthaginians. The Romans were attempting, symbolically, to take her away from her long-standing connection to Carthage and thus to Hannibal. Greek mythical traditions in Sicily, where support for the Carthaginians remained strong, also tied the foundation of the cult to Aeneas, the Trojan founder of Rome. Thus the links of the Romans to the Greek traditions, so important among the allies in southern Italy and Sicily, were being emphasized.
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Hannibal had understood from the beginning that the politics of religion and myth would loom large in the struggle for Italy and now the Romans were fighting back.

Underlying Fabius Maximus’ reaction to the defeat at Trasimeno was the belief of the Roman people that they had been abandoned by the gods.
⁵⁵
Hannibal’s propaganda had worked on the minds of the Romans and they feared the gods must be on his side after his miraculous feats and now his great victory. Hannibal claimed to have Herakles on his side and to be supported by divine favour. So Fabius Maximus took practical steps to challenge this supremacy. Fabius’ own family history also plays a large part in the decision to adopt the particular cult of Venus Erycina. This cult connected Fabius’ dictatorship with the wars of his grandfather against the Samnites (in 295
BCE
) when another temple to Venus (
Venus Obsequens
) had been vowed during his consulship.
⁵⁶
Together with an effort to assuage public fear, this was an attempt by Fabius Maximus to mark a new beginning in Rome’s war with Hannibal by connecting his dictatorship to the victories of his illustrious ancestors, thus emphasizing how power politics played out by rival families underlay much of the decision-making at Rome in this period.
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The cult of Mens, vowed at the same time as that of Venus Erycina, had a more prosaic intent. Mens was a goddess of ‘good sense’ and perhaps embodied
what the dictator Fabius Maximus would bring to his government. Mens was the opposite to what Flaminius had shown at Trasimeno. This balance reflects Roman culture in the third century, when influences from abroad and more traditional beliefs mixed in the city. The exotic cult of Venus Erycina both suggested the acquisition of the Carthaginian goddess and tied the Romans to an epic Greek past. Mens was a cult steeped in the traditions of Roman and Latin culture, very earthy and central Italic, based on the values of indigenous Rome.
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The battle for divine support had many implications for the politics of Italy in the third century; Hannibal had understood from the outset that it was a fight that would have to be won to ensure victory.

For Hannibal the years 218–217
BCE
brought brilliant victories and mythic challenges. Our sources have a single focus of the war in Italy during this period, beguiled by Hannibal’s charismatic leadership and military achievements. The war had, however, quickly spread to much of the western Mediterranean and was being pursued in other theatres, engulfing Iberia and Sardinia as well as Sicily in these years.
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Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal’s younger brother, had been left to continue the consolidation and defence of Carthaginian Iberia. When Gn. Scipio (consul himself in 222/221
BCE
), the older brother of Cornelius Scipio, had taken over the legions and fleet from his brother (the bulk of two legions and allies, roughly 25,000 men) at the mouth of the Rhône he had gone straight to Emporium (modern Ampurias). Emporium was a colony founded by Rome’s main allies in the region, the Massalians (Polyb. 3.76.1). By the time he arrived there in the autumn of 218
BCE
it was already close to the end of the fighting season (Polyb. 3.49.4; Livy 21.32.3).
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Hanno, the Carthaginian commander Hannibal had left in charge of the territory beyond the Ebro, responded with force to the Roman invasion and set out to engage them at a city called Cissa.
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The battle that followed was a disaster for the Carthaginians. Hanno and one of the key Iberian allied leaders Andobales, called ‘despot of all central Iberia’, were both captured. Gn. Scipio won the battle and took possession of ‘valuable booty’, all the heavy baggage that Hannibal had left behind when he had set out for Italy (Polyb. 3.76.6–7; Livy 21.60.7). This was a region that Hannibal had subdued on his march through to Italy but it had quickly been secured by the Romans.
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The Romans aimed to stop Hasdrubal from linking up with his brother via the overland route into Italy. They attempted to restrict the Carthaginians to their power base in Iberia, while prising their allies away from them.
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When news of this defeat reached Hasdrubal he immediately set out from the south and crossed the Ebro. There he found Gn. Scipio’s Roman fleet
unprotected. The men of the fleet were both ‘off their guard and unduly confident’. Hasdrubal attacked and killed a ‘large number of them’. The rest had to take refuge on their ships. Hasdrubal then retreated south of the Ebro where he fortified and garrisoned the cities ‘and passed the winter in New Carthage’. Gn. Scipio returned to his fleet and punished the crews for what had happened. He ‘inflicted the customary penalty’, which is likely to have been execution by beating for desertion (or exile, if one survived the thrashing) and then retreated to his winter quarters at Tarraco (Polyb. 3.76.12).
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The year 217 did not go as well for Hasdrubal Barca as it had for his brother in Italy. In the spring Hasdrubal launched both naval and land attacks on the Romans north of the Ebro. Hasdrubal’s fleet met the Roman forces, who were supported by the Massalians. He was defeated at the mouth of the Ebro, with the loss of twenty-five ships (Polyb. 3.95.1–6; Livy 22.19.1–12).
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The Romans pressed on deep into Carthaginian territory past the Ebro and their ships raided the countryside even to the south of New Carthage and the island of Ebusus (Ibiza). The Balearic Islands, whose highly specialized slingers played such an important role in Hannibal’s light infantry, sent envoys to Rome seeking to make peace.
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The Romans encouraged, bought and supported any disturbance to Carthaginian power among their allies and a Celtiberian rebellion ensued. In many ways this was the reverse of what was happening in Italy and made it impossible for Hasdrubal Barca to fulfil his promise to support his brother there. The successes of Gn. Scipio at the Ebro and the consequences seem to have encouraged the Roman Senate to send reinforcements. A newly raised fleet of twenty ships arrived under the command of Publius Scipio some time later in 217
BCE
(Polyb. 3.97.2). Publius Scipio had been named proconsul and ‘from this time the two Scipio brothers carried on the war in Iberia’ (Appian,
Ib
. 15).
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The sustained Roman pressure in the Iberian peninsula was meant to ensure that they were not fighting all three Barcid brothers in Italy and it would be years, rather than months, before Hasdrubal could even attempt to join up with Hannibal.
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CHAPTER 7

THE APOGEE

CANNAE AND THE WAR IN ITALY

And he sang … of the victorious delays of Fabius, of the ill-starred fight of Cannae; and the gods that turned to answer pious prayers …
(Propertius 3.3. 9–10)

H
ANNIBAL AND HIS ARMY
moved freely in the period immediately after Trasimeno. There were no Roman forces to oppose him as he restored his troops and gathered supplies. He received envoys from cities around Italy. Some came to him to test the waters, others just to meet the man, give advice and understand his plans (Livy 22.13.2–3).
¹
Italy was allied Roman territory but many alliances had been imposed by force rather than choice. There was no shortage of hostility to Rome and many may have hoped to use Hannibal as an antidote to Roman hegemony. Hannibal would have welcomed all who sought alliance but with a large force to feed he could not stay in one place for too long. After resting by the Adriatic the Carthaginian army moved south into the region of Apulia. Hannibal went to the south because he believed the Roman alliance was most vulnerable there and his tactics might be most successfully employed. By moving south, staying to the east of the Apennines, Hannibal also avoided territory directly controlled by the Romans. The army plundered as they went, attacking the Roman colony of Luceria and the countryside around it, moving into the fertile agricultural region of the modern Gargano, near the town of Arpi (Polyb. 3.88.2–6) (see
Map 1
).

Unchallenged, Hannibal attacked Roman allies and colonies and appeared to have complete control of the countryside. He may have hoped to provoke
the Romans into another battle that would help to seal his success. When he received reports that the newly appointed dictator Fabius Maximus was nearby with an army, Hannibal prepared to engage. Moving towards Fabius, he ‘led his forces out and drew them up in order of battle at a short distance from the Roman camp but after waiting some time and as nobody came out to meet him he retired again to his own camp’ (Polyb. 3.89.1).
²

As dictator, Fabius Maximus took control of four legions and set out with a clear strategy to take on Hannibal. He had no intention of engaging the Carthaginian army directly in battle but planned to shadow them. Fabius Maximus became famous for this policy of non-engagement and is known to posterity by the epithet
Cunctator
, the delayer. ‘Risk averse’ might be the better description of Fabius, who understood the dangers of a set-piece battle against Hannibal’s highly effective, disciplined fighting force and superior cavalry. Fabius was ‘a man of admirable judgement and great natural gifts’, in the eyes of Polybius (3.87.6). Considering that most of his troops were no match for the battle-hardened Carthaginian army at that moment his options were limited. The Romans had other strengths and ‘these advantages … lay in an inexhaustible supply of provisions and men’ (Polyb. 3.89.9). Two millennia later when Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 the great Russian general Kutuzov employed similar tactics to defeat a superior fighting force, relying on an almost limitless supply of men and provisions and a better knowledge of the countryside.
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