Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (31 page)

Hannibal’s victories unsettled Roman alliances in all regions. Directly after Cannae powerful leaders reached out to him in Italy and across the Adriatic. As hostilities spilled over from Italy into the neighbouring states it would only be a matter of time before the epicentre of the First Punic War, Sicily, was drawn into the struggle. Livy comments that ‘one might well have thought that the theatre of war had shifted from Italy, so focused on Sicily were the two peoples’ (24.36.4). Indeed, the story of Syracuse, the wealthiest and most powerful city in Sicily, would play an epic part in the outcome of the war.
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When Hannibal first invaded Italy, Syracuse was still ruled by the nonagenarian king Hiero II whose long reign had begun early in the First Punic War. By shifting allegiance from Carthage to Rome in the 260s, Hiero had navigated the first war with much of his territory intact. This had revitalized the city’s fortunes and Hiero’s long allegiance to the Romans defined his rule.
⁵⁹
In the inter-war years Syracuse was a loyal ally of Rome but functioned independently as a regional power. After Cannae, the extent of Hannibal’s military
victory unsettled the population of Syracuse and exposed a latent hostility to the Roman alliance among the younger generation. During his long rule, Hiero had kept order in the city but now, in his nineties, his influence waned. In the aftermath of Hannibal’s victories, Hiero’s son, heir and co-regent Gelo declared his allegiance to the Carthaginians, setting off a period of dynastic strife and rebellion.
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Then Gelo died suddenly in mysterious circumstances, ‘so timely a death as to taint even the father with suspicion’, and not long afterwards Hiero too passed away after a fifty-four-year reign (Livy 23.30.11–12). The deaths left Syracuse with a power vacuum (Polyb. 7.8.4).

Hannibal kept abreast of developments at Syracuse using spies, agents and envoys. The stage was set for Carthaginian and Roman allied factions within the city to struggle over the succession. ‘Hiero’s death changed the whole situation,’ claimed Livy, and rule passed to Hiero’s fifteen-year-old grandson Hieronymus. When he assumed the throne at Syracuse real power lay in the hands of Hieronymus’ uncles, Adranodorus and Zoippus (husbands of Hiero’s daughters) who had been appointed as guardians to the young king, along with thirteen Syracusan noblemen (Livy 24.4.1–4). The struggle for power at Syracuse initiated a period of violence, intrigue and assassination at the court of the old king. There was turmoil and conspiracy as agents of both Rome and Hannibal vied for influence with various factions.
⁶¹
In the aftermath of Hiero’s death, a plot on the life of the young heir was exposed, implicating one of his guardians, the pro-Roman Thraso (falsely accused, according to Livy 24.4.5–5.14).

Hieronymus was then persuaded to send envoys to Hannibal in Italy to broach the idea of cooperation with the Carthaginians (Polyb.7.2.2). Hannibal surely received the embassy with enthusiasm and sent one of his lieutenants (the commander of the triremes, also named Hannibal) and two special envoys to negotiate with the new king. The envoys were Hippocrates and Epicydes, brothers of mixed Carthaginian–Syracusan origin who served in Hannibal’s army.
⁶²
The scope of Hannibal’s control over the events in the war outside Italy has often been debated but there seems little doubt that he was directing Carthaginian policy in Sicily from his base in Italy.

Whilst Hannibal negotiated a new alliance with Syracuse, the Roman commander in Sicily, Appius Claudius Pulcher, sent representatives to Hieronymus to ‘renew the treaty made with his ancestors’. The Roman delegation was given an audience with the king. Hannibal’s envoys were present at the meeting, which was both a hostile and profoundly insulting gesture to the Romans. The boy king, whose head had naturally been turned by the tales of Hannibal’s great victories and charismatic leadership, even taunted the
Roman envoys in front of the Carthaginians. Hieronymus told the Romans he ‘sympathized with them for having been wiped out by the Carthaginians in battles in Italy’ (Polyb. 7.3.2–4).
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The Roman envoys reacted in protest and warned the young king not to accept the words of their enemies or violate the existing treaty made with his grandfather.

The governing council at Syracuse was split on how to act but under the influence of Adranodorus (the king’s uncle) and his supporters the decision was taken to go to war against Rome (Polyb. 7.3–5). After discussions with Hieronymus, the Carthaginian delegation continued on to Carthage followed by a Syracusan mission sent ‘to establish a treaty of the terms negotiated with Hannibal’ (Livy 24.6.7).
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Hieronymus was a teenage boy and at the mercy of his divided advisors. It is not surprising that he turned out to be a most unstable ally and whilst one group of envoys negotiated a treaty at Carthage, he decided to change the terms of that agreement. The first agreement envisioned Carthage as supplying land and sea forces against the Romans in Sicily, and once the Romans were expelled the two powers would split Sicily in two, with the river Himera as the border (
Map 1
). Another set of advisors saw the opportunity to extend Syracusan hegemony beyond their traditional realm. They coaxed the young king with talk of his noble lineage (he was related to King Pyrrhus through his mother) and the further potential for Syracusan greatness (Polyb.7.4.1–2; Livy 24.6.7).

Hieronymus sent another group of negotiators to Carthage with new conditions that claimed the whole of Sicily as his by right. Syracuse offered to assist Carthage in Italy as long as Carthage helped the king recover the island for his own rule (Polyb. 7.4.2). This vision saw a future where neither Rome nor Carthage had an interest in Sicily. The Carthaginians, although they ‘perceived the full extent of the young man’s instability and unbalanced condition’, needed Syracuse and access to the ports in Sicily for their own interests. Thus they seemed willing to agree to the concept of a Sicily fully dominated by Syracuse if it meant the demise of Roman power on the island (Polyb. 7.4.7–8; Livy 24.6.8).

When Hannibal was informed of the new terms of the treaty he cannot have been pleased, but the new alliance was hugely significant for his efforts in Italy. He could have asked for no more substantial an ally than Syracuse and no more of a distraction for the Romans than Sicily in rebellion. If the Carthaginians could once more access Sicilian ports, then Hannibal would more easily receive his supplies. Perhaps he was also willing to concede future power to a young, unstable boy king whose prospects were far from settled.

In 214
BCE
as Syracuse prepared for war Hieronymus, who had now reigned for thirteen months, travelled with an army to the nearby town of Leontinoi. There his short rule came to an end when he was assassinated in an ambush (Polyb. 7.7.3). It is entirely possible that Roman agents were to blame for the assassination. The Romans had the most to gain from the king’s death but there were many elements at play in the struggle for Syracuse. In addition to the agents of Rome and Carthage vying for influence with the different factions in the city, there was an important anti-monarchist group among the population. The boy king had proven to be impetuous and irrational and any number of factions may have been responsible for his downfall. In the chaotic aftermath of the assassination, Adranodorus tried to seize power, but he too was killed. There followed the brutal slaughter of every man, woman and child related to the royal family of Hiero (Livy 24.25–26). When a new government took power, steps were taken towards re-establishing a Roman alliance and contact made with Appius Claudius Pulcher, based with his fleet at Lilybaeum. As these negotiations continued, Hippocrates and Epicydes, Hannibal’s envoys who had been elected magistrates in Syracuse, seized power and established control in the city. They were certainly acting on behalf of the pro-Hannibalic faction at Syracuse and most likely under Hannibal’s direct orders (Livy 24.27.1, 30.2–32.9; Polyb. 8.3.1).
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As the control of Syracuse lay in the balance a Carthaginian army with naval support supplemented the Syracusan forces defending the city. Meanwhile another Carthaginian army under the commander Himilco landed in Sicily at Heraclea and recaptured the city of Agrigentum for the Carthaginians, almost fifty years after it had fallen in the First Punic War. Himilco’s aim was the encouragement of a wider rebellion among the cities on the island. The Romans simultaneously built up their military presence in Sicily. Their talismanic general Marcellus joined Appius Claudius Pulcher, perhaps as early as the autumn of 214
BCE
, and assumed overall command of the military expedition in Sicily.
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Roman forces included the fleet stationed at Lilybaeum with over 100 vessels and a land army of three legions (reinforced to a total of 130 ships and four legions by 213
BCE
).
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In the spring of 213
BCE
the two Roman commanders made a joint land and sea attack on Syracuse.

The struggle for Sicily would be crucial if the Carthaginians were to aid Hannibal in the war in Italy. Syracuse was one of the largest cities in the Mediterranean with a major urban centre and large ports. It was well defended both by nature and construction. The Roman geographer Strabo, writing two centuries later, called Syracuse a
pentapolis
– a city made up of five towns. The
centre of the city was the island of Ortygia that sat between the two harbours and was the focus of civic life, with the neighbourhoods of Achradina, Tycha and Neapolis spread out on the mainland.
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The circuit walls of Syracuse enclosed the island of Ortygia and the suburbs on the mainland. They ran for 17 kilometres and included a vast area to the north of the city, the plateau known as Epipolae.
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The Romans launched a two-pronged attack on the city of Syracuse with the land force assaulting the wall at the Hexapylon gate and the navy focusing on Achradina. Marcellus’ attack fleet included 60 quinqueremes equipped with the most up-to-date weaponry and even a floating siege engine that Polybius calls a ‘
sambukas
’ (8.4.3).
⁷⁰
The confident Marcellus had assumed that once he sailed up to the walls of the city with his impressive fleet, ‘his personal prestige would combine to overawe the Syracusans’. It turns out that behind the walls of Syracuse was an even more impressive weapon and Marcellus had not taken into account the power of the famous scientist and engineer Archimedes (Plutarch,
Marc
. 14).
⁷¹
In the initial stages of the attack the sophisticated Roman machines of war were rendered ‘insignificant not only in the philosopher’s [Archimedes’] estimation but also by comparison with those which he had constructed himself’ (
Marc
. 14).

Archimedes was a native of Syracuse whose father had been an astronomer and mathematician and was possibly related to the old king Hiero.
⁷²
After studying in Alexandria in the mid-third century, Archimedes had returned home to Syracuse during the long period of Hiero’s rule. The old king had built Syracuse into a Hellenistic centre that fostered an environment of learning and scientific experimentation. Archimedes lived and studied under this patronage. Part of his work was directed at developing the urban defences and fortifications of the city. These had originally been constructed in the fifth century but the advent of sophisticated siege weaponry in the Hellenistic period meant that the walls and forts had been upgraded during Hiero’s rule, and Archimedes is credited with this work (Diodorus Sic. 14.18.4–8).
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Elaborate land defences and sea walls protected Syracuse. It would not fall easily, and when the initial Roman attack on the city was repulsed, all credit for this lay with Archimedes.
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By every account Archimedes’ counter-siege engines were miraculous and he embodied the innovative approach to war in the spirit of the Hellenistic age. His machines included ‘catapults, beams that dropped heavy rocks, grappling irons and small catapults called
scorpians‘
. With these machines the Syracusan defenders sank Roman ships, knocked out their lines of infantry and caused general mayhem among their troops. So efficient was the defence
mounted by the Syracusans using the weaponry of Archimedes that ‘the Romans began to believe they were fighting against a supernatural enemy’ (Plutarch,
Marc
. 15.1–17.4).

The evidence for this wondrous defence of Syracuse under Archimedes’ direction comes purely from anecdotes in later sources, the earliest being Polybius and frequent mentions can be found in Cicero. Plutarch’s
Life of Marcellus
contains a long digression on Archimedes defence of the city. Unfortunately, hard facts about the life and death of Archimedes are difficult to come by, perhaps because Archimedes, much like Hannibal, became so famous in the ancient world after his death. His name came to embody ancient science and innovation; he was one of the world’s first celebrated scientists, much like a Hellenistic Einstein. Even today with his ‘Eureka’ moment in the bath, Archimedes is a household name and a symbol of genius in the ancient world.

The stories of the great siege and counter-siege of Syracuse developed in Roman tradition and gave birth to the Archimedes legend.
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‘So long as he was present they did not dare even to attempt an attack by any method which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them’ (Polyb. 8.7.9). In many ways Archimedes became to science what Hannibal became to military genius in the Roman imagination: both of them men of enormous achievement who challenged the might of Rome. The ‘machines of Archimedes’ were so successful in defending Syracuse that they forced the Romans to stand back from their assault. The Romans decided the best course of action was to stay well clear of the city walls and set up a blockade to starve Syracuse into submission by cutting off both land and sea routes (Livy 24.34.16).
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