Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program (47 page)

Rockwell analyzed some off-nominal conditions of temperature and pin/socket misalignment and concluded that there was such a possibility, remote but real. A slight change to pin/socket could avoid this condition. WG3 was split on the issue, Bob White’s team, who were already in Moscow for the mate check, felt it was remote enough to not warrant a late hardware change. Rockwell voted for the change. The worst-case conditions of side loads were two hundred fifty to four hundred fifty pounds (versus allowable side loads of three hundred pounds) combined with a very slight hesitation and retraction of the pin from the side exceeding .02 inches. We concluded that these conditions could be reached in flight.

Bob White discussed it in Moscow with the Soviet team. Syromyatnikov understood and was partial to the change of our hardware but was comfortable with his own. I approved the change and reviewed it with Chet Lee at NASA HQ since I expected it to be controversial with the Soviets. We then explained our logic to the Soviets, especially Professor Bushuyev on our telecom. Arnie Aldrich took the new hardware replacement parts to Moscow and represented our thinking and more details to Bushuyev and WG3 members. The Soviets affirmed that no change was needed with their docking system, but they accepted our change to the U.S. docking system. I may have been influenced by the repeated difficulties with our own docking probe. Something often prevented proper operation of the capture latches as recently as the last spacecraft mission to the Skylab. This late change was awkward, and even embarrassing to us. But, saving face was not the priority. I was confident that this was the right thing to do.

I will also give well deserved credit to Rockwell for their time-critical support to this change, and especially to our overall efforts. Ray Larson, the Rockwell Program Manager, was steadfast in his role as the leader of the Rockwell team. They were “one” with the NASA/ASTP team throughout.

1975 was different from previous years. Up until 1975, the focus was on the design and test processes for the flight hardware – docking system, docking module with its life support equipment, the radios, use of the guidance system and docking targets. Now the testing phase was nearing completion and the designers were tracking the last of the open items. The operations focus for the crews and the ground operators had been on developing and learning the facilities, plans and procedures and how to define all of the above in two languages and with an equal partner. The operations teams were moving to put all that into practice and simulations would be their tests. It was also the beginning of the normal ramp-up of the intensity and adrenaline flow. Besides the simulations, the late traffic was dominated by the joint experiments, the ceremonials with the docked phase, the finalization of the PAO Part Two document and the completion of all onboard documentation.

One of the major confidence boosters at this point was the success of Soyuz 16, the precursor mission to ASTP. The flight duplicated as much as possible of the planned ASTP mission – including launch, orbital rendezvous maneuvers and especially the planned decrease of Soyuz cabin pressure fifteen PSI to ten PSI while on orbit, and then the planned increase to fifteen PSI for entry. Everything about the on-orbit tests of propulsion, the Soyuz life support system and all else performed exactly according to plan. Professor Bushuyev enjoyed giving his report on both our telecom after Soyuz 16 landed and then in person at our first 1975 meeting in January.

There was one remaining item of concern for the Soviet team. This was the subject of the Apollo forward firing “-X” RCS thrusters and effects on Soyuz during closing, docking, and the docked phase on orbit. Ed Smith had been working the issue during the last half of 1974 and determined the concern derived from a NASA motion picture of the Skylab as the Apollo CSM approached the station. Because of the Skylab launch failure, which tore away one of two of the solar panels and the thermal shield, there was a parasol that had been deployed on the first mission over the affected area to reduce the heating on the outer surface of Skylab and its warming effect on the internal cabin temperature in Skylab. The parasol was made out of very flimsy mylar-like material and the CSM RCS firings caused a rippling of the shade material. There was no damage, but the rippling of the material was upsetting to members of the Soviet team. There was concern for heating various systems external to Soyuz, and the potential for upsetting the Soyuz control system. As a result, WG2 had been discussing and analyzing the possible effects on Soyuz and actions to minimize those things. Ed Smith agreed to provide the history on the firing of the –X thrusters during approach to our own vehicles during Apollo and Skylab. During those phases, the thrusters firing duration is computer controlled to be very short pulses during firing on the order of 0.5 seconds. During these periods, the flight experience was that firing greater than 0.5 seconds were very rare and their repetitive firing was even more rare. This level of pulsing was analyzed earlier for thermal effects of the Soyuz external materials including the docking seals. The studies indicated no real thermal problem.

There was still concern the pulses could upset the Soyuz attitude control system. We provided all of the data during the late 1974 working group meetings. We hosted a return visit by one of the Soviet specialists after he analyzed the Apollo RCS pulsing flight history. We gradually learned that their concern was not the duration or frequency of firing but rather how we could guarantee that they would not continue firing after docking system capture. We were making progress on the real definition of the concern.

In January, the next round of discussion ensued. To limit the unwanted pulses, the Apollo procedure was: at capture, the Commander ceases translation and switches from the SCS to the CMC “free mode.” This mode will only fire thrusters when the hand control is operated by the Commander. Then, without moving the hand controller, the Commander turns off four RCS select switches that interrupt the electrical power to the four –X thrusters. They now have no electrical power to cause the firing. To his credit, Legostayev understood this very well and tried unsuccessfully to convince Professor Bushuyev and others.

Presented to the Soviet audience, all of whom believe firmly in automatic controls and don’t trust manual controls, the debate continued anew and became heated. We decided to try another route and offered Petrov and Yeliseyev (who was a skeptic but had flown with General Shatolov on several Soyuz flights) a session in the simulator with Stafford and another crewmember to call out “capture.” The procedure was run several times and the simplicity of it seemed to assure the two Soviet observers. As least they were ready to close the subject, and they did. I do believe that the resolution took a little arm-twisting internal to their delegation. It might take extra time to document this resolution in our formal documents, but that was workable. This was our last plenary before the FRR in six months.

DS mate checks From left: Bob White and Vladimir Syromyatnikov WG3 Chairmen

There was one more important group to be satisfied and it had to be done at this meeting with the last planned visit by Professor Bushuyev to the U.S before the July launch. In the U.S., there is an independent review group, chartered by Congress after the Apollo fire. The group reports to the NASA administrator as part of the safety and flight readiness process for every manned space flight. It is called Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) and their work is well respected by the NASA team. Since approval at the May ’72 summit, they started in their normal reviews of all of our plans for the mission in order to assess the mission safety. They interviewed all of the U.S. working groups and one of the ASAP members (Charles Harrington) traveled to Moscow and witnessed the late 1974 docking system mating test. Also in December, we provided them with an evaluation of the Soyuz 16 flight results. That and the fact that Bushuyev would not be back before the flight led to a request from ASAP to ask some specific questions of Professor Bushuyev. This represented a legitimate request on their part to complete their picture of the overall safety. And it should have been raised and addressed earlier.

But, I was concerned about the appearances of this group. This was a very high-level U.S. panel, including the Commanding General of the Defense Nuclear Agency, and it could easily feel like an interrogation to Bushuyev. They wanted us to translate and give Bushuyev written questions. I suggested that they let me lead him into the areas under discussion and listen to Bushuyev talk about these subjects. I would follow up to be sure that the questions would be fully answered, and if some were not they could ask for clarification. They were good with that approach. I went back to talk with Bushuyev with my trusted interpreter, Alex Tatischeff, and explained the background of why this panel was chartered and who these men were. I told him that I thought he could make a valuable contribution to the U.S. understanding of what the Soviet side has done to assure the safety of our joint flight.

In turn, Alex explained that the Russian word for this actually had two meanings: “safety” as we know it and “security” as in guards, fences and secrets. We stressed that this was not about National Security, rather cosmonaut safety. I told him that he did not have to defend the safety record of Soyuz. I also explained that, “members of the panel only hear my voice.” For them, “Your opinions and your arguments will be very authoritative.” Bushuyev was good to do the interview. It covered hazards such as fumes, fire, toxicity, pryos firing and inadvertent release of the docking latches. Also to be discussed was the operational decision making, planning, simulations and testing of those decisions. I coaxed out reminders of the extended time we had for our specialists to work together and how that served our mutual understanding. In the end, I think the panel learned more about their questions in this style of interview and they also got an upfront example of how the two of us worked together. Bushuyev was very forthcoming and informative during these discussions. By now, he was accomplished in response to questions. It seemed that he surprised the panel with his open and straightforward answers. I assumed the project got a good report card.

During February, the cosmonaut delegation visited the KSC launch site. These were the same venues—KSC tour and Disney World—which Professor Bushuyev and key members of his team visited earlier with me. The KSC team outdid themselves in making our guests most welcome and very well informed. Great job. The ASTP crewmembers joined them for a tour of the facilities and the flight vehicle. Their Florida visit also included an enjoyable stop at Disney World. The group then traveled to Houston and continued their final tune-ups. Prime and backup crews went through the simulators, rehearsing all the planned joint activities and the joint communications and language training. The MCC operators participated with their counterparts in the three two-day training sessions of selected phases of the joint part of the mission. WG1 continued with PAO subgroup working part POA Part Two that was finalized five days before launch. Much attention was focused on the completion plan for the onboard documentation.

Most of our working groups, except WG1, involved in the simulations arrived in Moscow on May fifth. Our task was to finalize all of the remaining open paperwork and present our status and recommendations on the flight readiness to the senior level FRR board.

Besides, Low and Frutkin, John Yardley (AA for OMSF) and Walt Kapryan (KSC launch director) joined the group as did I and we toured the Baykonur launch site before the FRR on May twenty-third. Professor Bushuyev also joined our delegation at the launch site. The tour started with a visit to the launch pad used for the Gagarin launch in April 1961. The launch pad was different than ours; the vehicle was not held down on the launch pad, it actually flies out of the pad. The booms fall back and away from the stack as moved by a counter balance and then gravity. The stacking of the vehicle is done horizontally – first the spacecraft, then the shroud over the spacecraft, then that assembly is taken to the pad for fuel, later on, the spacecraft plus shroud is mated to the launch vehicle in the horizontal position. The final action moves the stack to the vertical and places it on the launch pad. On this trip, we learned the Professor Bushuyev visited and stayed in the cottage at the launch site with Korolev, who was the founder and Chief Designer of their space program. He began working with Korolev, right after the war in spacecraft and launch vehicles. Busheyev had told me earlier that he and his wife worked in an aircraft factory during the war and they had relocated with it to east of the Ural Mountains to get out of the range of the Luftwaffe. Back in Moscow at the FRR, the two Technical Directors reported on our respective readiness and completion of all the necessary certifications. Low asked several questions on Soyuz 16 and two Cosmos flights as to whether they had any significant anomalies. Bushuyev reported two minor conditions, namely – too much cooling on the feet and some food problems.