Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (127 page)

More significant, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” noted that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor. In the worst case scenario, how
ever, transfer of the throne to a successor might be unavoidable. If this should happen it must take a spontaneous form.” Konoe and Sakai were also prepared to “return to politics predicated on
minpon seiji
” or “the people-under-the-emperor.” They used this Taish
-era term to mean “democracy” at a time when the Japanese people viewed democracy as the culture of the enemy. Significantly, even Konoe did not dare to seek the emperor's approval of his attached “Explanation.”
⁷⁴

In maneuvering for a “peace with honor” that would protect the throne, Konoe and Sakai also revealed their willingness to send some of their fellow countrymen into forced labor in lieu of material reparations if cutting a deal required it. Thus the “Essentials” declared that “We shall demobilize the military overseas in the places they are stationed, and endeavor to repatriate them. If that is impossible, we shall consent to leaving some of them where they are for awhile.” Their explanation of this item noted: “We consent to offer some labor as reparations.” Clearly the idea of interning Japanese POWs at forced labor for the Soviet economy (later implemented by the Russians in Siberian work camps) was not exclusively a Soviet notion but actually originated with men in the emperor's entourage.
⁷⁵

III

The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, coupled with Kido's and the emperor's concern over growing popular criticism of the throne and its occupant, and their almost paranoiac fear that, sooner or later, the people would react violently against their leaders if they allowed the war to go on much longer—these factors finally caused Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.
⁷⁶

At the first meeting of the six constituent members of the Supreme War Leadership Council, from 10:30
A.M
. to 1:00
P.M
. on
August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijir
representing the army and Yonai representing the navy, and T
g
representing the Foreign Ministry were supposed to have discussed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead they debated whether to try to surrender with conditions: one condition, preservation of the
kokutai
, or four?

After Suzuki had addressed the gathering about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, according to the account of Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak and to frame the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk,” he began. “Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions…? If not, and we want to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may go about it this way. First, preservation of the
kokutai
, and then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.”
⁷⁷
Thus the participants extracted what they considered to be the unclear points of the Potsdam Declaration and made them the basis for their discussions.

The army insisted on four conditions.
⁷⁸
These were, first, preservation of the
kokutai
, considered by all as something distinct from the Potsdam Declaration. The other conditions were, second, assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, no occupation; and finally, delegation to the Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals.
⁷⁹
The army equated the
kokutai
with the emperor's right of supreme command. Its self-serving desire to have autonomous war crimes trials was predicated on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to indict the military on political grounds. Hence the army leaders wanted to preempt the work of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—exactly as the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans had done after World War I.
⁸⁰

Supporting the military's views at cabinet meetings during the day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Min
ister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui T
ji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko.
⁸¹
At the imperial conference that night (it lasted into the early morning hours of the tenth), Foreign Minister T
g
held that the sole surrender condition be preservation of the
kokutai
. And throughout the discussion “preservation of the
kokutai
” meant for T
g
preservation only of the Imperial House or dynasty, not the continuation of Hirohito's reign.

This was not what it meant for the others. Hiranuma, also a supporter of one condition, had a very different interpretation of the
kokutai
, one in which the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [did] not derive from national law.” Accordingly Hiranuma insisted that “Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the
kokutai
and the security of the imperial house.”
⁸²
Stated differently, there was no completely unified understanding of what the
kokutai
meant; the debate on one condition versus four was really about the future form of the Japanese state and concealed the competition for future political power that was already under way.