Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (309 page)

24.
Yoshida Yutaka, who makes this argument, also identifies the “emergency war funds special account” as the mechanism that allowed the army and navy to accumulate tremendous war power. Both services diverted emergency military appropriations, earmarked for the China war, to build up their basic war power. Both services fought the war in China on the cheap and saved the greater part of their emergency military funds for purposes of stockpiling and arms expansion. Citing the official history of the Finance Ministry (
Sh
wa zaiseishi, dai yonkan
[T
y
Keizai Shinp
sha, 1955], he estimates that the direct cost of the China war down to 1945 was only one-third of the entire emergency military allocation.

 
      See Yoshida Yutaka,
Nihonjin no sens
kan
(Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 17–19; and Captain John Weckerling, “Military Attaché Report No. 9221,” Feb. 3, 1938, p. 4, National Archives, Reel no. 13.

25.
Nobutake Ike, ed. and trans.,
Japan's Decision for War: Records of the l941 Policy Conferences
(Stanford University Press, l967), pp. 78–79. I have altered Ike's translation in part. See also Sanb
honbu, ed.,
Sugiyama memo, j
(Hara Shob
, 1967), p. 251.

26.
Awaya Kentar
et al., eds.,
Tokyo saiban shiry
: Kido K
ichi jinmonch
sho
(
tsuki Shoten, 1987), p. 557.