Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (323 page)

107.
Cited in Okabe Makio, “Ajia taiheiy
sens
no kaisen tetsuzuki,” in
Kikan sens
sekinin kenky
8 (Summer 1995), p. 29.

108.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, entries of Dec. 5, 6, 1941, p. 932; Tanaka,
Dokyumento Sh
wa tenn
dai nikan,
pp. 361–63.

109.
Okabe, “Ajia taiheiy
sens
no kaisen tetsuzuki,” pp. 29–30.

110.
The opening line of the
Senjinkun
, adopted in Jan. 1941, read: “The battlefield is where the Imperial Army, acting under the imperial command, displays its true character, conquering whenever it attacks, winning whenever it engages in combat, in order to spread K
D
[the Imperial Way] far and wide so that the enemy may look up in awe to the august virtues of his majesty.”

111.
J
nikki
, p. 119. The most credible version of Hirohito's reaction to the Roosevelt letter is in Prince Takamatsu's diary. On Dec. 10, 1941, Takamatsu recorded Hirohito telling him that the letter from Roosevelt
came through Grew and that “We answered [Grew] just as we have been saying in government-to-government talks. What a meaningless thing to come and tell us.” Takamatsu then added that “because the media was distracted by the president's letter on the night of the seventh, it helped conceal our military operation.” The least trustworthy version is Hirohito's “Monologue” account, which blames T
g
for his nonreply:
I knew beforehand…that a telegram would probably be coming to me by short-wave from Roosevelt; but it didn't come. I was wondering what had happened…when, finally, at 3
A.M
. on December 8, T
g
[Shigenori] brought it to me. I understand that Ambassador Grew sought an audience so that he could hand it to me personally. I wanted to answer this presidential telegram but T
g
said that already on the 6th “Two of our submarines were sunk off the coast of Hawaii; it is better not to answer now.” At his suggestion, I decided not to reply.
TN, dai sankan,
p. 333; and
STD
, pp. 77–78.