Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (381 page)

78.
Ibid., p. 226.

79.
Kinoshita,
Sokkin nisshi
, p. 145.

80.
Ashida Hitoshi,
Ashida Hitoshi nikki, dai ikkan
(Iwanami Shoten, 1986), pp. 78–79.

81.
Ibid., p. 80.

82.
Ibid., p. 82.

83.
Kinoshita Michio,
Sokkin nisshi
, p. 160, diary entry of February 28.

84.
New York Times
(Mar. 4, 1946), p. 6.

85.
Kinoshita,
Sokkin nisshi
, pp. 163–64.

86.
Tanaka Akihito,
Nijusseiki no Nihon, dai nikan, Anzen hosh
: sengo goj
nen no mosaku
(Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), p. 33. Yokota later abandoned his initial interpretation of Article 9 and distanced himself from earlier criticism of Hirohito. After the outbreak of the Korean War, both he and Ashida became strong supporters of rearmament. By 1960 Yokota had moved sufficiently to the right to qualify as a justice of the Supreme Court.

87.
Takahashi Hiroshi, “Kaisetsu—Sh
wa tenn
to ‘Sokkin nisshi' no jidai” in Kinoshita,
Sokkin nisshi
, p. 268.

88.
Ashida nikki, dai ikkan
, p. 90. The emperor's resistance has been argued persuasively by Watanabe Osamu in
Sengo seiji shi no naka no tenn
sei
(Aoki Shoten, 1990) and “Tenn
,” in
Nihonshi daijiten, yonkan
(Heibonsha, 1994), p. 1246.

89.
See Yoshida Shigeru,
Kais
j
nen
(Shinch
sha, 1957–58).

90.
The GHQ account, written by Alfred R. Hussey, states: “On the 22nd, as a last recourse, the Prime Minister, accompanied by Yoshida and Narahashi, consulted the Emperor. Hirohito did not hesitate. He advised Shidehara that he fully supported the most thorough-going revision, even to the point of depriving the Emperor himself of all political authority.”
Political Reorientation of Japan
, p. 106.

91.
Watanabe,
Sengo seijishi no naka no tenn
sei
, pp. 119–120, citing
Asahi shinbun
, Apr. 18, 1977.

92.
The following day, Mar. 6, 1946, Kinoshita (p. 165) tried to comfort Hirohito regarding the loss of his sovereign powers by telling him it was better to discard the old constitution:
…and obtain freedom to guide the spirit of politicians and the people. The emperor seems to have the same idea.
Concerning abdication, the emperor said that it would probably be easier for him if he abdicated, for then he wouldn't have to experience today's difficulties. But Prince Chichibu is sick; Prince Takamatsu had been pro-war and at the hub of the military at that time, so he was unsuitable to be regent. Prince Mikasa was young and inexperienced. He felt especially disappointed at the rash act of Prince Higashikuni and said that Higashikuni probably never considered these sort of circumstances.

93.
Watanabe, “Sengo kaikaku to h
: tenn
sei kokka wa dat
sareta ka,” pp. 235–38. Watanabe emphasizes (p. 239) the highly limited nature of the constitutional revision process, rebutting the argument that the 1946 revision continued the tradition of constitution making of the 1870s-early 1880s. “The heightening of the movement for postwar reform had barely begun,” he writes, “when the basic framework of the constitution was determined from above.”