Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (54 page)

Nakajima concluded his analysis of the Yokohama newspapers of 1928 by noting that “Japan had not yet entered the age of fascism yet the editorials were already preaching the theme of ‘the eight corners of the world under one roof' (
hakk
ichiu
) without using that term.”
⁶⁶
The idea of the universal reign of peace in which each nation would take its proper place in the sun and recognize the leadership of Japan had lain dormant in the writings of Tokugawa-era scholars.
⁶⁷
During the opening of Japan in the 1850s and 1860s,
hakk
ichiu
was revived and linked to the new conviction that Japan's emperor should always be “a charismatic political leader who stands at the head of, and promotes, the process of civilization and enlightenment.”
⁶⁸
The latter idea had influenced Meiji's image throughout his reign. Starting around 1928 Hirohito and his reign became asso
ciated with the rediscovery of
hakk
ichiu
, an expansionist belief that imparted new dynamism to Japanese nationalism.

Clearly the long enthronement process of the late 1920s built up and released enormous popular energy and enthusiasm.
⁶⁹
Because the celebrations were set against a background of literary and artistic representations of an earlier military triumph—the Russo-Japanese War—the enthronement at its point of climax was experienced as a victorious foreign war. Undoubtedly it played a major role in enticing people to the side of the emperor and the state, and in mobilizing self-governing bodies, such as court-sponsored youth groups, the Imperial Reservists Association, neighborhood associations, and right-wing gangs. While that was going on, the Rising Sun flag was also diffused, and the Photography Department of the Imperial Household Ministry made preparations for “bestowing” on the nation's schools the most important symbol of the new nationalism—the sacred portrait of Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako, he in his new supreme generalissimo's uniform, with decorations on his chest; she beside him wearing a low-cut Western gown with a decorated sash.

Campaigns of national spiritual mobilization continued after 1928, pushing the nation's pride in Hirohito and in itself to new heights, and making belief in his sacredness the touchstone of political correctness. On December 1, 1928, the Tanaka cabinet issued a Statement Concerning the Guidance of Thought that advocated “promotion of education” and the “cultivation of the concept of the
kokutai
.” Nine months later another cabinet launched a project dear to the court group since the start of Hirohito's regency: a national movement to give instruction and guidance to the nation on the danger of antiestablishment mass movements and on “improving economic life and nurturing national power.” The propaganda campaign also sought to “clarify the
kokutai
and promote national spirit.” With these multiple goals in mind, the Ministry of Educa
tion shortly afterward issued a directive to all schools and colleges throughout the country concerning the implementation of the new thought campaign.
⁷⁰

In this way the Sh
wa monarchy became ideologically empowered through the indoctrination of the masses in the religion of Japanese spirit and deep veneration for—even worship of—the sacred ruler. It cannot be overlooked that these tendencies of Japanese nationalism emerged in the late 1920s, on the very eve of the great world economic slump, when Italian Fascism first registered itself internationally and the Nazi Party began its electoral surge in Germany. These themes and obsessions of Sh
wa nationalism at first descended mainly “from above” into mainstream culture rather than rising from the common people. As they unfolded they subverted the Meiji constitutional structure while reconnecting with Shinto orthodoxy. The popular enthusiasm engendered by war and imperialist expansion during the fourth year of Hirohito's reign added new elements and motivations from below, which further transformed the constitutional order. When Hirohito began his reign, emperor ideology was definitely eroding and had become a psychological burden. Hirohito and the court group did their utmost, from the very start, to impart a new lease on life to all the irrational beliefs associated with the throne. They actively encouraged people to look to the emperor as the source of their morality—an omnipotent ruler conjoining political and military power with religious authority.

The political activities of Hirohito and the court group relaunched the monarchy in ways that gave a more militaristic configuration to Japanese nationalism. By embellishing the Meiji past, by celebrating the personality and “virtues” of the Meiji emperor, while simultaneously exalting the Sh
wa emperor, they erected the springboard for the 1930s cult of emperor worship. Hirohito was its vehicle, and under him, with his active encouragement, the cam
paign soon took off and transformed Japanese politics, which were already becoming more pluralistic, divisive, and repressive.

Furthermore, during the very period in which political parties were rising to the apogee of their power, Hirohito's ritual enthronement and deification gave mystical intensity and strength to his double image as living diety (
arahitogami
) and supreme commander of the armed forces (
daigensui
). The powerful emotions released by these rites countered “democracy” and pacifism at home and antimilitary initiatives abroad. Only
after
Hirohito and his entourage had delivered all these blows to the Taish
democracy movement did military officers act out their dissatisfaction with party governments by resorting to aggression in Manchuria.

Whether early Sh
wa nationalism, grounded in emperor ideology and imperial myths and rituals, can properly be seen as part of a worldwide “fascist” phenomenon remains contested among historians. Deification of the national racial community through its embodiment in a cult figure was a common element. Militarism, dictatorship, and the glorification of war, as well as youth, spirit, moral regeneration, and national mission, were certainly other common elements. And while Japan was always itself and sui generis, and Hirohito was no rabble-rousing, mesmerizing, crowd-dominating Führer or Duce, neither were Germany and Italy identical ideologically or organizationally. On balance, therefore, the ideological similarities among the leading revisionist fascist states during the 1930s, the similar psychological roles played by their cult leaders, as well as their historical trajectories of late development, all seem to be more important than their obvious differences.