Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (64 page)

In terms of strategic doctrine the Kodo-ha considered the Soviet Union to be Japan's main enemy. They emphasized military and national “spirit” over material force, a principle that had become army doctrine after the Russo-Japanese War. The T
sei-ha, on the other hand, gave priority to military modernization and the establishment of a “national defense state,” a term borrowed from Nazi Germany. T
sei-ha officers were aware that modern war had become a confrontation between whole societies requiring calculations of total national power. War against both the United States and the Soviet Union would require the technological upgrading of the army and navy, the modernization of industry, and the spiritual mobilization of the entire Japanese nation.
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As the Manchurian Incident unfolded, the conflict between these two loose groupings, which differed mainly over means, not ends, intensified and became a permanent feature of Japanese politics throughout the 1930s.

I

It is fair to say that through 1931 Hirohito had less ruled than presided over his people, and that his performance had been dilatory, inconsistent, and self-contradictory. He had asserted his authority at petty moments; at more serious ones, he had caved in to insubordinate army officers. More aware of Japan's economic dependency on the West than the staff officers who had engineered the Manchurian Incident, he had worried about diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, but never once said, publicly or privately, that the Manchurian action of the army had been wrong. Instead, with excessive tolerance, he ratified each expansion of the action while pampering and refusing to punish senior officers who had committed criminal acts of insubordination. For young officers throughout the army and navy, the message went out that the emperor's main concern was success; obedience to the central command in Tokyo was secondary. Signaling to the plotters and advocates of a “Sh
wa restoration” that his priorities were not always those of his advisers, Hirohito made further acts of military insubordination more likely—a consequence he certainly did not intend.

Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned on December 11, 1931. He had failed to control the army, to contain the Depression, and, most vitally, to maintain the backing of the court group. The Manchurian Incident now entered a second stage. The court officials conferred and decided that the more chauvinistic Seiy
kai, then a minority party in both the Diet and the prefectural assemblies, should form the next cabinet. Inukai Tsuyoshi, president of the Seiy
kai, had sided with the opponents of the London Naval Treaty in 1930 and later had affirmed the legitimacy of the Manchurian Incident. He had also publicly rejected the League of Nations' recommendations on Manchuria and declared (in a phrase that recurs throughout the whole history of twentieth-century Japanese diplomacy) that Japan should “escape from the diplomacy of apology” and develop a “new, more autonomous road.”
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Aware of Inukai's indulgence of the military regarding Manchuria,
the court group instructed Saionji to discuss with him the terms of his appointment, which were to include avoidance of any radical changes in either foreign or domestic economic policy. This Saionji did, late on the afternoon of December 12, after having conferred with Makino, Suzuki, Ichiki, and the emperor. Four days later Inukai secured Hirohito's permission for a cabinet composed of discordant factions, with Mori Tsutomu as chief secretary, Lieutenant General Araki as army minister, and the more liberal Takahashi as finance minister.
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On becoming prime minister Inukai immediately ended Japan's two-year adherence to the gold-standard exchange system on which the free flow of commodities and loan capital had been based during much of the 1920s. With this action Japan joined Britain and other powers that had begun to pursue divergent—and defensive—economic recovery policies that undermined international trust. Next Inukai requested the emperor's permission to dispatch two battalions to Tientsin and a brigade to Manchuria, where since early December Kwantung Army troops had been massing for a ground assault on Chinchou. On December 23, as Hirohito was instructing Inukai, then serving as his foreign minister, “to adopt a policy of not attacking Chinchou” and “to maintain international trust,” the Kwantung Army moved on the city.
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The United States, Britain, and France warned Japan that its actions contravened the Nine-Power Treaty. On December 27 Nara noted that the emperor had again cautioned Inukai about “the impact that the Chinchou incident is having on international affairs.”
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Nevertheless the Kwantung Army proceeded to occupy Chinchou, worsening the strain in Japanese-American relations.

Once the Rising Sun Flag flew over occupied Chinchou, however, Hirohito put aside his misgivings. On January 4, 1932, he took the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Meiji's Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors to issue his own rescript calling on all military men to meditate on its meaning—in effect, a very mild admo
nition. Four days later, perhaps on the recommendation of Prince Kan'in, he issued an imperial rescript that praised the insubordinate Kwantung Army for having fought courageously in “self-defense” against Chinese “bandits” and for having “strengthened the authority of the emperor's army [
k
gun
].” Widely disseminated nationwide through the radio and the newspapers, the rescript quieted dissent and nudged people toward war.
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Needless to say it did nothing to support Inukai's efforts to restore discipline in the army.

Moreover, over the next few years Hirohito granted awards and promotions to approximately three thousand military and civil officials for meritorious service in connection with the Manchurian war and the Shanghai Incident, both of which were tremendously popular at home, and the opposite abroad. Kwantung Army Commander Honj
, Army Minister Araki, and Navy Minister Osumi Mineo were awarded the title of baron.
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Hirohito's public support of the army's campaign in Manchuria fits right in with his failure to punish them even when they disobeyed orders.

Between late January and March 1932, the Japan-China conflict spread to Shanghai, and condemnation of Japan continued to grow in the West. When a puppet Manchukuo government under Pu Yi, the last Ch'ing Dynasty emperor (from 1908 to 1912), was established, Inukai deliberately withheld recognition from the new state. Heading a divided party cabinet, he governed with the help of the privy council and relied on emergency imperial edicts and emergency financial measures that flouted the Diet's budgetary authority.
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Even after his Seiy
kai Party had won overwhelmingly in the February general election, Inukai still faced intense opposition in his efforts to maintain the status quo at home as the court had instructed him to do. Right-wing extremists and terrorists repeatedly assailed him verbally, while the leading reformer in his own party, Mori, sought to break up the party system itself and ally with the military to create a new, more authoritarian political order.