Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (89 page)

Thus for Kido, who was trusted by the military and entirely willing to ally with Germany, the problem in advising the emperor would be to get him to change his thinking slightly so that no gap developed between him and some undefined “right wing.” Or, in Kido's own words: “As with Emperor K
mei in his last years, when his entourage had completely converted to the side of the
bakufu
, something quite like that might come about. We must adopt a more understanding attitude toward the army and lead while pretending that we are being led.”
²⁸

Since 1930 Kido had served at court, where his responsibilities and influence had increased together with the military's rise to power. Having aided in the birth of the Sait
Makoto cabinet in 1932—the first step in the court's entrusting of politics to the military—Kido had drawn steadily closer to both the reform bureaucrats in different government ministries and the Control faction of the army, centered on Generals T
j
and Mut
Akira. While serving in the Hiranuma cabinet, he had found nothing at all objectionable in a military alliance with Nazi Germany. Kido had also grown frustrated with the conduct of the incumbent privy seal, Yuasa,
whom he criticized for sticking to the law on everything and not being as “advanced” as “the right wing.”
²⁹
By the time of his own appointment as privy seal, Kido knew how displeased the army had become with Prime Minister Yonai for stalling the negotiations with Germany. Last, Kido understood the sense of urgency in army and navy circles about seizing control of the British, French, and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia.
³⁰

After becoming privy seal, Kido settled into a routine of closer daily contact with Hirohito than any previous political adviser. His task was to learn the emperor's intentions while alerting him to problems that lay ahead as the nation girded itself for even greater military efforts. Kido's family background, and their long prior association from 1930 to 1938, helped to cement their relationship. So too did Hirohito's belief in the rightness of the China war and in a peaceful “southward advance.” Kido now began to move the emperor closer to those leaders in the army and navy who refused to abandon the China war and imagined they could extricate themselves from their predicament by taking advantage of the European war, in which Germany looked to be the likely winner.

At an imperial briefing on June 19, 1940, Hirohito asked Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata: “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question revealed not only that Hirohito expected an early German victory but that he had also begun to consider the possibility of deploying troops in both Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, now that the French and Dutch had been conquered by the Germans, even if the less opportunistic side of his personality recoiled at the idea of doing so.
³¹

When the problem of French Indochina arose again the next day in a conversation with Kido, the emperor revealed both his keen concern with appearances and his genuine vacillation over what to do about the undefended European colonies. Conscious of the ide
ological ideals that he, defender of the nation's moral integrity, was expected to uphold, he remarked that, historically, “there were actions such as those taken by Frederick and Napoleon.” But “our country does not want to act in such Machiavellian ways. Shouldn't we always try to bear in mind the true spirit of
hakk
ichi'u
[benevolent rule], which has been our policy since the age of the gods.”
³²
Avowing “benevolent rule” and disavowing Machiavellianism, while simultaneously sanctioning the use of poison gas against the Chinese—these contradictory acts reveal Hirohito's divided nature. Here he was telling Kido, indirectly, I am the kind of person who favors action on the basis of ideals but when tactical needs and opportunities arise—well, it can't be helped. Needless to say, Hirohito's action fit a pattern of exterminating people while enveloping oneself in moral, humanitarian rhetoric that was just as much Western as Japanese.

On July 10, when Army Minister Hata and Chief of Staff Kan'in went to Hayama to report to Hirohito on military preparations, the emperor remarked that if the latest “Paulownia peace maneuver” in China should fail, then “we will have to employ the mediation of a third country…. In the final analysis, it will have to be Germany. But if we trust them and are not careful, they might come up with unreasonable demands later on. You must act on this matter after preparing thoroughly.”
³³
Begun in Hong Kong in late December l939 by one of the army's many intelligence bureaus in China, the peace overture was targeted at T. V. Sung (Chiang Kai-shek's minister of finance) and Sung Mei-ling (Chiang's wife). When Hirohito made this remark he no longer took seriously the secret peace negotiations with Chungking, which had been discontinued and restarted. They were floundering over the stationing of Japanese troops in China, the recognition of Manchukuo, the arrangement of a truce, and the status of the client Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking.
³⁴
On the other hand he was not at all certain that Japan
could use Germany to do its bidding in China without having to pay some unacceptable price.

The next day Kido, also in Hayama, recorded the emperor's concern that the United States could easily cut off oil supplies to Japan. Forecasting that “Britain will probably reject our request for closing down the route for supplies to reach Chiang Kai-shek,” and that “we shall then be forced to occupy Hong Kong and might, ultimately, have to declare war,” the emperor observed that: “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don't you agree?” Kido reassured him by saying that the nation must “be fully resolved to resist,” to proceed cautiously, and “not [to] be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies.”
³⁵

Six days after this exchange Kido presided over a meeting at the palace with President of the Privy Council Hara Yoshimichi and five former prime ministers: Wakatsuki, Hirota, Okada, Hayashi, and Konoe. In record time (only thirty minutes) they nominated Konoe—the charismatic prince who in 1937 had enlarged the China war, then quit when the going got rough—to succeed Admiral Yonai as prime minister.
³⁶
The emperor sanctioned their candidate, and on July 17, 1940, issued the order for Konoe to form a cabinet. Thus Konoe was able to return to office because five former prime ministers agreed to his nomination, his friend Kido pushed his candidacy, and Hirohito continued to trust him.

For army minister Konoe chose the tough, fifty-five-year-old General T
j
, the leading representative of the army's hard-line, expansionist faction, a man bent on realizing the ethnocentric ideal of “direct imperial rule.” For foreign minister he chose the voluble, high-strung Matsuoka Y
suke, who was not afraid of either the emperor or the military, and with whom he shared many beliefs about the international order. Matsuoka promised to restrain the military abroad.