Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (99 page)

IV

The cabinet that General T
j
formed on October 17 was committed to keeping the emperor fully informed on all important questions while they were under study. Kaya Okinori came in as finance minister and T
g
Shigenori as foreign minister. Over the next two weeks both these men grew extremely pessimistic about the chances of success in a war with the United States, yet neither was willing to make any one-sided diplomatic concessions to secure American agreement. Nor did they, even once, openly threaten to resign and bring down the cabinet if they could not follow their convictions when it really counted.

At a marathon seventeen-hour meeting of the liaison conference on November 1, called to decide on a revised “Outline for Carrying Out the National Policies of the Empire,” T
g
tried to prolong the discussions in Washington beyond the time desired by the navy and army so as to avoid a war decision. Eventually he yielded to military pressure and the arguments of Prime Minister T
j
, who insisted that “when hardship comes, the people will gird up their loins. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, we took our stand with no prospect of victory, and that was the situation for one year from the Battle of the Yalu River. Yet we won.”
⁷⁷

T
g
responded, “Is there no way we can manage a decisive
battle in a short period of time?”
⁷⁸
But after the liaison conference adjourned, T
g
concurred with the army and navy on a cutoff date for negotiations with the United States, followed by the use of diplomatic trickery. Thereafter he repeatedly rejected Ambassador Nomura's requests to offer the Americans meaningful concessions.

On November 2 T
j
and the military chiefs, Admiral Nagano and General Sugiyama, briefed the emperor on the previously decided national policies. T
j
reported that his reexamination of eleven points, including the raw materials situation, begun on October 23, had been in vain; precious time had been lost.
⁷⁹
The emperor seemed satisfied. No doubt he felt that he had gone an extra mile. He now had his excuse for ratifying the decision to initiate war. The stipulated next step was at hand, but he needed one more detail settled. “What,” he asked T
j
, “are you going to do to provide justification [for the war]?” Intent on shielding his public image, so different from the leader his military and cabinets knew, and even more concerned with total public support for the forthcoming conflict, Hirohito ordered the loyal T
j
to devise the most plausible war rationale possible. T
j
answered, “The matter is presently being examined. I shall soon report on it.”
⁸⁰