Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (24 page)

Hitler also reorganized his forces. On 12 March Rendulic returned to Courland, and Gen. Walter Weiss assumed command of Army Group North. In order to achieve unified command in East and West Prussia, as of 13 March OKH attached Second Army (at this time isolated in the Danzig–Gdynia sector) to Weiss’s army group. Fourth Army, with the remnants
of nineteen divisions, held a front along the Haff around Heiligenbeil approximately fifty kilometers long and twenty kilometers deep.
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Vasilevskii resumed the attack against Fourth Army on 13 March. The Soviets cut the army’s link with Königsberg on the first day of the assault and began to squeeze the pocket. Hitler repeatedly refused the army’s requests to evacuate the coast, rejecting proposals for an attack to reach Königsberg or for a withdrawal across the Haff to the Nehrung. He maintained that it would be impossible to bring out the troops’ heavy equipment, a loss that he could not permit due to the current weapons shortage.
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Suddenly, on 24 March, Hitler reversed this decision and allowed Fourth Army to withdraw to the Nehrung after it evacuated its heavy equipment. The last troops crossed to the Nehrung and Pillau on 29 March.

On 6 April, the same day as the final Soviet assault on Vienna, Bagramian launched his offensive on Königsberg. The Soviets quickly broke into the city and cut the link to the Samland on 8 April. By the 9th the city’s commander, Gen. Otto Lasch, regarded the situation as hopeless and offered Fortress Königsberg’s surrender early the next morning.
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All that remained for the Soviets was to destroy German forces in the Samland. On 13 April Vasilevskii was ready, and the Russians scored a quick success in the northern part of the peninsula. By 15 April they had pushed the Germans into a small bridgehead at the base of the Pillau spit. At this point German morale began to crack. Troops of the once-vaunted 5th Panzer Division disobeyed an order to counterattack and withdrew to the coast to flee the Samland in barges. After the Russians captured Fischhausen on 16 April the Germans slowed the Soviet advance down the narrow peninsula to Pillau, only twelve kilometers long and two to five kilometers wide, until 25 April. The few surviving German troops crossed over to the Frische Nehrung.
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Here the Germans yielded ground slowly down the Nehrung in the final days of the war.

West Prussia and Pomerania

I
N THE MEANTIME
, on 21 January Hitler created a new Army Group Vistula under Himmler. Hitler charged the SS leader with closing the gap between Army Groups Center and A (on 25 January renamed, as noted above, Army Groups North and Center) and preventing the Soviets from isolating East Prussia by a thrust to the coast near Danzig. To accomplish this Himmler received the battered Ninth Army, defending the sector in front of Berlin; the equally weakened Second Army at the mouth of the Nogat and Vistula; and a newly formed Eleventh SS Panzer Army to fill the huge
void between the two. In early February Third Panzer Army’s staff, evacuated from East Prussia, joined the army group. OKH instructed Army Group Vistula to prepare an attack from the Stargard sector to smash Soviet forces advancing on the Oder and thereby eliminate the threat to Berlin. In addition, Himmler’s army group was to mount an attack to reestablish a secure land link to East Prussia.
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On 8 February Stavka instructed Rokossovskii’s Second Belorussian Front to destroy German forces in Pomerania and seize the ports of Danzig, Gdynia, and Stettin, clearing the Baltic coast to the mouth of the Oder River. Rokossovskii attacked Second Army on 10 February but his exhausted divisions, hampered by poor weather and encountering fierce resistance, made little progress, and he called off the attack on the 19th.
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The Red Army had outrun its supplies and needed time to rest and replenish its units.

Guderian recognized that despite their tremendous gains in the past weeks, the Soviets were overextended. He proposed a pincer attack from Pomerania and Silesia to cut off and eliminate Soviet spearheads, reducing the threat to Berlin. Hitler, however, decided to conduct the offensive only from Pomerania, ordering Sixth SS Panzer Army, transferred to the East after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive (the Battle of the Bulge) to Hungary instead to protect vital oilfields there. The German attack from Pomerania envisioned an assault with over a dozen divisions from Stargard to the south, to clear Soviet units north of the Warthe River and allow the Germans to maintain possession of Pomerania. This ill-conceived offensive began on 15 February and gained only a few miles of ground. Hitler canceled the attack on 21 February, but it had effectively been halted three days earlier.
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Although this offensive had utterly failed in achieving its ambitious goals, however, it gave Stalin pause.

Zhukov, First Belorussian Front’s commander, wished to make a dash for Berlin, but Stalin hesitated. Zhukov’s troops had reached a broad line along the Oder, even crossing the river in places, but Second Belorussian Front lagged behind on the Vistula, nearly a hundred miles away. Soviet intelligence reported the arrival of German reinforcements in Pomerania, poised to strike Zhukov’s open right flank. Stalin’s caution appeared justified in view of Cherniakovskii’s and Rokossovskii’s failure to eliminate Fourth and Second armies and of the German counterattack from Pomerania. Possibly recalling the Red Army’s defeat at the gates of Warsaw in 1920, Stalin ordered the drive on Berlin postponed until Zhukov secured his northern flank. The offensive in Pomerania called for Zhukov and Rokossovskii to thrust to the Baltic coast to isolate Second Army.
Rokossovskii’s goal was to reach the coast near Köslin and turn east to wipe out Second Army in the Danzig–Gdynia sector, while Zhukov drove to the sea near Kolberg and pushed Third Panzer Army back behind the Oder.
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This time the Soviet offensive proceeded according to plan. Rokossovskii attacked on 24 February, striking Army Group Vistula at the junction of Third Panzer and Second armies. Second Belorussian Front reached the Baltic north of Köslin on 3 March, isolating Second Army with approximately sixteen divisions in eastern Pomerania and West Prussia. Zhukov attacked on 1 March, much to the surprise of the Germans, who expected an assault on Berlin. Three days later Zhukov’s troops fought through to the coast near Kolberg and gained the Oder on 5 March near Cammin. Rokossovskii’s troops wheeled to the east and hurled Second Army back against the Bay of Danzig. By 25 March the Russians had splintered Second Army into three groupings: one in Danzig, another in Gdynia, and the third at the base of the Hela Peninsula.
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Gdynia fell on 28 March, its defenders fleeing to a bridgehead north of the city near Oxhöft. The Germans held the Oxhöft bridgehead until 5 April, when they were evacuated to Hela. By 30 March the Russians had driven German troops from Danzig to their last refuge at the mouth of the Vistula. The remnants of Second Army clung to this area and the Hela Peninsula until Germany’s surrender on 8 May.

Hitler, Dönitz, and Guderian

T
HE SOVIET SEIZURE
of the Baltic coast from Memel to Stettin dealt a catastrophic blow to Hitler and Dönitz. Despite the Soviet advance to the gates of Berlin, however, both Nazi leaders insisted to the very end on the defense of virtually every foot of ground along the Baltic. Both men realized that possession of Baltic ports was essential both to supply the ever-increasing number of German units isolated along the coast and to maintain domination of the Baltic itself. Moreover, Hitler contended that the presence of German fortresses in the Russians’ rear, both on the coast and in the interior, tied down vast numbers of Soviet divisions, divisions Stalin could not deploy for an attack on Berlin.

The army had no interest in defending Memel. Guderian doubted the city could be held for any length of time and indicated no desire to maintain a bridgehead there. His main concern was to obtain for his own use the two motorized divisions isolated there to defend East Prussia.
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Thus, from the beginning neither OKH nor Reinhardt considered Memel’s defense particularly advantageous, much less essential. This was not the case with
the navy. As early as September the Skl asked OKW to declare Memel a fortified site. Although Guderian claimed this was unnecessary, the navy won its case. On 22 November OKH informed Reinhardt that Memel had been declared a fortress.
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The Skl grew increasingly anxious as the Soviets drove toward the Baltic coast at the beginning of October. For about a week, from 7 to 15 October, the fate of Memel hung in the balance. The Skl did everything in its power to ensure that the garrison held on, rushing ammunition, weapons, and food to the soldiers defending Memel. Moreover, naval troops, including U-boat trainees, manned positions around the city. The navy provided the greatest assistance, however, with its warships. Heavy warships and destroyers pounded Soviet troop concentrations near Memel on 11, 12, 14, and 15 October. Fear of another Soviet attack the following week, an assault that never materialized, brought the Second Task Force back on the 23rd.
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The navy’s concern for Memel is evident in the Skl’s approval of the use of Second Task Force off Sworbe and south of Libau for the following days only if it was not needed at Memel. The Skl was willing to risk its heavy warships despite the presence of Soviet submarines, which sank two vessels near Memel on 15 October. In addition, the Luftwaffe notified the Skl that fuel shortages would reduce the amount of fighter protection to an absolute minimum. Nevertheless, when Army Group Center requested support against the anticipated Russian attack on 23 October, the Skl ordered Kummetz to send the task force even if there was no fighter escort.
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Hitler also closely followed Memel’s defense. He commanded the Skl to consider using artillery barges in the Haff to shell Soviet positions and prevent crossing attempts. On 10 December Hitler briefed Dönitz that intelligence reports indicated the Soviets had withdrawn troops from Courland to the Memel front. He instructed Dönitz that if the Russians launched a major offensive against the city, the navy was to commit everything it had to support the defense. In reply, Dönitz emphasized the navy’s great concern for Memel, the loss of which would further endanger naval bases, training areas, and convoy routes.
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The Skl instructed Kummetz to utilize the current lull to make all necessary preparations for action off Memel, insisting that warships be ready to support the army there at any time. Mines posed the greatest challenge to Kummetz. At the end of December he complained that he had no forces available to clear mines from predetermined bombardment positions off Memel. The Skl declared that this was intolerable and ordered the mines swept from the area at once.
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The subject of clearing mines and readying warships for action off Memel arose frequently in the days prior to the anticipated Soviet offensive,
emphasizing the importance of retaining Memel to the Skl. Furthermore, a former regimental commander of the 58th Infantry Division maintains that during the first weeks of January 1945, vessels brought enough additional provisions to Memel to lay in a two-month supply.
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Dönitz obviously had no intention of abandoning Memel, but the Soviet January offensive threatened to wreck all of Dönitz’s plans in the Baltic. As early as 14 January the Skl instructed Kummetz to take precautionary measures to evacuate East Prussian ports. On 18 January Dönitz considered giving all superfluous naval personnel to the army in hopes of stemming the Soviet advance, and he ordered the navy’s two remaining pocket battleships,
Admiral Scheer
and
Lützow,
and the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen
readied to sail upon three hours’ notice. The following day, with the Soviets driving on the Baltic coast to cut off East Prussia, Dönitz informed Hitler that the loss of East and West Prussia would mean an end to the U-boat war. Hitler agreed that these areas were of decisive importance, and after the conference Dönitz discussed this matter with Jodl.
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The 23rd of January 1945 was a dark day for the German Navy. OKH’s naval liaison officer alerted the navy to prepare to supply Reinhardt’s army group by sea. Assuming a daily requirement of two thousand tons, the Skl gloomily observed that it would have to withdraw additional shipping from Norway. Kummetz also learned that lack of fuel would soon immobilize the
Admiral Scheer
and
Lützow.
Despite all this, the Skl reaffirmed its operational intention to hold major ports at all costs.
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In the next week, with East Prussia’s isolation a reality, the Skl ordered a destroyer flotilla and a minesweeping flotilla from Norway to the Baltic.
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The Nazi leadership considered possession of Königsberg of the utmost importance. On 22 January Guderian complained that Königsberg’s garrison was too weak and commanded Reinhardt to withdraw Volkssturm units from areas near the front, or even from the front itself, to reinforce the city. Though most army commanders regarded the fighting value of Volkssturm units as negligible, one of their primary combat roles was to hold key points behind the front in the event of an enemy breakthrough until regular army units arrived to take over the defense. The Skl deemed possession of the port of Pillau essential to holding Königsberg, and at the navy’s request Guderian declared Pillau a fortress.
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Only when Hitler believed that Königsberg was in danger did he order the evacuation of Memel. He instructed Dönitz to evacuate the city as quickly as possible and commanded the navy to support the withdrawal with its warships. On 26 January Hitler ordered Rendulic to accelerate Memel’s evacuation to obtain troops to prevent a Soviet breakthrough at Königsberg. Hitler asserted that Army
Group North’s most vital task was to protect Königsberg and Pillau, because possession of these ports was necessary to continuing the fight in East Prussia. In comparison, regaining land contact with Army Group Vistula was of secondary importance.
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