Every Dutch adult was required to carry Lentz' personal identification card. But a feature was added that only affected Jews. Eventually the letter
J
was stamped on every identification card carried by those defined as Jewish. The manual card file receipts became the first stepping-stone toward comprehensive automated Dutch Jewish registration.
52
On October 22, all Jewish enterprises were compelled to register. Jews were defined, as in the Nuremberg Laws, according to their grandparents, not their current religious affiliation. Businesses were deemed Jewish if any member of the ownership or management was Jewish or had Jewish ancestors, again mimicking the decrees espoused earlier in the Reich. A Bureau of Economic Investigation was formed to decide whether suspect companies were actually Jewish under rigid ancestral definitions. As soon as German civil authorities in Holland announced the Jewish commercial registration, the nation erupted in protest. Virtually all Protestant churches, that next Sunday, condemned from the pulpit a Jewish registration they called "un-Christian."
53
By early 1941, the Germans felt they were ready to begin the last phase before deportation. On January 10, 1941, Nazi State Secretary Friedrich Wimmer issued the all-important decree VO6/41 requiring all Jews—Dutch and foreign—to register at their local Census Office. Wimmer's deadline was four weeks for those residing outside of Amsterdam and ten weeks for Amsterdam residents. Since the 1930 census, Dutch Census Offices were completely automated with Hollerith systems. By comparing the Jewish registrations to the existing total population card index created by the Lentz card, the authorities could pinpoint any Jew who failed to sign up.
54
Although nearly all of Holland angrily condemned the Nazi registration, the Jews did as instructed. With few exceptions, every Dutch Jewish family dutifully picked up its questionnaires, filled them out completely, and filed with the nearest registration office. The uncanny compliance was based on traditional Dutch respect for laws and regulations, as well as the stated penalty for not registering—five years in prison and the confiscation of property. Jews also understood that resistance was futile because their names had already long been innocently registered as "Jewish" in numerous statistical and registration bureaus throughout the Netherlands, and especially in the new card indices created by Lentz' personal identification program. Even though some Jews rioted in early February 1941, the entire community nonetheless filled out the forms as required. More than 157,000 questionnaires were ultimately returned in the first months—more than the entire Jewish community because many sympathetic Dutchmen actually volunteered to register alongside their Jewish countrymen. Lentz' punching cadres began converting the Jews to Hollerith records as quickly as possible.
55
But none of it was fast enough for the Nazis. There were many delays. Although decree VO6/41 was espoused on January 10, 1941, German administrators did not release it to the media until January 14, when the news was published around the world, including in the
New York Times.
Because the registration ruling did not become effective until January 24, the official Dutch government gazette did not publish the details for census administrators until its February 3 issue. Hence local Census Offices across the country lost time in setting up registration facilities. Nonetheless, the offices remained open all day and night to speed the process. Each day, thousands of Dutch Jews marched into the local Census Office, paid a token guilder, and filled out the elaborate questionnaires providing the Germans with everything they needed to know about their possessions, families, and parentage.
56
The German authorities at first praised the Census Office for "exemplary" service. But as Wimmer's early April deadline approached and the tallies were far from complete, Lentz' organization was challenged and rebuked for tardiness. The Germans even suggested some localities were sabotaging the program.
57
Nazi administrators feared sabotage for good reason. Outraged Amsterdam workers had spontaneously called a strike, in large part over repressive measures. Nazi occupiers suppressed the defiance by throwing hand grenades and firing machine guns at crowds of protesters. Violent reprisals followed. The city of Amsterdam itself was fined 15 million guilders for the strike.
58
But Lentz bristled at any suggestion his operation was doing less than its best. As Inspector of the Population Registries, he defended his national operation down to the local office. On March 25, he bluntly wrote Wimmer, "The government Inspectorate has thus far received approximately 30,000 registrations from the local registration posts. . . . the delay in registration is definitely not based on registration posts not willing to cooperate, or any sabotage, but on the circumstances, that the employees of the registration posts have been overburdened (specifically caused by the identification card decree); and on top of that, we just could not appoint key, reliable employees. The delay is also caused by the great number of dubious cases and interrogations." Acknowledging that more than a quarter million names were expected, Lentz assured, "I have ordered a circular letter by the Ministry of the Interior to the local registration posts, in which I have again asked for the greatest haste."
59
Part of Wimmer's problem was that the Nazis simply could not take a Jewish census in Holland. A traditional census or population count required an army of enumerators visiting every citizen's home, diligently filling out forms. German administrators could not find reliable census takers to serve among the outraged masses. A registration, on the other hand, depended upon Jewish subjects voluntarily walking into the Census Office to fill out forms. That process was impeded by the general day-to-day reluctance that gripped Dutch Jewry, overcome only incrementally by each Jewish family. Moreover, a storm of venomous attacks in the popular underground media of Amsterdam made even the staffers of local Census Offices queasy.
60
Two weeks later, on April 9, Lentz was still offering the Germans excuses for the slow progress, explaining that many local burgomasters had not yet read the government gazette, which came out in February.
61
Of 1,050 municipalities outside Amsterdam, he reported, 1,019 had already completed their registration. As an example of local difficulties, he cited the town of Apeldoorn's "difficulty registering the inmates of the local Jewish insane asylum." The poor inmates could not provide cogent responses. But by May 5, most burgomasters had completed their registration. For many, the task was easy; some 483 localities had not a single Jew to report.
62
By mid-May, Wimmer's office was beginning to understand that the constellation of overlapping local registrations in Holland fell short of what the Nazi program of destruction needed. Lentz' numerous Census Offices lacked the coordinated ability to identify, cross-index, and organize Jewish names nationally. Only a centralized Hollerith operation could do that. Moreover, Wimmer wanted the Jews alphabetized. Without alphabetizing, an organized step-by-step round-up and deportation to camps could not occur.
On May 19, 1941, Wimmer decided "that besides the registers that have been constructed so far, a special alphabetical register should be made, that [lists] all Jews and Jews of mixed blood, who are and have been reported after decree 6/41." This extra dimension would have tasked Lentz' overworked operation. To date, Lentz' bureaus had not even turned in reports on the first 78,119 questionnaires filed. While the Germans wanted to press Lentz to the maximum, they didn't want to pressure him too much.
63
So some days later, Lentz was notified, quite carefully, by Hans Calmeyer, Wimmer's chief expert on Jewish affairs. "Dr. Wimmer would like to see constructed a register like the Hollerith punch card system," wrote Calmeyer. "The register must [contain] age, profession, and gender . . . [and] the category (Jew, Mixed I, Mixed II) to which the registered belongs. I don't deny that the compilation of such a register would form a serious burden for the Population Registries. However, without such an alphabetic register alongside the register on identity cards, and besides the already existing registers on municipalities, the [Jewish] registration just won't be sufficient.
64
"You will soon have to be prepared for many . . . requests about information on individuals," Calmeyer continued. "These requests won't be able to name the last residence of the requested person in every case. Such requests will form an extraordinary workload for your office if the aforementioned alphabetical register is not compiled, because thus far, the requests can only be answered after searching through all municipal registers. Of course, the municipal registers should not be neglected. . . . Pray, also let me know what kind of punch card system you think most efficient and most easily introduced." Calmeyer ended his note asking how long Lentz would need to complete the alphabetical register.
65
Lentz was ahead of Wimmer and Calmeyer. With barely suppressed braggadocio, Lentz replied the next day, "With much interest I have taken notice of your letter of 26th of May 1941, in which you informed me of the wishes of Sir Secretary of State Dr. Wimmer concerning the making of [another] punch card system. I am glad to inform you that the Inspectorate has already been creating such a system according to the Hollerith method for several weeks."
66
Two months earlier, Lentz had requested permission from the Interior Ministry to rent an extra Hollerith from the local IBM subsidiary. His expense request was approved on April 23 and he was waiting for the equipment. But as soon as the approval was granted, he began to advance work. "I immediately commenced the execution of the plan," Lentz informed Calmeyer. "We have already made much progress with the so-called 'coding' of the data and the punching is almost ready too, thanks to the co-operation of another government department. I add a model of the punch card for your information. The machinery has not arrived yet, but measures have been taken, so that this will soon become available."
67
There was a major problem, though, confessed Lentz. His entire program was based on numerical identification of individuals, not alphabetical. He emphasized to Calmeyer, "the [new] Hollerith punch card system is not suited for functioning as an alphabetical register since the cards are not punched by name, but by number. Punching alphabetically is possible, but there are so many technical difficulties connected with it." As a result, Lentz declared he would regretfully bypass all other projects and concentrate on the alphabetizing. "I will now have an alphabetical register made that will contain the names of all Jews and
Mischlinge
[people of mixed blood] who have reported for registering."
68
To further reduce delays, Lentz declared he would split the task into two: those Jews in Amsterdam and those outside the city. Since the areas outside Amsterdam were already complete, Lentz promised that list first. "This part will be ready about mid-June." If on the other hand, Wimmer and Calmeyer preferred Amsterdam first, Lentz could deliver that list just slightly later. "If you would like to have the names of the registered people in Amsterdam put into the alphabetical register as well," he stated, "then I would be able to have that completed by the end of June or in the beginning of July."
69
On May 30, 1941, a German civil occupation official summarized the on-going overlapping Hollerith projects to Wimmer and the many technical obstacles. "Besides the already constructed and to be constructed registers," the report described "a special alphabetical register, possibly with the Hollerith punch card-system, for all people who have to report." But the punch cards for the new alphabetical file could not be printed without a careful design of data. So, the official added, his office would first have to determine exactly which punch card columns needed to be allocated to yield the desired data.
70
This was a question only Hollerith engineers could answer. Only IBM could print the cards.
"The Central Register has already requested the material and the machines for the construction of the Hollerith system," the official continued. Repeating Lentz' warning, he told Wimmer, "The Central Register, however, points out that the [existing] Hollerith punch card system, which currently assigns a number to every processed form and registered person, is not appropriate for the compilation of an alphabetic register. The alphabetic punching is connected to so many technical difficulties that a [quick] change of the system towards alphabetic processing seems just not possible in practice."
71
"I don't deny," the report continued, "that this [additional] processing of persons who are obligated to report from Amsterdam (over 85,000 persons), will greatly increase the workload of the Central Office, and it will also delay the completion of the special registers."
72
But for Wimmer, no time could be wasted. He ordered all alphabetizing projects to go forward at full speed, regardless of the difficulty. That was the priority. Lentz' devoted efforts prevailed. By June 14, 1941, Wimmer's office had received ten copies of a completed preliminary survey "of all persons of Jewish blood." The alphabetical index would be ready shortly. "Very soon," the report to Wimmer promised, "we shall be able to start categorizing certain groups through the Hollerith method." Now that the Jews were almost entirely alphabetized, demographic segments could be cross-indexed, sorted, and then called up by age, gender, and profession, all in alphabetical order.
73