Ike's Spies (8 page)

Eisenhower began to realize how far out he had stuck his neck. He had made a political blunder or—more correctly—was being made the victim of one. He had no power base of his own, he was unknown, he had won no great victories, he was expendable. At a critical moment in his career, his head was on the block.

Ike defended himself in a series of brilliantly written and argued messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt, and Churchill. (To Churchill: “Please be assured that I have too often listened to your sage advice to be completely handcuffed and blindfolded by all of the slickers with which this part of the world is so thickly populated.”)
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His principal justification was military expendiency; as Funk notes, this turned Clausewitz on his head by “insisting that military achievement be sought at the expense of diplomatic disaster.”
¹³
Another of Ike's justifications was to put the blame on his intelligence service (although he never blamed Murphy); to the Combined Chiefs he declared, “The actual state of existing sentiment here does not repeat not agree even remotely with some of our prior calculations.”
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The military case was indeed a strong one, but it would have been much stronger if Ike had immediately captured Tunisia and if the French fleet had rallied to Darlan. Because neither happened, it was hard to see exactly what benefits the Allies had received from dealing with Darlan.
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Making matters worse, one of the chief radio stations broadcasting from North Africa to the Allied world, Radio Maroc, had fallen into the hands of some of Colonel Donovan's
OSS
agents. These agents, according to Ike's younger brother Milton, were “idealistic New Dealers.” They broadcast critical news stories on the Darlan Deal, stories that emphasized the point that the coming of the Allies had made no difference in day-to-day life, as Vichy officials continued to run a fascist state in North Africa.
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At this point, Roosevelt must have been tempted to fire Eisenhower, repudiate the Darlan Deal, put a soldier like Juin or Giraud in Darlan's place, and make a fresh start on creating an intelligence establishment for the United States. Churchill had fired a string of generals in Egypt and now looked like a genius for having done so, as Montgomery had just won the Battle of El Alamein. But FDR did have a sense of fair play and he knew perfectly well that, in dealing with Darlan, Ike had stayed well within his orders.

In addition, three men, representing three levels of the American Government, came to Ike's defense. One was a senior official and elder statesman, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Another was the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall. The third was a young, up-and-coming bureaucrat, formerly assistant to Henry Wallace in the Department of Agriculture, currently Elmer Davis' number two man in the Office of War Information, Milton Eisenhower. What these three men, so far apart in age and experience, had in common was the President's trust. FDR had a long and deep relationship with all three men and he believed what they told him, and in Roosevelt's administration—as in all others—personal relationships were often crucial.

Secretary Stimson barged into the White House and flatly told Roosevelt that he, as President, absolutely had to speak out in Eisenhower's defense. Marshall too insisted that Roosevelt had to defend Ike. Marshall also tried to get the press to soften its criticism. At a press conference, he pointed out that the Americans suffered 1,800 killed in action in taking North Africa, although planning estimates had been that the losses would be around 18,000. Marshall claimed that the figures showed the Darlan Deal had saved 16,200 American lives.
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Marshall told Roosevelt that criticism of Ike played into the hands of the British, who would demand Ike's replacement by a British general, and American leadership of an Allied expedition would have such a black eye that there would be great difficulty getting an American into such an exalted position again. Marshall thought that Eisenhower, if successful, would put the United States into a position of world prestige beyond anything Roosevelt had ever imagined.
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Roosevelt was impressed by Marshall's arguments. He called in
Milton and asked a series of questions about Ike's politics. Reassured that Eisenhower was comfortably in the middle of the American road and certainly no fascist, FDR then asked Milton to draft a presidential statement accepting the Darlan Deal but emphasizing that it was temporary in nature and undertaken only for military expediency. Milton did as directed, brought back the draft for Roosevelt's approval, and then watched “with some pain as FDR added the word ‘temporary' about six more times, which plus my four made ten times the word was used.”
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The most immediate result of Roosevelt's statement was a note from Darlan to Clark. The tiny admiral was hurt. Mustering what dignity he could, he declared, “Information coming from various parts tends to give credit to the opinion that I am but a lemon which the Americans will drop after it is crushed.”
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Roosevelt, meanwhile, had sent Milton Eisenhower over to North Africa to take control of Radio Maroc (which he quickly did) and to do what he could to bolster Ike's reputation (which he tried but without much luck). Milton met with Darlan, who used the same analogy with him, saying, “I know I am but a lemon which you intend to use and then toss aside.”
¹⁹
Murphy records that Milton, furious that some newspaper and radio commentators were still calling his brother a fascist, said that “unless drastic action were taken immediately, the General's career might be irreparably damaged. ‘Heads must roll, Murphy!' he exclaimed. ‘Heads must roll!' ”
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Despite Milton's best efforts, and despite Roosevelt's and Churchill's endorsement, the Darlan Deal continued to stink. Pro-Allied French officers who had conspired with Murphy and Eddy were either in hiding or in jail, while the Vichy officials who had caused so much American bloodshed remained in power. Ike tried to put pressure on Darlan to liberalize his administration, asking that he at least give back to the Jews the rights of citizenship, but Darlan moved slowly. He told Ike progress would be difficult “because of the anti-Semitism of the Arabs,” which may have been the first and only time during the French occupation of Algeria that the French took Arab sentiment into account.
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Like Diem in Saigon in the early sixties, Darlan in Algiers in late 1942 had become an acute embarrassment for the Americans.

For Ike, it was terribly frustrating. He wanted to be fighting Germans in Tunisia, not up to his neck in politics in Algiers. Nor did he enjoy being a target of criticism. “I have been called a Fascist
and almost a Hitlerite,” he complained to his son John, then a cadet at West Point. Ike told his son that it was in fact his most earnest conviction that “no other war in history has so definitely lined up the forces of arbitrary oppression and dictatorship against those of human rights and individual liberty.”
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To his British political adviser, Harold Macmillan, he confessed, “I can't understand why these long-haired, starry-eyed guys keep gunning for me. I'm no reactionary. Christ on the mountain! I'm as idealistic as Hell.”
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It was true, however, that only American and British arms—commanded by Eisenhower—kept Darlan in power. The admiral had no political base, no support. The Germans had occupied all of France, ending whatever pretensions Vichy had as an independent, legitimate government. Vichy officials in North Africa, led by Darlan, stood revealed as opportunists who would collaborate with whatever side seemed to be winning the war. It was an inherently unstable, dangerous situation.

Especially for Darlan, who had an impressive list of enemies. The Germans wanted him dead because he had double-crossed them. Marshal Pétain and his gang at Vichy felt the same way. De Gaulle and the Free French needed to remove Darlan in order to make way for a new regime in Algiers. The British had always hated Darlan and now held him responsible for the fact that the French fleet was at the bottom of Toulon Harbor instead of sailing beside the Allied navies. The Americans, terribly embarrassed by the Darlan Deal, were anxiously looking for a way out.

Dubreuil and Henri d'Astier, meanwhile, were dismayed at the way things had turned out. They had expected Murphy and Ike to put Giraud in command, and they had been confident they could control the politically innocent Giraud. Having hoped to become the real authorities in North Africa, Dubreuil found himself completely excluded from Darlan's government while d'Astier was chief of police for Algiers only.

In sum, potential assassins were lining up to get at Darlan. Algiers murmured with intrigue. Darlan was aware of the activity; at one point in mid-December he told Murphy, “You know, there are four plots in existence to assassinate me.”
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One of those plots involved men who were directly or indirectly associated with the
OSS
. Colonel Edmond Taylor of the
OSS
, a Chicago journalist before the war, headed a small group of American officials attached to the Anglo-American Psychological Warfare
Branch (
PWB
), which was in theory a staff section of Eisenhower's headquarters. But
OSS
station chiefs, like their
CIA
successors, were inclined to independent action based on their own perception of the situation. Ike's policy was clear—to cooperate with Darlan—but Taylor and his
PWB
officers rejected it. The
PWB
became a haven for American critics of the Darlan Deal, and Taylor sought out anti-Vichy Frenchmen to assure them that not all Americans had abandoned them,
PWB
officers also acted on their own to arrest, without warrants, in the best “Chicago gangster style,” fascist politicians and pro-Nazi journalists. The French authorities protested vigorously, and Eisenhower later remarked that the
PWB
had given him more trouble than all the Germans in Africa.
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PWB
became a rallying point for anti-Darlan Frenchmen, which gave Taylor an excellent listening post on attempted coups or assassinations. In mid-December, Taylor told Murphy that his information was that Henri d'Astier was involved in a conspiracy to replace Darlan with the Comte de Paris as head of a new French provisional government, with Dubreuil as finance minister. Taylor's informants noted that the Comte de Paris had recently arrived in Algiers, and said that d'Astier might well try an armed coup d'etat. Murphy, according to Taylor, was unconcerned; in fact, Murphy had played a role in persuading Darlan to appoint d'Astier as chief of police in Algiers, which put d'Astier in the perfect position to execute a plot.
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D'Astier's young men of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse were meanwhile seeking an opportunity to strike a blow. They had been humiliated on the night of the invasion, when the regular French Army had disarmed them as if they were children. They burned for revenge. They were political innocents, representing every point of view, from Communist sympathizers to royalists supporting the Comte de Paris, but they were united in their fervent patriotism and their hatred of Darlan, who had sullied the honor of France.

Many of these youths had joined the Corps Franc d'Afrique, a new commando unit formed under the direction of
OSS
Arab specialist and Harvard anthropologist Major Carleton Coon. One such recruit was Roger Rosfelder, and he provides a good example of how d'Astier could confuse and manipulate his youngsters. An impetuous eighteen years of age, Rosfelder was ready to act, not think. D'Astier told him that, after Darlan's removal, the Comte de
Paris would become King of France, and that he would then call on de Gaulle to form a government. Rosfelder objected, said he was no royalist, but finally agreed to help remove Darlan. His attitude, he later declared, was: “First of all, there is a traitor to be executed and that is the important thing. The political calculations are beyond me.”

In Rosfelder's account, which he wrote in 1972, he stated that “Mario Faivre and I propose some projects for Darlan's execution. My plan is finally retained.… [It was to] form a barrage with two cars; Darlan's car is stopped. I approach and empty my Sten at him. I abandon the Sten (I am covered by another gun) and regain the Boulevard where another car takes me to the Special Detachment of the Corps Franc where I have several witnesses who will recognize that I had spent the day with them.”

Fortunately for Rosfelder, older heads decided against his indulging his passion for a blaze of machine-gun fire and vetoed his plan. The Abbé Cordier, d'Astier's associate, told Rosfelder that Bonnier de la Chapelle had been selected to execute Darlan, directly and alone, in the Summer Palace in Algiers.
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On December 23, Rosfelder took Bonnier to meet Abbé Cordier at the Church of St. Augustine. The priest heard Bonnier's confession, gave him absolution, and then and there, in the confessional, turned over Henri d'Astier's two dueling pistols.

The following day, Christmas Eve, Rosfelder, Faivre, and Henri d'Astier's son Jean drove Bonnier to the Summer Palace. As Bonnier—dressed all in black—got out of the car (with a new pistol belonging to Faivre, as the dueling pistols did not work), he gave Rosfelder his identity papers and a photo of himself. “You will give them back to me afterward,” he said. “If not, you will burn them!” Bonnier was convinced, Rosfelder recorded, that there was no risk. Both d'Astier, the chief of police, and Abbé Cordier, his priest, had told him, “Don't worry, everything is accounted for.”
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After all, when one has the chief of police's own pistols, one has a certain confidence.