DNI McConnell’s relationship with the Bush administration came into question in August 2007, during his negotiations with Congress over a revision of the law controlling wire taps. This issue first arose when it was revealed in December 2005 that the Bush administration had been authorizing wire taps, which are permitted under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), without going to the special court set up under FISA to approve warrants. The administration had argued that this process was too time consuming. There was also the perception that the legal requirement for a court order (i.e., probable cause) might not be met in cases where there was “reasonable suspicion” and that waiting for probable cause might give suspected terrorists too much time to plan and perhaps act. (See chap. 12 for an in-depth discussion of this issue.) As both the president’s senior intelligence adviser and as a former director of NSA, McConnell was ideally suited to explain and to advocate the need for changes in the FISA law. According to some members of the House, McConnell reached an agreement with them but then insisted on different terms after the administration objected. Some members felt that McConnell had strayed into partisanship and argued that McConnell acted more as an advocate than as an expert.
The boundaries between expertise and advocacy or what constitutes partisan behavior remain vague. The DNI, like the DCI, serves at the pleasure of the president. Beyond the vague requirement of “extensive national security experience,” there are no professional qualifications given in the law for a candidate to become the DNI. Very few past DCIs were professional intelligence officers (Richard Helms, William Colby, Robert Gates). Some of the others had past intelligence experience (Allen Dulles, William Casey, George Tenet). All DCIs were chosen for a variety of political reasons. The same is true of the DNI. McConnell is a professional intelligence officer, but his predecessor, Negroponte, is a career diplomat. If a DNI is uncomfortable with a position taken by the administration or with a position that an administration advocates, the DNI can always resign. But the DNI cannot operate entirely independently of the administration. Indeed, DCIs who have found themselves at odds with administration policy end up being ignored. But if a DNI feels strongly about some proposal, then the DNI is going to do more than explain why it is necessary. The DNI is likely to advocate for or against a proposal, depending on the issue. This already occurs in certain areas, such as the budget. DCIs and DNIs do not just present a budget to Congress. They advocate overall amounts and argue for or against specific programs. The fact that the DNI has control over few analytical components (essentially the NIC and the NCTC) means that the DNI, or the DNI staff, will have to spend a great deal of time trying to keep track of analytic activities across the sixteen intelligence agencies. It also means that the DNI will have a relatively weak institutional base. Several of the heads of intelligence agencies will be rivals for the DNI as they will have greater insight into and control over activities that are of concern to policy makers. It also places the DNI in a somewhat anomalous position. The DNI is the senior intelligence adviser to the president but is relying on analysis controlled and produced by subordinates, given the DNI controls so few analysts.
To make the appointment a more professional and less political one, suggestions were made in the past that the DCI, like the director of the FBI, be subject to a fixed term of office. (The FBI director serves for ten years.) Politicization of intelligence appointments was possible in the past but did not become a reality until 1977, when incoming president Jimmy Carter asked for the resignation of DCI George Bush (1976-1977). Bush became the first DCI who was asked to resign because of a change in the party controlling the White House. This partisan turnover then became the practice for DCIs when partisan control of the White House shifted, until President George W. Bush asked DCI Tenet to stay on in 2001.
Another argument in favor of a tixed term is that it would allow DCls to serve under presidents who had not appointed them, thus increasing the chances for objectivity. The main argument against it, and one that was voiced by several former DCIs, goes back to the personal nature of the relationship between the DCI and the president. The concern is that, under a fixed DCI term that overlaps the cycle of elections, the president would inherit a DCI not of his or her choosing and with whom there would be no rapport, thus increasing the likelihood that the DCI’s access would diminish. Moreover, the DCI and the director of the FBI did not hold comparable positions, a disparity that continued under the DNI. The DNI is responsible for the entire intelligence community, whereas the director of the FBI runs an agency within an executive department (Justice). The strained relations between FBI director Louis J. Freeh and both Attorney General Janet Reno and President Clinton during the latter part of the Clinton administration underscore the problems that can arise with a fixed term. The 2004 intelligence act did not set a fixed term for the DNI, who continues to serve at the pleasure of the president. The selection of Ambassador Negroponte as the first DNI also established the precedent that the DNI need not be a professional intelligence officer. This was also true of the DCI position. Of the nineteen DCIs, three were career intelligence officers: Richard Helms (1966-1973); William Colby (1973-1976); and Robert Gates (1991-1993). A fourth, Allen Dulles (1953-1961), had wartime intelligence experience in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
The relationship of the DNI with the CIA remains crucial. The CIA has lost status within the intelligence community in recent years. However, it has retained several key roles, including all-source analysis, HUMINT, intelligence operations, and foreign liaison. Former DCIs William H. Webster (1987-1991) and Tenet argued that the DNI cannot be effective without control over these activities, but those in favor of the new law were adamant about keeping the DNI separate from any agency. Thus, tension likely will arise between the DNI and the DCIA as the DNI seeks insight into CIA activities for which the DNI is ultimately responsible. To what degree will the DNI have insight into and oversight of covert actions, one of the most important and risky activities undertaken by intelligence agencies?
Many observers wondered if the DNI would control the morning presidential briefing, which is central to the DNI’s access to the president. The issue was settled when White House chief of staff Andrew Card announced that the DNI would be responsible for the president’s daily brief (PDB). This still left open the question of who the DNI would rely upon to prepare the PDB. This was settled when the PDB was given over to the new deputy DNI for analysis. The PDB is now much more of a community product rather than an exclusively CIA product. As important as the PDB is in terms of the DNI’s relationship with the president, it also consumes a great deal of the DNI’s time six days a week, in terms of preparation, the actual briefing itself, and travel time to get to wherever the president is.
Similarly, senior CIA officers and analysts have usually provided the intelligence support for the
Principals Committee
(PC) and
Deputies Committee
(DC) of the NSC. The PC is the senior policy coordinating body of the NSC structure, consisting of the assistant to the president for national security affairs, sometimes the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the DNI, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other cabinet officials (secretaries of Homeland Security, Energy, and so on) attend as necessary. The DC is made up of the deputies of the PC members and has a similar function, working on issues before the PC considers them. This intelligence function is important not only for its role in supporting policy but also for the insights it gives to intelligence officials about the possible courses of policy being considered. Such support requires substantive knowledge of the issues being discussed. The DNI or the principal deputy DNI is the intelligence participant at PCs and DCs. They now rely primarily on national intelligence officers for analytic support. A great deal of this work involves the coordination of papers and the assembling of briefing books. It is a necessary activity but perhaps not one that should be carried out by the NIC, whose primary job is to prepare NIEs. Under the DCIs, this role was carried out by support staff in the CIA. Some have suggested that, over time, the DNI’s reliance on the CIA’s DI may create pressure to shift the DI from CIA to the DNI. This would be a major change, which would mirror the British structure.
Much depends on how DNIs choose to define their role. As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out (
Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11,
2005), the DNI can function as the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief operating officer (COO) of the intelligence community. The CEO function will keep the DNI at a higher, community level. The COO function will get the DNI more involved in details. The preliminary indicators are that the DNI is being forced into the chief operating function by virtue of such daily demands as the PDB, PCs, and DCs.
Negroponte functioned like a CEO. McConnell appears to have a more direct approach. The DNI’s relationship with the director of the NCTC is also important. The director of the NCTC has almost autonomous status. This director is appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and serves as the principal adviser to the DNI on analysis and operations related to terrorism and counterterrorism. Under the mission manager system now being used for key issues, and first recommended in 2005 by the WMD Commission (formally the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction), the director of the NCTC is the mission manager for terrorism intelligence. Given the primacy of terrorism as a national security issue, the director of NCTC is likely to enjoy a fair amount of access to senior officials, including the president, thus creating the potential for rivalry with the DNI. The 2004 law is specific in stating that the director of NCTC reports directly to the president on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations.
The secretary of state is the chief foreign policy officer below the president; intelligence under the DNI is widely viewed as an arm of foreign policy. At least two issues are important in the relationship between the secretary of state and the DNI: coordinating proposed intelligence operations with foreign policy goals and using the State Department (that is, the Foreign Service) as cover for clandestine intelligence officers overseas. Inevitably, tension arises between the bureaucracies under these two officials. Using the State Department for cover could prove to be a source of concern between the secretary of state and the DCIA. Few DCIs and secretaries of state have the warm relationship that Allen Dulles (DCI, 1953-1961) and his brother John Foster Dulles (secretary of state, 1953- 1959) enjoyed. At best, the relationship usually has a slight edge; at worst, it is outright competitive.
Overseas, a long tradition of tension has been evident between U.S. ambassadors and their senior CIA officers, usually called the chief of station (COS). The ambassador is in charge of the entire country team—all U.S. personnel assigned to the embassy, regardless of their parent organizations. (Larger country teams may have representatives from State, CIA, DOD, justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture.) But COSs have not always kept the ambassador—whether career Foreign Service or political appointee—apprised of their intelligence activities. Despite repeated efforts to address this problem, it still occurs. In addition, several new issues have arisen. The first is who does the COS represent? In theory, the COS is now the representative of the DNI. But, given the DCIA’s continued responsibility for HUMINT, intelligence operations, and foreign liaison, it is also obvious that the stations are a key component of the DCIA’s activities. Moreover, the COSs look to the DCIA for their promotions, evaluations, assignments, and so forth. Thus, they will continue to think of the CIA as their home. Tension between the DNI and the DCIA over control of HUMINT and covert action could make the stations even less willing to share information with ambassadors as yet another way of keeping it from the DNI.
On a day-to-day basis, the secretary of defense controls more of the intelligence community (NSA, DIA, NGA, and the service intelligence units) than does the DNI (NIC, NCTC, NCPC, NCIX). The secretary of defense also represents the vast majority of the intelligence client base, because of the broad range of defense intelligence requirements. Moreover, the intelligence budget is hidden within the defense budget and, in many ways, is beholden to it. Therefore, the relationship between the secretary of defense and the DNI is vital. No matter how collegial the relationship may appear, it is not one of equals. The outcome of the debate over the intelligence budget in the 2004 intelligence act underscores the political clout of the secretary of defense in Congress. It is not clear if the DNI will be stronger or weaker than was the DCI in relationship to the secretary of defense. On the one hand, the DNI lacks the institutional base that the DCI could fall back on—the CIA. On the other hand, the DNI has a large staff and enough authority in law that, if exercised properly, could give the DNI a more equal relationship with DOD. DNI Negroponte faced an aggressive secretary of defense and undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Donald Rumsfeld and Stephen Cambone, respectively. Many of their intelligence initiatives appeared to aim at creating separate intelligence capabilities under DOD. The advent of Robert Gates as secretary of defense was a significant change, as he brought his own background as a DCI, when he also faced a formidable secretary of defense, Richard Cheney. Early in his tenure at the Pentagon, Gates signaled that he would scale back some of the previous team’s intelligence initiatives. The new USDI, James Clapper—who had run afoul of Rumsfeld and Cambone during Clapper’s tenure as director of NGA—also signaled a more cooperative approach to the DNI, as discussed below.